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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is an examination of the rise and fracturing of Kurdish 
nationalism and territoriality in the context of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 
division of the defeated Ottoman Empire, and of the ensuing British and Turkish 
policies toward the Kurds. The regions of interest in this research are 
southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq, the former lands of the Ottoman Empire 
set aside by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres for the creation of an independent 
Kurdistan. The main theoretical aspects of this study pertain to the rise of, and 
difficulties within, Kurdish nationalism, and to the territorial ambitions of the Kurds 
and regional governments upon Kurdish dominated lands. This work examines 
primary source documents and academic works to gain a better understanding of 
the policies of the governments involved, as well as attempts by the Kurds to 
acquire an independent state. In addition to archival and library research, 
concepts from political geography and comparative politics are employed to 
provide insight into issues such as territoriality and nationalism.  
 
Statement of the Problem 
The Kurds are the world’s largest stateless nation, today numbering 
around thirty-five million, and mostly inhabiting the region known as Kurdistan, 
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which stretches across the states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Armenia. An 
officially recognized independent Kurdish state has never existed. This study 
involves an investigation of the history, politics, and physical geographical 
aspects of the Kurdish situation through the lenses of theories of nationalism, 
territoriality, and political geography. It provides an explanation of why factors 
that seemed to be supportive of Kurdish aspirations for independence worked 
against the Kurds. The developments of Kurdish nationalism and separatism in 
Turkey and Iraq were highly visible over the course of the twentieth century, and 
more so than in Iran, Syria, or Armenia. In both cases, the post-World War I 
division of the Ottoman Empire and the promotion of nation-states encouraged 
separatist efforts by the Kurds. The interwar period was a formative time for 
Kurdish political nationalism. In the Republic of Turkey, the leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal (Atatürk) promoted a Turkish civic nationalism (a form of identity rooted in 
citizenship of a country and the ideals promoted by the state, in contrast to 
ethnic-based identity) for the advancement of secularism and modernity, 
otherwise referred to as Kemalism. However, the newly assembled Kingdom of 
Iraq, comprised of Mesopotamia and southern Kurdistan, was under the British 
mandate. The mandate expired prior to World War II, and the Kurds living there 
fell completely under the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Iraq. The Kurds 
experienced similar circumstances in the two states. Their experiences diverged 
as a result of different policies pursued by the British and the Turks. In both 
cases, Kurdish efforts to gain territorial control were crushed by the respective 
governments. However, in Turkey Kurdish identity was denied outright, while in 
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Iraq Kurdish identity was recognized as part of the Iraqi mosaic of identities. 
Kurdish separatism continues to affect the states and the region in which Kurds 
reside. 
 While this study does not address the situation of the Kurds and Kurdistan 
from World War II to the present, it seeks to lay a political geographical 
foundation for understanding the beginnings of events that are still playing out in 
the Middle East today. During the period immediately after World War I the Kurds 
were led to believe they would be granted statehood in territories now part of 
Turkey and Iraq. Political geographers such as Dahlman1 and O’Shea2 have 
examined Kurdistan, but these studies were broadly focused over time and 
included Iran and Syria. This research focuses specifically on the interwar period 
in Turkey and Iraq. Persia (Iran) and Syria are discussed, but only as staging 
grounds and refuges for nationalists and their causes. The justification for 
studying Iraq and Turkey is based on the fact that the 1920 Treaty of Sévres 
provided for a Kurdish entity to be drawn from the lands these two states now 
occupy. The reason for focusing exclusively on the interwar era is that this period 
witnessed the rise of Kurdish nationalism, which served as a foundation for later 
movements. When the promise of a homeland with self-governance was not 
fulfilled, the Kurds organized themselves, albeit in factions, and rebelled against 
the authorities in an attempt to fulfill their dreams. Had it not been for British and 
Turkish air force capabilities, the Kurds, in their mountain setting, might have 
succeeded in achieving independence. 
 
 4 
Research Questions 
 Data collected from archival sources and secondary sources will provide 
answers to the following questions: 
1. Why did Kurdistan as a nation-state fail to become a reality? 
 
2. What impact did the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres provision for Kurdish 
statehood have on Kurdish identity and political cohesion? 
 
3. Why did Turkey and British-controlled Iraq disallow Kurdish statehood? 
 
 
 
Theoretical Overview 
 
This study is a historical political geographical undertaking, and is mostly 
descriptive in nature. The main theoretical aspects of this study pertain to the rise 
of, and difficulties within, Kurdish nationalism, and to the territorial ambitions of 
the Kurds and regional governments upon Kurdish dominated lands. I propose to 
answer these questions with three areas of inquiry and elaboration: nationalism, 
territoriality, and geopolitics. Primary documents such as British diplomatic 
reporting and correspondences are examined through qualitative content 
analysis in which relevant data is encoded and extracted for interpretation.  
The first area of inquiry involves the rise of Kurdish national 
consciousness and the political and military struggles that ensued. This 
emphasis addresses the question of the impact of the Treaty of Sèvres on 
Kurdish identity and cohesion, and, ultimately why Kurdistan as a state failed to 
become a reality. Library and archival research involving sources noted in the 
literature review section along with theories of nationalism shall be utilized to this 
end. Two main lines of thought regarding the origins of nationalism are 
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primordialism and modernism, also referred to as instrumentalism or 
constructivism. Primordialists claim that nations have ancient roots, and that 
nationalist movements of today are the extensions of these. Modernists, 
however, argue that nationalist movements are a modern phenomenon and a 
reaction to the homogenizing forces of industrialization. Anthony D. Smith has 
sought to understand and merge both ideas in his systemic theory of nationalism 
known as ethnosymbolism. He argues that the ethnie, or a pre-modern 
community with its own distinctive sense of self-identity and collectivity, is the 
root of modern nations.3 This idea of a pre-modern ethnic core seems to fit well 
with the Kurds, given the pre-modern nationalist works, such as Sharaf al-Din al-
Bitlisi’s sixteenth century epic, Sharafname, that are cited as evidence of national 
consciousness. Indeed, Natali notes that pre-modern Kurdish nationalist 
literature such as “Bitlisi’s Sharafname, Khani’s Mem-u-Zin, Chamo’s Dimdim, 
and Kurdo’s Kurdish Civilization emphasize the uniqueness of Kurdish identity.”4 
She asserts that Kurdish national identity, or Kurdayeti, arose prior to the 
creation of the modern states of the region, and has undergone many shifts as a 
result of political changes and communication around and among the Kurds.5 
The second area of inquiry, related to nationalism, is into territoriality 
among the Kurds. Similar to nationalism, territoriality is focused upon Kurdish 
identity and its connection to Kurdistan. Since the Treaty of Sèvres involved 
definition of lands associated with a planned Kurdish state, this emphasis centers 
upon Kurdish ties to those territories and their incorporation into a new nationalist 
dream. Although territory often is associated with nationalist sentiments, the land 
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itself is merely land. It is the social sentiment of one’s self and one’s people being 
associated with a specific geographic area that gives meaning to the land.6 The 
sentiment that the “Kurds have no friends but the mountains” is an example of 
such a geographic tie of identity to land. The mountainous landscape of the 
Kurdish lands has provided refuge and sustenance for the Kurds against the 
ravages of nature and hostile neighbors on adjacent lands. Over time, the Kurds 
have come to associate themselves with those mountains, hence the saying. 
While Kurdistan does not have any exact boundaries, the mountains of 
southeastern Anatolia, to the north of Mesopotamia, and the northwest of the 
Iranian Plateau have been generally regarded as Kurdish by Kurds and outsiders 
alike. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres legitimized a portion of this perceived territory 
when it demarcated lands for two Kurdish autonomous regions to possibly be 
joined for an independent Kurdish state. The treaty’s provisions changed many 
Kurds’ perceptions of themselves and their lands. Murphy states that “(t)o create 
an area with legal or administrative significance is to bring into being a functional 
spatial unit that can profoundly alter ideas about social groupings,”7 thus 
reinforcing an existing identity by adding the symbol of place to ideas of a group’s 
shared history and culture.8 The mere suggestion of such a spatial unit for the 
Kurds had the effect of generally strengthening the Kurds’ territoriality and 
fostering the idea of an independent Kurdistan.9 Murphy further states that 
identity “is inherently territorial” and that special considerations for groups “can 
help sustain and promote ethnic social cleavages.”10 
 7 
The third area of interest is into the geopolitical ambitions of the non-
Kurdish entities upon Kurdish dominated lands, namely the interests of the British 
and Turks. The British policy toward the Kurds, as well as Turkey, and their 
consciousness of the Soviet Union, will be analyzed through the lens of 
Mackinder’s Heartland Theory and Spykman’s Rimland Theory. This analysis is 
in terms of what Meinig defines as “positional supremacy.”11 Utilizing these 
theories, I seek to demonstrate that Kurdistan is a gateway between the two, and 
was almost certain to be divided between powers. 
It is useful to turn to the context of the Great Game to understand some of 
the competition for Kurdish lands, especially in the case of the United Kingdom 
and its perception of the rebirth of its old adversary, Russia, as the Soviet Union. 
The Great Game was a competition waged between the British Empire and the 
Russian Empire for territory and influence in central and southern Asia during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This competition held political, military, 
and economic objectives, with the British seeking to secure their colonial 
interests in India, and the Russians to expand their empire. It led the Russians 
into the khanates of Central Asia, and led the alarmed British to seek support 
from rulers of the lands surrounding India.12 Both parties courted the favor of 
Afghanistan’s rulers since that country was a gateway between Central and 
South Asia. British interest in this gateway was intense enough that when 
Afghanistan’s leadership wavered in its support the British invaded.13 The British 
feared the consequences of raids by the Afghans pouring into India in either a 
call to jihad14 or at the behest of the Russians to help bring down the British 
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Empire.15 This is relevant to this dissertation because the British chain of 
interests stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Burma was subject to 
many gateways that the British believed posed a threat from a reemerging 
Russian power. Kurdistan was part of one of these linking the Middle East with 
the areas of the Eastern European Plain, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, later 
conceptualized and referred to as the “Heartland.” 
The two states having the greatest influence over the Kurdish lands slated 
for autonomy or outright independence by the Treaty of Sévres were Turkey and 
the United Kingdom. The British Foreign Office has declassified many of its 
reports and correspondences from the period around World War I to World War 
II. These documents provide a unique perspective on the British activities toward 
the Kurds and rival governments in Iraq and the region. 
Content analysis is a useful method for studying the documents from the 
various individuals and agencies of the period. The types of data this study 
proposes to use fall under what Dibble refers to as the “four types of inference 
from documents to events,” which are testimony, social bookkeeping, correlates, 
and direct indicators.16 Testimony is a document based on an individual interview 
or an account of an event,17 while social bookkeeping is a document or a series 
of documents recording information produced by an institution or a group.18 For 
instance, an account of a British colonial administrator’s experiences in Iraq is 
considered testimony, but British diplomatic reports are considered a type of 
social bookkeeping. Correlates are pieces of information not directly dealing with 
an event, but that may either work as ancillary evidence to substantiate or refute 
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historical claims.19 Direct indicators are those sources that may provide a direct 
answer to a historical inquiry.20 
While information extracted from these types of documents may not 
necessarily be factual, it does provide a basis for interpreting views held at the 
time. Prior states that textual “representation should be understood not as a true 
and accurate reflection of some aspect of an external world, but as something to 
be explained and accounted for through the discursive rules and themes that 
predominate in a particular socio-historical context.”21 Content analysis will 
provide groundwork for interpretation of the materials in the context of the 
policies that were constructed and implemented regarding the British, Iraqi, and 
Turkish governments’ stances toward the Kurds. According to Prior, 
“classificatory systems provide a fruitful terrain for the qualitative researcher,”22 
because they enable researchers to extract information from sources in an 
organized and meaningful manner. A coding system for the documents will be 
constructed for classification of the data. For example, data from British Foreign 
Office documents may be coded according to several categories: direct relations 
with the Kurds, relationship to Kurdish lands, relationship to other governments 
regarding the Kurds, relationship to other governments regarding Kurdish lands. 
This type of classificatory system will reveal the attitudes of the various parties 
involved in Kurdish politics and those related to Kurdish lands. The importance of 
what is being discussed in these documents is linked to the importance of the 
individuals or institutions involved and their abilities to shape the future of the 
Kurds and their lands. 
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This study faces some limitations. Turkish records remain off limits to most 
scholars. This is especially the case for scholars with an interest in controversial 
topics such as those concerning the Kurds or the Armenians. However, the 
scholars Bernard Lewis23 and Andrew Mango24 have been granted access and 
have used information from Turkish archives in their own works. These works 
provide pieces for the Turkish puzzle regarding the rise of the republic and its 
policy toward the Kurds. 
 
Historical Background 
 
 The name “Kurd” was historically applied to people living in the Zagros 
and Taurus mountains, regardless of their ethnic background. Much debate 
surrounds both the name and the origin of the Kurdish people.25 Even when 
foreign entities claimed Kurdistan as part of their territories, the Kurds were never 
actually under the direct rule of any non-Kurdish authority. Because much of 
Kurdistan is so mountainous and remote, the Kurds were also isolated from one 
another. This likely led to the linguistic divisions among the Kurds.26 With the rise 
of the Ottoman and Persian-Safavid empires, particularly during conflict between 
the two powers, the Kurds once again became important as subjects of foreign 
powers.27 The Kurds were fairly autonomous since Kurdistan served as a 
marchland between the empires.28 In competition for loyalty from the Kurds, the 
two empires set up feudal systems, which allowed for the establishment of 
several Kurdish principalities in the mountainous frontier area.29  
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 Ironically, Turkish and Persian efforts to organize Kurdish allies represent 
the beginnings of organized Kurdish nationalism. These empires granted local 
powers to Kurdish chieftains, thereby allowing cohesion of Kurds within these 
areas to take place, albeit to a limited extent.30 An important example of this 
cohesion is the Ottoman Empire’s creation of the Kurdish Hamidiye cavalry for 
eastern Anatolia, which allowed its members and their families to experience 
organization, education, and power previously unknown.31 It was during the 
nineteenth century that Kurdish leaders began to both recognize their people as 
separate from the groups surrounding them and act upon this notion to seek 
organization of the Kurds on a broader scale.32 Until the nineteenth century, 
organized Kurdish nationalism was absent, as most Kurds saw themselves as 
Muslims foremost and thereby kin to Arab, Turk, and Persian alike.33 Kurdish 
identity was recognized, but lower in order of importance relative to religious 
affiliation.34 At the same time, these Kurdish principalities were at odds with one 
another, and on occasion a leader appealed to the Turks or Persians for 
assistance against their own brothers and cousins.35 
 During the last phase of Ottoman control in Kurdistan, from Tanzimat 
(modernizing reforms, 1839-1879) until World War I, Kurdistan enjoyed 
autonomy as a buffer zone between the Ottoman Turkish heartland of Anatolia 
and the Persian Empire in the east.36 Kurdistan also served as a buffer to 
Ottoman-ruled Mesopotamia lying to the south of Anatolia. The mountainous 
area in which Kurdistan exists had never been subject to direct rule, because 
such a pursuit had proved fruitless time and again as a result of Kurdish 
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superiority in mountain warfare.37 Indirect rule, through autonomous and semi-
autonomous principalities, allowed the Ottoman and Persian empires to maintain 
relative calm in their Kurdish borderlands over the centuries.38 This autonomy 
and the relatively low level of outside interference their geographical position 
provided, contributed to a sense of territoriality among the Kurds for their 
mountainous refuge. 
 The European powers thought they had the entirety of the Ottoman 
Empire within their grasp before the close of World War I. This is evidenced by 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which partitioned Ottoman lands among the 
European powers. The original parties to the agreement in 1916 were the United 
Kingdom and France, but the agreement also brought in the Russian Empire. 
Later, the Soviet Union renounced all agreements made by its predecessor. This 
change affected the Sykes-Picot maps in that there was no longer a need for the 
French to hold the Mosul vilayet as a buffer zone,39 thus the area’s future was left 
in question. 
 After the surrender of the Ottoman Empire and the close of World War I, 
plans for the lands, resources, and people under former Ottoman jurisdiction 
were negotiated. While the U.K. and France were drawing their lines on the map 
of the Middle East, the Americans, whom they invited to take up mandates in 
Armenia and Kurdistan, refused to become involved on the ground. U.S. foreign 
policy was, in a word, fickle. According to Tejirian, “the internationalism of the 
1910s, which followed the first acquisitions of the ‘American empire’ after the 
Spanish-American War and led to U.S. entry into World War I, was followed by 
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the isolationism of the 1920s, emphasized most dramatically by U.S. refusal to 
join the League of Nations.”40 This was a starting point for Kurdish troubles, as 
far as their international legitimacy was concerned. Had the U.S. become a 
member in the League and taken up a mandate in Armenia, and possibly 
Kurdistan, Washington likely would have ensured the eventual statehood of a 
Kurdistan as specified in the postwar settlement terms the Ottoman government 
accepted. The British and French supported other mandates in the area backed 
with political and military force. A similar arrangement by the U.S. or other allies 
regarding Kurdistan likely would have prevailed. 
 The most comprehensive plan to emerge was the Treaty of Sèvres 
(Appendix A) in 1920.41 The treaty had been heavily influenced by the ideas of 
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Point 12 of Wilson’s Fourteen Points declared 
“that non-Turkish minorities of the Ottoman Empire should be granted the right of 
‘autonomous development.’”42 Indeed, the Treaty of Sèvres included Article 62 
providing the Kurds with autonomy and Article 64 allowing for possible 
independence.43 However, what the Europeans had not foreseen was the rise of 
the Republic of Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). Kemal’s 
surprising gains in the west against the Greeks as well as his movements in the 
east caused the U.K. and France to take notice. Like the Soviet Union in relation 
to the Russian Empire, the Republic of Turkey sought to undo the dealings of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified, and Kemal sought 
new terms of agreement. Kemal’s military victories allowed for the Treaty of 
Lausanne (Appendix B) in 1923, which did away with “the hated regime of 
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capitulations”44 that the Treaty of Sèvres represented to the Turks. This new 
treaty made no direct mention of the Kurds or Kurdistan;45 rather Ottoman 
Kurdistan was divided among Turkey and the two Arab states to the south, Iraq 
and Syria, which were under British and French mandates respectively. The 
following sections are a brief glimpse of the Kurds’ activities in Turkey and Iraq 
after the division of territories between the two states. 
 
Turkey 
 The first Kurdish political party originated in the Kurdish diaspora rather 
than from within Kurdistan. The organization known as Khoybun (also known as 
the Kurdish League), or “Independence,” was founded by a group of Kurdish 
intellectuals in Paris in 1918.46 These intellectuals saw the period following World 
War I as ripe for organizing a movement aimed at securing a Kurdish nation-state 
out of the ruins of the recently defeated Ottoman Empire.  
Animosity toward the new secular Turkish state had been building since 
the modernization programs the Ottoman Empire initiated during the latter phase 
of Tanzimat in the late 1880s.47 This was especially true in the Kurdish 
southeast, where a series of rebellions had occurred leading up to the fall of the 
empire. While many of these rebellions had been Islamic in nature, they had 
Kurdish underpinnings.48 In 1925, a new rebellion, more nationalistic than any to 
date, erupted under the leadership of Sheikh Said in the districts west of Lake 
Van.49 The Khoybun’s members waited eagerly for the outcome of Sheikh Said’s 
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efforts only to be disappointed when the rebellion was put down and its fighters 
fled across the frontier into Persia.50 
The Khoybun found allies in the Armenian population in Aleppo, Syria, 
especially with those belonging to the Dashnak party.51 Gathering troops across 
the Persian border, the new rebellion was launched in 1927 with the entirely 
secular goal of creating the Kurdish Republic of Ararat in the rugged far east of 
Turkey from the area surrounding Lake Van to the frontiers with the Soviet Union 
and Persia.52 The Turks soundly defeated the Khoybun Rebellion in 1930, largely 
through the Turkish Air Force (TAF), just as the British had against the Kurds in 
Iraq years before. The Kurds maintained ground advantage throughout the 
rebellion, but were ultimately edged out by the airpower.53 
A smaller rebellion by Kurds flared up around the city of Dersim in 1937-
1938. These Kurds were responding to so-called preventative measures taken 
up by the Turkish armed forces against Kurdish villages deemed dangerous. This 
rebellion was short-lived, and resulted in utter destruction of the villages. Kurdish 
casualties were enormous.54 The Kurds of Turkey did not pose a serious threat to 
the republic again until the 1980s. 
 
Iraq 
 In the Mosul vilayet, two Kurdish leaders emerged, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani 
and Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji.55 Mahmud was far more charismatic than Ahmed, 
and was able to recruit followers outside of his tribe. This gained Mahmud an 
audience with the British early on.56 Mahmud’s relationships with the British and 
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with rival Kurds were tumultuous, though he commanded much respect and held 
a lot of promise to lead an independent Kurdistan.57 Both Ahmed and Mahmud 
clashed with the British, but the U.K. gave Mahmud several opportunities to lead 
the Kurds and hold a cooperative relationship with the Arabs and British. Usually, 
Mahmud generated conflict by demanding territorial expansion of his authority 
and the right to command a Kurdish army. Mahmud was frequently exiled to 
Persia, where he was usually in conflict with the Persians. 
 The first experiment at Kurdish statehood came in 1918-1919, when the 
British allowed a Kurdish government in Sulaymaniyah to form, in which Mahmud 
was the key Kurdish player.58 The British saw Kurdish self-rule as a way to bring 
the Mosul vilayet under control, yet Mahmud’s government was dissolved in 1919 
when the British decided the Kurds were too anti-British. Mahmud led a revolt 
against the British, which was met with a swift response by the British Royal Air 
Force (RAF).59 Mahmud was forced into exile, only to be welcomed back by the 
British for another opportunity at a Kurdish state in 1922.60 Sulaymaniyah had 
been left as an undecided entity for this purpose. However, Mahmud ran into 
troubles with the British once again.61 Many, both within Kurdistan and the allied 
countries, viewed Mahmud as the wrong leader for the Kurds. This was also the 
view held by U.S. President Wilson.62 However, Mahmud had gained the 
allegiance of the Talabani tribe, and it was during this time that the enduring 
political rivalry between the Talabanis and Barzanis emerged.63 Winston 
Churchill sought the creation of an independent Kurdistan to serve as a friendly 
buffer state between Turkey and Mesopotamia, but he was dissuaded from 
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pursuing this.64 The U.K. opted to impose direct rule upon Kurdistan because of 
its instability and the threat the emerging Republic of Turkey was making to incite 
the Kurds there into rebellion. A sustained rebellion would have allowed Turkey 
to reclaim the Mosul vilayet.65 Mahmud’s final defeat came in 1931, but two of his 
previous demands, Kurdish schools and elected positions for Kurdish 
representation, were implemented.66 
 Ahmed took a different approach from Mahmud toward uniting the Kurds 
under his leadership. While Mahmud was dashing back and forth between Persia 
and Iraq, Ahmed was building his reputation by taking on any rivals in skirmishes, 
be they Turks, Arabs, British, or other Kurds. Ahmed and his Barzani tribe gained 
a fearsome and respected reputation during this time. The British had never 
seriously considered Ahmed for leadership among the Kurds, but by 1927 he had 
appeared on the horizons of all parties.67 The Barzani tribe became the most 
influential in Iraq and the region.68 As a result of his activities against the British, 
Ahmed was chased into Turkey by the RAF and later arrested and sent into exile 
in southern Iraq. The Barzani leadership passed to Ahmed’s brother, Mustafa, 
who became a major figure in Iraqi Kurdish nationalism in the middle of the 
century.69 
 One of the problems in leadership for the Kurds in Iraq was that the 
leaders, who tended to be urban and middle-class, did not speak for the 
majority.70 This compromised the unity of the Kurds in Mosul and Iraq; they were 
simply unable to unite as a force to pressure the British into granting them 
statehood. 
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    Significance of the Study 
 This dissertation re-examines two geopolitical theories of the early 
twentieth century in the context of Kurdish nationalist struggle following the 
Ottoman Empire’s demise. Sir Halford Mackinder’s Geographical Pivot/Heartland 
Theory and Nicholas Spykman’s Rimland Theory lend penetrating insight into 
British policy regarding the control of Eurasia during the early twentieth century 
and to the position of the Kurds within this geopolitical worldview. Mackinder’s 
Heartland Theory helped shape British geopolitics, and maintained an important 
place in the minds of policy makers. While the British were not going to control 
the Heartland directly, their strategic positioning in the Inner Crescent, the 
coastal fringes surrounding Eurasia, granted them a kind of control. The 
importance of controlling the Inner Crescent over the Heartland was later 
articulated by Spykman in his Rimland Theory during World War II, but the idea 
was already held by the British as they aligned themselves, through direct control 
or strong influence, from Cyprus to Burma. The British had reached détente with 
the Russian Empire over the Great Game just years before in 1907, but they had 
no such agreement with the Soviet Union. The Kurds and Kurdistan were of 
interest to the British as a potential safeguard against Bolshevik (communists 
who in October 1917 overthrew the Russian monarchy an replaced the Russian 
Empire with the Soviet Union) influence and territorial gains streaming southward 
through the Caucasus. The rapidly changing political situations in the region 
placed the Kurds in an awkward relationship with the British, and their position 
and candidacy for independence partially became a victim of the British need for 
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strategic positioning and security in Asia. Though these ideas are no longer 
guiding policy in the region, their effects are still evident on the political 
landscape. 
Though Kurdistan for centuries had been divided between the Ottoman 
Empire and Persian Empire, the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the division of its 
lands, and the emergence of organized nationalisms among the peoples there 
led to pronounced hostility among the Kurds toward their overlords: the Turks, 
the Arabs, and the Persians. The Kurds experienced further divisions and 
revolutionary social, economic, and political changes following World War I. The 
provision for an independent Kurdistan as presented in the Treaty of Sèvres 
remains an issue of contention between the Kurds and the states within whose 
borders they dwell. Changes brought about by new policies from British and 
Turkish administrations still reverberate today. The period between the two world 
wars was the formative period for Kurdish national consciousness and 
mobilization, and is the time when the idea of an independent Kurdistan was 
floated about in powerful international circles. The events of this period in Iraq 
and Turkey later influenced Kurdish nationalist movements in those states as 
well as movements in neighboring Iran and Syria and in the Kurdish diaspora. 
Many lessons regarding self-determination and the politics of the peoples of Iraq 
and Turkey can be taken from the British and Turkish experiences in the 1920s 
and 1930s. 
 The U.S. never declared war on the Ottoman Empire, and, apart from 
President Wilson, the U.S. had no ambition of reshaping the Middle East at the 
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end of World War I. However, the U.S. became a shaper of Middle Eastern 
politics and conflict over the course of the last century into the present. U.S. 
policy did not include the Kurds until the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Insight can be gained into the current U.S. involvement in Iraq from the British 
experience there following World War I. The current situation the Kurds face in 
both Iraq and Turkey reflects the events of the interwar period to some degree. 
 Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the United States has developed 
further interest in Iraq and its Kurdish population. The U.S. and the U.K. 
established a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, which led to virtual independence from 
Baghdad among a large segment of the Kurdish population there. This safe 
haven prospered under protection from the American and British air forces. After 
the U.S. invaded the country in 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein and attempted to 
establish a new order in Iraq, that interest has been magnified. The Kurdish 
people and the Kurdistan region in northern Iraq are a U.S. focal point for the 
goal of establishing security, trade, and democratic institutions within the entirety 
of Iraq. 
 This is a timely study because events in Iraq may lead to Kurdish 
independence in the near future. Today, talk of splitting Iraq into three states 
based on the Kurdish, Shi’a Arab, and Sunni Arab regions has been touted as a 
solution to Iraq’s sectarian strife. Whether this is an appropriate “solution” or not, 
the idea of a Kurdish state has risen once again. A portion of the Kurdish region 
of northern Iraq has been functioning as its own state over the past decade, but 
its neighbors would not readily welcome its declaration of independence. The 
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states in which Kurdish separatists reside would not look favorably at the loss or 
threat of loss of their territory. This is an unsettling idea to the government and 
military of Turkey, because they have faced a renewed Kurdish insurgency since 
the 1980s in the guise of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Iranian leaders still 
recall the Kurdish republic of Mahabad in 1946. Syria has clamped down on 
Kurdish activities, even establishing an Arab belt around the Kurds in the 
northeast. Previous experiments with Kurdish statehood were short-lived. The 
British attempts with Sheikh Mahmoud in Iraq were stopped because of Kurdish 
agitation outside of the designated territories. Turkey, Iran, and Syria all fear that 
a Kurdish state carved from Iraq would be a repetition of history, and that their 
own Kurdish populations would see an independent Kurdistan as inspiration for 
insurrection. These states have cause to fear this because of the active Kurdish 
movements in their territories. They believe Kurdish independence would create 
yet another conflict in the region. 
However, lessons from the past could be applied to provide a gradual 
transition for what seems like an inevitable Kurdish state without conflict. Iraqi 
Kurdistan is heavily connected economically to Turkey, Iran, and other regional 
states. Indeed, much foreign investment in Iraq since 2003 has gone into the 
Kurdish north. The changes that would occur, apart from Kurdish independence 
for the first time in history, would not be revolutionary as they were in the 1920s. 
The political, social, and economic systems are already in place and functioning. 
A departure from past policies would be for neighboring states and others 
concerned to assist the Kurds there with the transition, not as guides in the 
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colonial sense, but as partners in a globalizing world. This would also mean 
transitions would need to occur within the countries with Kurdish minorities. 
Repressive policies used in the past to contain or crush Kurdish nationalism and 
dreams of an independent Kurdistan would be unwise if peace is to be ensured. 
 The Kurds have gained considerable media exposure for the hardships 
the various Kurdish populations have endured under governments in Turkey and 
Iraq, as well as in Iran and Syria. These hardships have their beginnings in the 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the years immediately following. Today, 
attitudes toward the Kurds there have changed. No longer are there official 
attitudes reflecting the previous orientalist disdain for the Kurds who a British 
High Commission official in Constantinople in 1919 characterized as being “on 
too mediaeval a plane of thought and custom to make it possible to apply modern 
democratic criteria.”71 The Kurds of Iraq are again in a global media spotlight 
waiting to demonstrate their ability to succeed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The intent of this literature review is to discuss the various works 
consulted to answer the research questions. Sources range from primary and 
academic documents to theoretical and methodological works relating to the 
dissertation. The chapter is organized into two main sections. The first section is 
a review of the primary and academic sources the study draws upon for 
information on the Kurds, various treaties and conferences, and on British and 
Turkish policies toward the Kurds and Kurdistan. The second section is devoted 
to theoretical fields used in this study and is divided into three topics: nationalism, 
territoriality, and political geography. 
 
Primary Sources 
A great asset to this study is the wealth of information housed in 
declassified British documents from the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and 
the Air Ministry from the period of World War I up to World War II. These 
documents provide a unique perspective of the British activities in Iraq and the 
region directed toward the Kurds and rival governments, as well as activities of 
those governments and peoples of their lands. While these documents are 
housed at the Public Records Office in Kew, United Kingdom, companies have
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published them for worldwide distribution, and it is from these published works 
that information has been collected for study. In addition to these documents, 
memoirs of British officials involved in the Paris Peace Conference and the 
administration of Iraq during the British Mandate offer useful information.  
The starting point for the justification of a Kurdish state is the Paris Peace 
Conference and the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres.1 British Foreign Office documents 
from the peace conference reveal British perspectives on the proceedings and 
the future of the Middle East, culminating in the Treaty of Sèvres. Though the 
treaty was never ratified, it was a construction of international powerbrokers. The 
recognition of the Kurds and Kurdistan in articles 62-64 lends itself to recognition 
of Kurdish aspirations. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points heavily 
influenced the Paris Peace Conference and its resulting treaties.2 Point Twelve 
was directed specifically at providing self-determination to the non-Turkish 
peoples of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Kurdish representative to the Paris Peace Conference, General Sharif 
Pasha, laid out the geographical claims of the Kurds in both description and a 
map. This has been republished recently, and it presents a view of Kurdish elites 
that sought to redraw the Ottoman Empire’s borders in favor of an independent 
Kurdistan.3 David Llloyd George, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at the 
time, and the country’s primary representative at the conference, published his 
memoirs from Paris years later.4 These memoirs offer some views into what the 
U.K.’s position and expectations were regarding the Ottoman Empire and its 
division. The Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified, and its terms were rejected by 
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Mustafa Kemal, who forced negotiations for a new treaty. The 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne supplanted the agreement of the Allies with the Ottoman Empire and 
did not honor any Kurdish aspirations.5 It also represents the beginnings of a 
violent struggle for Kurdish recognition and rights throughout the twentieth 
century. Many other works provide a rich background for the research in terms of 
the overall setting of the emergence of Kurdish nationalism and its territorial 
aspects. 
British Foreign Office documents pertaining to the Middle East during the 
interwar period6 provide a much-welcomed source for this study. These 
documents cover the dispute over Mosul between Britain and Turkey, and they 
contain detailed information on nationalist activities and rebellions of the Kurds. 
Another set of volumes covers the Paris Peace Conference, with one volume 
devoted to the negotiations with the Ottoman Empire.7 Other documents from the 
British Colonial Office and the Air Ministry relating to the Kurds8 provide useful 
information that compliments the Foreign Office information. Memoirs and letters 
of various colonial administration figures such as Gertrude Bell9 and Wallace 
Lyon10 also provide useful content. These sources contain correspondences 
detailing activities related to the Kurds and Kurdish leaders, as well as general 
goings on of life in Iraq. Most primary sources used in this study are from British 
governmental institutions and individuals. The British Foreign Office documents 
provide insight into the events of the time: decisions made over how to deal with 
Kurdish nationalist activities, border disputes, and the strategic positioning of the 
British in relation to Turkey and the Kurds. The documents in this series deal with 
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the entire region, not just the British administered areas. Some documents 
include information on Kurdish activities in Turkey and the Turkish responses. 
These documents used in association with secondary sources dealing with 
Turkish archives yield important information in the absence of access to those 
archival materials. 
 
Academic Sources 
Since the emergence of Kurdish nationalism following World War I, many 
works have been written on the Kurds and their political activities. This study, 
involving the analysis of the Kurdish policies of the Republic of Turkey and the 
Iraqi government under British administration, and the Kurdish reaction to those 
policies, draws upon these sources and later academic works. A core of literature 
on Kurdish history is presented in the following paragraphs. Following this, 
literature pertaining to the Paris Peace Conference and the subsequent course of 
events are discussed. 
 Many exceptional works on Kurdish history exist and provide a wealth of 
information of benefit to this study. Jwaideh’s The Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement11 offers useful information regarding all of the major activities of 
Kurdish movements from the Ottoman and Safavid empires until after the 
Second World War. Jwaideh, an Iraqi, provides extensive native knowledge of 
the history and geography of the Kurds in the Middle East. His research spans 
Kurdish nationalism from the 1880s up to the formation and destruction of the 
Mahabad Republic in 1946. This is the published version of Jwaideh’s 
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dissertation, which has been consulted by most scholars attempting to gain any 
knowledge of the Kurds. His extensive research into the various figures and 
events associated with Kurdish political nationalism are a major contribution to 
this study. Jwaideh’s local knowledge of his subject adds to the importance of his 
work. 
McDowall’s A Modern History of the Kurds12 is an authoritative source 
regarding the history of the Kurdish nation from the nineteenth century forward. 
McDowall’s work focuses on the development and activities of the Kurds in the 
different countries in which they reside. McDowall’s bibliography is a wealth of 
information, as he has consulted a variety of Kurdish, Turkish, Persian, Arabic, 
and other sources. McDowall presents a detailed narrative of the events and 
lives of the figures involved in the making of Kurdish history.  
Another instructive volume is Izady’s The Kurds: A Concise Handbook,13 
which is an exceptionally thorough and well-organized work dealing with many 
facets of Kurdish society and culture. Izady provides highly detailed information 
on themes such as the physical geography of Kurdistan, language, religion, 
political issues and the creation of the Kurdish diaspora. His information on the 
formative period of Kurdish nationalism following World War I is invaluable. 
 Entessar’s Kurdish Ethnonationalism14 is an analysis of Kurdish national 
and political consciousness and the difficulties of the Kurds’ quest for recognition 
and independence. Entessar breaks the question down to a country-by-country 
study of the nationalist movements across the twentieth century. By doing this, 
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Entessar follows the development of nationalism and the different routes it takes 
among the Kurds in their different political settings. 
Edmonds’s article, “Kurdish Nationalism,”15 provides a narrative of the rise 
of Kurdish nationalism and its many difficulties, especially those among the 
Kurds themselves. In a similar fashion, Entessar’s aptly titled “The Kurdish 
Mosaic of Discord”16 examines the reasons behind the barriers for Kurdish unity. 
Dahlman’s article “The Political Geography of Kurdistan”17 discusses the situation 
of the Kurds and Kurdistan in a geopolitical context, though focused heavily on 
the latter part of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. 
Rubin’s article, “Are Kurds a Pariah Minority?,”18 poses many interesting 
questions regarding Kurdish identity. He identifies the fact the Kurds do not have 
a common history, but a mosaic of histories based on geographical divisions and 
different interactions with other Kurds and surrounding populations. This does not 
discount Kurdish identity or nationalism; rather, it means that because there are 
so many identities based on the different past experiences, the situation is more 
difficult for cohesion to occur. 
In the Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism,19 Olson investigates the rise of 
Kurdish nationalism under Sheikh Ubaydullah in the Ottoman Empire during the 
1880s and follows its development in both Iraq and Turkey to the Sheikh Said 
rebellion of 1925. Olson examines the Kurdish reaction throughout the 
developments of war, peace settlement, and the realignment of Middle Eastern 
borders. Olson20 continues his work on early Kurdish nationalism in Turkey with 
an article following the development of the major rebellions of Sheikh Said in 
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1925, the Khoybun around Ararat from 1927 to 1930, and the Dersim Kurds in 
1938. He also explains the Turkish military advantage of using warplanes against 
the Kurds as the Royal Air Force (RAF) had in Iraq. This is an important point, 
because it enabled both the British and the Turks to put down the rebellions that 
may have become outright revolutions had the conflict been limited to the ground 
where the Kurds had the advantage. 
 A number of scholars have researched the British Mandate period in Iraq 
and have produced invaluable works detailing the British and Kurdish activities 
there. Eskander’s works surround the period from 1918-1923, when Britain was 
unsure of what to do with the Kurds and their territory.21A focus of Eskander’s is 
on the Kurdish governments that were formed and then scrapped under British 
supervision. Olson’s22 analysis of the Colonial Office correspondences between 
Winston Churchill and Percy Cox provides clarity on the thoughts of the British 
administrators involved in the Cairo Conference and the establishment of the 
Kingdom of Iraq and the attachment of southern Kurdistan to Mesopotamia. This 
article is important because it examines the reasons behind Churchill’s decision 
to include southern Kurdistan with Mesopotamia to form Iraq. Churchill had been 
one of Britain’s most vocal proponents for a Kurdish state. Strangely, Percy Cox 
convinced Churchill not to pursue Kurdish independence.  
Several dissertations provide further information for this research. These 
studies come from history and political science, and they tie in well with the 
political geographical interest of this dissertation. Özoğlu’s23 focus is on the 
Kurdish elites, or notables, in the Ottoman Empire’s late period. Özoğlu’s work 
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traces the strains of nationalism surrounding these figures. Similarly, Klein’s24 
research on the all Kurdish Hamidiye Light Cavalry examines their establishment 
during the late Ottoman period. Her study is insightful because it examines the 
Ottoman Empire’s attempt to organize and modernize Kurds in the face of 
growing religious and Kurdish, as well as Armenian, nationalist unrest in 
southeastern Anatolia. The cavalry was formed in response to the uprising of 
Sheikh Ubaydullah during the 1880s. Ubaydullah’s uprising and other smaller 
ones were responses to the void in power left by the Ottoman dismantlement of 
the Kurdish principalities along the Ottoman-Persian frontier. Following the 
demise of the elites’ powers and what was perceived by the Kurds to be a turning 
away from Islam by the Ottoman government, some Kurds sought their own 
Kurdish path. The organization of the cavalry in response to the rebellions, 
ironically, helped lay a foundation for future organization by former cavalry 
members in revolts against the Republic of Turkey’s authority. These two 
dissertations are related to Yavuz’s25 article on the paths of Kurdish nationalism 
in Turkey, with the elites on one hand and the cavalry on another. Eventually, 
these two paths joined, but the marriage was not harmonious. 
Watt’s26 dissertation explores Kurdish nationalism and its politics in Turkey 
across the twentieth century. She focuses on the development of the Kurdish 
diaspora in western Turkey, which was created by deportations in the first part of 
the twentieth century and by migrations away from violence and economic 
hardship in the southeast. She provides an excellent foundation for the rise of 
organization and nationalism among the Kurds during the 1920s and 1930s. In a 
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similar fashion, Otucu’s27 research examines violence between the Republic of 
Turkey and its Kurds. While Otucu’s study places emphasis on the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), it covers the earlier stages of Kurdish nationalism and 
rebellion. 
Pasley’s28 work centers on British ambitions on Turkey following the 
Ottoman Empire’s defeat and its abrupt end with the rise of Mustafa Kemal and 
the Republic of Turkey. Her study covers developments from the war’s end to the 
Treaty of Lausanne. Ali’s29 dissertation is one of the most thorough works on the 
Kurds in British Iraq, covering the period from World War I to the end of the 
mandate in 1932. It provides useful information and sources regarding British 
policy toward the Kurds. Ali’s subject matter is wide ranging, canvassing topics 
from economics and agriculture to the various Kurdish nationalist efforts and 
British actions toward them. 
Other academic works provide accounts of events and decisions 
surrounding the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Sèvres. Ahmad’s 
work, Kurdistan During the First World War,30 chronicles the destruction and 
change that took place during the war. It also details the set up for the postwar 
claims to territory by the Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, and the Allies. 
Helmreich’s From Paris to Sèvres31 chronicles the Ottoman Empire’s entry into 
negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference and the emergence of the Treaty of 
Sèvres. Fromkin’s A Peace to End All Peace32 is one of the most comprehensive 
accounts of the Ottoman Empire’s entry into World War I and the aftermath of its 
defeat. MacMillan’s Paris 191933 is an in-depth work on the Paris Peace 
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Conferences, which sought the creation of a lasting peace among the warring 
parties. It has extensive information on the Treaty of Sèvres, why it failed, and 
the renegotiation of the terms with the new Republic of Turkey in the Treaty of 
Lausanne. Another similar work is by Goldstein,34 who offers an analysis of the 
individual treaties and the course of events following them. The impact of the 
Treaty of Sèvres begins with the treaty itself, which is largely a product of U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism and idealism encapsulated in his 
Fourteen Points. This document, and the ideas behind it, provided the basis for 
self-determination among the non-Turkish populations of the Ottoman Empire. 
While the treaty was never ratified, it remains an important artifact among 
Kurdish nationalists because it provides not only international acknowledgement 
of the Kurds as a people, but also for their statehood. This dissertation does not 
focus on Woodrow Wilson or American policy at the time, but the ideas promoted 
by Wilson and the establishment of international institutions, namely the League 
of Nations, aimed at solving the world’s problems are relevant. 
A work from the period is Isaiah Bowman’s The New World.35 He 
describes the post-World War world and its many challenges. This text went 
through four different versions across the 1920s as situations changed. The first 
edition in 1921 had a chapter dedicated to the Kurdish question,36 but by the 
fourth edition, in 1928, Bowman removed the chapter in favor of a more robust 
section on the Republic of Turkey.37 Bowman’s work provides insight into the 
situation of the Kurds following the First World War. Bowman’s 1926 edition 
includes a supplementary contents section on the Treaty of Sèvres and the 
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postwar developments in the former Ottoman Empire. In these notes he opens 
with, “the Treaty of Sèvres, signed but never ratified, has finally become a dead 
letter and the revised political maps of the past three years must undergo still 
another revision.”38 Referring to non-Turkish minorities Bowman writes, “The 
long-sustained policy of the Ottoman Empire with reference to deportations, 
massacres, and conscription had brought about ethnic distributions calculated to 
make the setting up of government by minorities an almost impossible task in 
1919, even if territorial adjustments and boundary definitions had not presented 
problems of the first magnitude.”39 However, Bowman’s statement with regard to 
an independent Kurdistan is flawed, for the Kurds were concentrated mainly 
within their traditional territory and had expanded into former Armenian lands to 
become the dominant population north of Lake Van. Another error of Bowman’s 
is his assertion that, “There is to be full and complete protection of life and liberty 
to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, 
or religion.”40 Further, Bowman states, “Instruction in their own language is to be 
provided for non-Moslem nationals in Turkey in those districts in which they form 
a considerable portion of the total population.”41 The interesting aspect of 
Bowman’s observation is that he shifts from the rights of all citizens of Turkey to 
those of non-Muslim citizens. This second statement meant that because most 
Kurds were Muslims they would not receive education or services in Kurdish. 
Turkey did extend full rights to all its inhabitants as long as they renounced any 
previous affinities and their heritage in favor of a new “Turkish” identity and 
loyalty to the state. 
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When Kemal rose to power and the Republic of Turkey was born, the 
British had to contend with a new force in Turkey. The actions and posturing of 
the Turks influenced British activities in the region, Iraq, and especially in 
Kurdistan. The works of Lewis,42 Hale,43 and Mango44 are important to this study, 
because the three scholars have been granted access to information from 
Turkish archives in their studies. These works provide pieces for the Turkish 
puzzle regarding the rise of the republic and its policy toward the Kurds. Lewis45 
chronicles the rise of modern Turkey and offers the Turkish perspective on the 
Kurdish question. Hale’s46 analysis of Turkish foreign policy is useful for its 
perspective on disputes with Iraq, cooperation with the Soviet Union, and British 
concerns over both. Mango’s47 biography of Kemal Atatürk delves into the life 
and career of Turkey’s founder and chief decision maker during the republic’s 
formative years. Atatürk’s legacy toward the Kurds is a mixture of abandonment 
and hostility to Kurdishness, yet he sought to incorporate the Kurds into the 
republic as “Turks.” Atatürk was an ambitious man with grand dreams and many 
successes, but his efforts to change a people’s identity met with fierce resistance 
that persists. Mango captures the good and the bad features of Atatürk’s 
leadership. 
Several works on the establishment of Iraq have been published in recent 
years with the increase of interest in that country since the U.S.-led invasion in 
2003. Catherwood48 examines Winston Churchill, then Secretary of the Colonies, 
and his role regarding the future of Iraq. This book meshes nicely with Olson’s49 
article on the Churchill-Cox correspondences over the status of southern 
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Kurdistan. Two similar works are Dodge’s Inventing Iraq50 and Polk’s 
Understanding Iraq.51 Both of these works link the current U.S. policy in Iraq with 
that of the British in the 1920s. They also offer useful social and political 
backgrounds to the creation of Iraq and the revolutionary changes brought upon 
the people by the British policies. Both works highlight Kurdish aspirations and 
British actions in response. Even with the rebellions and anti-British activities of 
the Kurds, cultural and educational rights were given to Kurds in Iraq. This 
provoked animosity from the Turkish government. The Turks believed the British 
were encouraging Kurdish nationalism in Iraq as a way to undermine Turkey’s 
grip on its own Kurdish population and territories. These works follow Iraq’s 
precarious relations with its neighbor to the north. Another related study of 
interest is Atarodi’s Great Powers, Oil and Kurds in Mosul.52 The work is 
concerned with the control of the Mosul vilayet and the competition on many 
fronts for the territory and its resources. Beck53 focuses on the same question 
from the British perspective, using correspondences to reconstruct the dispute. 
The Creation of Iraq54 is a volume of collected articles on Iraq’s beginning. 
This volume covers different aspects of Iraq’s creation from the perspectives of 
the people to the importance of resources to the settlement of border disputes. 
Chief among the articles of importance to this study is Izady’s55 piece on the 
Kurdish position during Iraq’s birth. Izady examines the uncertainty of a Kurdish 
state following two abortive attempts to create one by the British. With statehood 
out of the question, Izady then turns his attention to the rebellions of Sheikh 
Mahmoud Barzinji and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani. He follows these up to the final 
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rebellion of Mahmoud in 1931. Fromkin56 discusses the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
between the British and the French. This was an important question in the early 
postwar Middle East because the French held a claim to Mosul in the agreement. 
However, the British felt it should be part of their domain since their army seized 
it. They wanted it to be included with either an independent Kurdistan or to be 
attached to Mesopotamia. Fromkin highlights the concessions granted to the 
French and the transfer of the dispute to the British and the Turks. The Turks 
maintained their claim to Mosul, arguing that the British stole a march to illegally 
seize it after the Ottoman Empire’s surrender. This dispute was solved years 
later after referral to the League of Nations. Shields57 and Cuthell58 present 
articles on the Mosul dispute and the question of the Iraqi-Turkish border. 
Sinnott’s59 piece on the Russian Revolution perhaps seems out of place for a 
collection of articles on the creation of Iraq, but it examines the consequences of 
that change and the revolution’s openness to nationalities. His focus is on those 
nationalities south of the Caucasus, including those in Ottoman territories. It was 
a few years after the revolution that the Soviet Union was able to assert its 
control over Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The British and governments in 
lands adjacent to the former Russian Empire feared that a Soviet military 
incursion or the appeal of Soviet ideology would undermine or end their rule. 
The Great Game is an important backdrop for this study, especially the 
geopolitical aspect of it. A background on the competition is useful. For this, the 
works of Hopkirk60 and of Meyer and Blair-Brysac61 serve the purpose. These 
texts offer the big picture of British policy and political maneuvers in the region 
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and toward geopolitical strategy. The Great Game had been taking place before 
the period focused on in this study, yet it is important to understand how it relates 
to the aftermath of World War I in the former Ottoman territories, specifically with 
regard to Kurdistan. 
 
Nationalism 
The two main schools of thought regarding the origins of nationalism are 
the primordialists and modernists. Primordialists hold that nations have ancient 
roots, and that the nations of today are expressions of these roots. Modernists, 
on the other hand, argue that nations are modern creations. The primordialist 
position is best explained by Geertz, who articulates the concept of “assumed 
givens.”62 These assumed givens are characteristics that individuals are born into 
and brought up within: language, religion, social customs, and assumed blood 
ties. According to primordialism, these givens have continuity and provide a basis 
for community through time. This is the view taken by many Kurds who believe 
their community dates back to the Medes of the sixth century, B.C.63 Indeed, 
Geertz categorizes the Kurds as an assumed blood ties group.64 Geertz makes a 
comment pertinent to the situation of the Kurds in Turkey:  
To subordinate these specific and familiar identifications in favor of a generalized 
commitment to an overarching and somewhat alien civil order is to risk a loss of 
definition as an autonomous person, either through absorption into a culturally 
undifferentiated mass or, what is even worse, through domination by some other 
rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community that is able to imbue that order with the 
temper of its own personality.65 
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This statement characterizes their experience of having transitioned from the 
multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish 
government’s drive to Turkify all of its citizens. 
Gellner, a modernist, states that nationalist movements are a result of the 
homogenizing forces of industrial society, and that organization of nations is 
essential for a cohesive workforce and a unified country.66 Gellner’s argument is 
useful because it offers insight into the ability of a nation to unify and forge a new 
state, or at least the forces needed for such an end. 
Similarly, Anderson’s idea of imagined communities identifies 
characteristics for self-definition, comradeship, and the emergence of nations.67 
These nations, or imagined communities, are communities that are perceived to 
exist, but members of this community will not meet all other members during their 
lifetime.68 Also, these communities are perceived to be limited and have a certain 
number of members, yet the exact number is never known.69 He offers that 
language and religion are the two most common cultural characteristics by which 
a community identifies itself.70 He argues that nations are a modern creation,71 
and that religious and linguistic forces are often used to draw people together in 
nations. It is Anderson’s argument that the advent of print capitalism allowed for 
the creation of imagined communities.72 Print capitalism, even in largely illiterate 
communities, allows for a record to be kept and mythology to be created for the 
posterity of the nation.73 It also allows for a wider transmission of nationalistic 
ideas and the greater sense of community spread over great distances. Like 
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Gellner,74 Anderson notes that imagery and symbols can be used in appeal for 
strengthened feelings of unity.75  
Smith looks to both primordialism and instrumentalism in his theory of 
nationalism. He acknowledges the roots of many groups as pre-modern, and 
asserts that instrumentalism of industrial societies reinforces identity.76 Smith’s 
fusing of primordialism and instrumentalism for a systemic theory of nationalism 
meshes well with the progression of Kurdish national and political consciousness 
and provides a useful theory for analyzing the development of Kurdish 
nationalism. Smith’s fusion involves the idea of a homeland, unique language, 
self-definition separate from surrounding groups, and hostile surrounding 
groups.77 
It is useful to consult Hartshorne’s78 concepts of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces. Centripetal forces are those that unite a population, while centrifugal 
forces divide. These concepts are an asset for identifying factors affecting 
Kurdish nationalism. Of related importance are Gottmann’s79 thoughts on 
iconography and circulation. These ideas are helpful for identifying the 
manipulation of symbols intended to unite people, and for identifying movement 
and communication of people and ideas. 
Cruz’s80 work on collective identity in Nicaragua and Costa Rica argues 
that the historical experiences of the people of the two states differ greatly and 
affected the political stability of both countries after they became independent. 
Cruz’s study is insightful because it offers theory for why states develop 
differently even though their situations may be similar. This approach to 
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comparative politics is useful to this study involving the rise of Kurdish 
nationalism in the neighboring countries of Turkey and Iraq. In both countries, the 
Kurds are a sizable minority and are in majority coreligionists with the dominant 
groups. However, because of differences in histories of governance and cultural 
attitudes, the situations and Kurdish nationalism evolved quite differently. 
Marx’s81 concepts of inclusion and exclusion provide the study with a 
framework to gauge Turkish and Iraqi inclusionism or exclusionism toward the 
Kurds, as well as the Kurds’ actions toward other Kurds. Marx puts forth the idea 
that inclusion and exclusion change over time and circumstance, depending 
largely on the objectives of the core group involved. An example of such an 
occurrence relates to the Kurds of Iraq. The Yezidi population of Iraq has 
generally been kept to the fringes of Kurdish society, and many Yezidis have 
been content with that arrangement. However, Sheikh Ahmed’s attempt to create 
a new Kurdish religion, based on all the faiths practiced by Kurds throughout the 
region, sought to bring the Yezidis into the fold of the pan-Kurdish movement. 
While the attempt backfired, it demonstrates the change that can occur. Because 
of their subject matter and their application across varied cultures and places, 
these works provide an ideal framework for this study. 
 
Territoriality 
Sack’s definition of territoriality as ”an attempt to affect, influence, or 
control actions and interactions (of people, things, and relationships) by asserting 
and attempting to enforce control over a geographic area” 82 is an instructive 
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basis for understanding Kurdish rebellions between world wars and beyond. Two 
important facets of territoriality are that “the attempt to control space is a basic 
feature of human existence deeply embedded in social and political relations,” 
and “territory is a social construct that is fundamentally embedded in social 
processes.”83 Territoriality by nature includes and excludes,84 which marries the 
concept to the idea of inclusion and exclusion in nationalism.85 From this 
meaning of association with the land, people “define themselves to a significant 
degree in terms of space, deriving their sense of identity from specified tracts of 
land.”86  
Knight states, “The concept of territory is involved in every type of system 
of political organization.”87 This can even be informal organization in terms of a 
nationalist movement. Knight suggests that territory is a psychological and 
cultural construct, and that “‘Geographies of the mind’ can and do find expression 
in the way space is structured; landscapes as perceived by the occupants can 
have powerful symbolic links to a group’s territorial identity.”88 This 
characterization meshes well with the perceptions of the Kurds toward Kurdistan. 
Knight raises an intriguing question when he asks, “Should all groups with 
distinct territorially based identities have the right to separate territorial and 
political independence?”89 This question was doubtless on the minds of those 
attendees of the Paris Peace Conference when deciding how to parcel out the 
Ottoman Empire. 
While Kurdistan does not have any exact boundaries, the mountains of 
southeastern Anatolia, to the north of Mesopotamia, and the northwest of the 
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Iranian Plateau have been generally regarded as Kurdish by Kurds and outsiders 
alike.90 The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres legitimized a portion of this perceived territory 
when it demarcated lands for two Kurdish autonomous regions to possibly be 
joined for an independent Kurdish state. The treaty’s provisions changed many 
Kurds’ perceptions of themselves and their lands. Murphy states that “To create 
an area with legal or administrative significance is to bring into being a functional 
spatial unit that can profoundly alter ideas about social groupings.”91 The mere 
suggestion of such a spatial unit for the Kurds had the effect of generally 
strengthening the Kurds’ territoriality and fostering the idea of an independent 
Kurdistan.92 Murphy further states that identity “is inherently territorial” and that 
special considerations for groups “can help sustain and promote ethnic social 
cleavages.”93 Blacksell94 offers that symbols are also an important component of 
both nationalism and territoriality, and that signage, especially in frontier areas, is 
an example of such. The power of symbolism is one of the reasons the Turkish 
government eventually banned the public display of the Kurdish language. The 
Turks did not want to allow the Kurds any symbols to rally around. 
Murphy’s work on territorial claims justified by historical factors is focused 
on interstate conflicts regarding territory, yet many points he makes are relevant 
to the Kurds as a stateless nation in a struggle for an independent homeland. His 
statement that “territory is at the heart of national identity and cohesion”95 applies 
to the Kurds and their perceptions of Kurdistan. His comments on the Paris 
Peace Conference make reference to ethnic claims to territory based on history, 
and he notes, “Consequently, justifications for territorial change during the 
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interwar years were frequently rooted in ethnic-cum-historical arguments.”96 All of 
the major Kurdish rebellions during this period were rooted in this argument. 
Blacksell makes a point that “territoriality must be communicated, either 
physically on the ground, or through some form of easily decipherable graphical 
representation on a map or plan.”97 Two interesting studies pertaining to Kurdish 
territoriality and the perception of Kurdistan have been conducted by O’Shea98 
and by Culcasi.99 O’Shea’s work involves the Kurdish perception of Kurdistan, 
while Culcasi’s work examines Kurdistan as portrayed in Western media. 
O’Shea100 presents the concept of Kurdistan from its early placement on maps 
up to present claims of territory in the minds of Kurds. Perceptual geography 
provides some psychological underpinning to the concept of a people’s perceived 
territory and its link to nationalism. O’Shea’s work is filled with maps depicting 
differing ideas of where Kurdistan is. She offers explanations for the 
visualizations through discussions on political agendas, resource concerns, and 
cultural preferences of the Kurds. 
Culcasi101 offers a different perspective on Kurdistan, one which explores 
the Western, often Orientalist, concept of Kurdistan. She examines hundreds of 
map depictions of Kurdistan from Western press agencies to determine the 
purpose or error of depiction on the part of the presenters. These depictions 
often obscure Kurdish territory or anger states whose own political territory is 
included in the depiction. 
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Political Geography 
 An objective of this study involves the consideration of the geopolitical 
ramifications of Kurdistan in the larger context of the interwar period and the 
renewal of the Great Game. Two interesting and controversial theories are of use 
to this analysis: Mackinder’s Geographical Pivot/Heartland Theory102 and 
Spykman’s Rimland Theory.103 Since Mackinder’s works have often been 
criticized as environmentally deterministic, many scholars have shunned them.104 
However, these works provide part of a useful framework for examining 
Kurdistan’s situation within the competition for control of territories and resources 
between Turkey and Iraq. While this is not an examination of Soviet foreign 
policy, it will examine the British and Turkish fears of competition from a 
resurgent Russia in the form of the Soviet Union. 
 In 1904, Halford Mackinder proposed the idea of the Geographical Pivot105 
in the heart of the Eurasian continent. A power controlling it could become a 
superpower if it applied itself to the task. This zone included the lands of Central 
Asia, the Transcaucasus, and a large portion of the Eastern European Plain. The 
area includes large swaths of fertile lands and is bordered on the south by 
barriers of deserts and uplands that comprise a natural fortress. At the time, 
Russia was an adversary of Britain’s, and the two countries were still engaged in 
the Great Game throughout Central Asia. However, Mackinder also saw the rise 
of Germany on the horizon and recognized the potential of either Germany or 
Russia, or an alliance of both, to control the Geographical Pivot. In all cases 
considered, the British saw India threatened, and the specter of the British 
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Empire’s demise looming should the threat go unchecked. However, the Great 
Game ended, albeit temporarily, with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Conference. With 
World War I, and the ambitions of Germany and its alliance with the Ottoman 
Empire, a competition in Asia ignited between the Central Powers and the British. 
The Russian Empire, in alliance with the British and French, planned for new 
territories to be annexed from a defeated Ottoman Empire. However, the 
Bolshevik Revolution took hold in Russia and brought about a new government 
and a Russian withdrawal from the war. The changes in Russia included a 
nullification of all treaties and agreements the Russian Empire had made with 
other countries. The emergence of the Soviet Union and the appeal of 
Bolshevism among working classes in many countries, including the British 
Empire, brought on a sense of anxiety among the British and a renewal of the 
Great Game. As Gottmann notes, Mackinder “warned constantly against the 
danger of a possible decline of the British Empire.”106 
The Soviets eventually began to assert their claims to lands of the 
Russian Empire in the Caucasus and in Central Asia that had been virtually 
independent since the fall of the empire. The rise of Soviet power along the 
fringes of the Middle East and South Asia worried British officials and was 
predicted by Mackinder’s 1919 Democratic Ideals and Reality,107 in which the 
Geographical Pivot was refined and replaced by the term Heartland. In this work, 
Mackinder revised some of his boundaries for the Heartland. A criticism has been 
leveled by some108 that the lack of clarity regarding the Heartland’s borders is a 
great weakness of his theory. However, clear boundaries for such an overarching 
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theory would be a weakness because the Heartland is a zone rather than a 
country. The zone can change based on different criteria. The fact that the theory 
does not have definite boundaries allows it to be flexible over time and 
circumstances. This accounts for the theory’s reemergence several times across 
the past century. 
As a global sea power, Britain had to devise a method for countering the 
force of a rising Heartland power. This counter was not articulated in a published 
form until World War II, during a time when Germany made another drive at the 
Heartland. This time the strategist was Nicholas Spykman, his manuscript The 
Geography of the Peace109 being published posthumously. What he envisioned 
was the importance of Mackinder’s Inner or Marginal Crescent, what he termed 
the Rimland, against the Heartland. Spykman saw strength in the Rimland rooted 
in its populations, its resources, and its control of the strategic gateways between 
itself and the Heartland. Some observers have maintained that Spykman’s theory 
refutes Mackinder’s theory, yet this argument appears misplaced. Spykman’s 
work is more appropriately termed a solution to Mackinder’s Heartland 
superpower problem. Indeed, either directly or indirectly, the Rimland Theory was 
the basis for containment against the Soviet Union after World War II.110 Critical 
analyses of the Heartland Theory and the Rimland Theory are of use to this 
study. Meinig111 offers interpretation of these theories of “positional supremacy” 
by examining them in a historical context. Parker’s112 biography of Sir Halford 
Mackinder features both Mackinder’s life and a defense against criticisms of his 
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ideas. Blouet’s study of geopolitical developments across the twentieth century 
offers continuing relevancy of Mackinder’s ideas.113 
The relevance of both of these theories is born out in the geopolitical 
situations this dissertation examines. The position of Kurdistan is between the 
Heartland and the Rimland. Furthermore, Kurdistan is one of the gateways 
between the two zones. It leads from Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and the Iranian 
Plateau into the Caucasus Mountains. Kurdistan had been divided among the 
British, French, and Russians in a variation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. After 
World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, Ottoman Kurdistan was an area of 
contention. Since Russia left the war, its claims were no longer held, which left 
the British and French to their claims. This settled, the British and the Turks vied 
for control, and the idea of an independent Kurdistan was killed. 
 In addition to the works of Mackinder and Spykman, ideas from other 
geopolitical studies are supplementary to this study. One articulation of the 
usefulness of these theories has been made by Zoë Preston in The 
Crystallization of the Iraqi State.114 However, she stops short of in-depth 
investigation of the physical setting in relation to the interests of the parties 
involved, be they British, Arabs, Turks, Kurds, or Soviets. As Preston notes, “Iraq 
was an important buffer for the Ottomans, between their core areas, and the 
tribal unrest of southern Arabia, and between their empire and European 
encroachment into the Gulf region.”115 She also notes that the location of the 
country “shaped the British interest,”116 thus enabling the British to establish a 
Middle East link to India. This link stretched from Egypt and Cyprus in the west to 
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Burma in the east. The British held sway in some form or another from the 
Mediterranean to the eastern Indian Ocean. The significance of this can be found 
in Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. The British strategy that materialized is spelled 
out by Spykman’s Rimland Theory, which was published two decades later.  
 Lattimore’s “The New Political Geography of Inner Asia”117 offers many 
insights on physical and political geography that may be applied to the Kurds and 
the renewed Great Game by the British following the Russian Revolution. 
Lattimore’s study examines the positions of frontiers and the people that inhabit 
those zones. Indeed, zone is a more appropriate word than borders because “the 
frontier ‘line’ is in fact a legal abstraction.”118 These lines often “divide kindred 
peoples from each other and place them under different political 
sovereignties.”119 This describes exactly the situation of the Kurds. Another 
aspect of frontier society that Lattimore observes is that “the divided frontier 
people has no sense of kinship with either of the major nationalities between 
which it is divided;”120 therefore the frontier people tend to shift loyalties to the 
prevailing side. This is another accurate description of Kurdish history whether 
relating to the Turks, Persians, Arabs, or British. 
 Lattimore’s description of Mackinder’s ideas is useful because he notes 
the context of the Great Game and the “stabilization of the balance between sea-
power and the ‘heartland.’”121 This stabilization came with the 1907 Anglo-
Russian Conference, which “ended” the Great Game by establishing recognized 
domains for the Russians and the British in Asia. The situation changed with 
World War I, when Germany set its sights on Russian territories for its eastern 
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ambitions. When Russia withdrew from the war and the Bolsheviks gained 
power, previous treaties and other agreements were nullified. The Russian 
Revolution sparked renewed fears among the British that the Russians would 
advance on India or incite the population there to mutiny. 
 The political landscape of the region and of Kurdistan following the First 
World War was one characterized by instability and uncertainty of the future. The 
war brought out animosity within the myriad of ethnicities for which the region 
was known. Mass deportations and massacres caused trust to wane quickly as 
neighbors who once coexisted peacefully became enemies. All that was familiar 
to Ottoman subjects was overturned with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and 
the invasion of British forces. The British strategic imprint became visible on the 
political landscape following the treaties and parceling out of territory. The 
political geographical theories presented above provide an understanding for the 
changes and the objective of those changes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology presented in this chapter is used to aid analysis of the 
rise of Kurdish nationalism and territoriality within the context of the 1920 Treaty 
of Sèvres, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and British and Turkish policies toward 
the Kurds and Kurdistan. It uses documents housed in the British Public Records 
Office in association with other historical and academic works to analyze the 
difficulties Kurds faced in their attempts to gain an independent homeland and to 
unify the Kurdish people in a fashion that neighboring nations had accomplished. 
Qualitative methods are employed for extraction, organization, and analysis of 
information from the documents. 
 
Historical Methods 
The primary sources for this research are declassified documents from the 
British Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Air Ministry.1 The collections contain 
thousands of documents and cover a wide range of interests to the British 
Empire. Not all of these documents are important to this study, and an effective 
method of sorting the relevant documents from the rest is required. Hoxie notes 
the dangers and difficulties in dealing with large amounts of information in 
 62 
archival research in an “attempt to get at the meaning of any definite problem by 
first filling the mind with a mass of information, relevant and irrelevant, 
indistinguishably intermixed.”2 Some mixing of relevant and irrelevant information 
is unavoidable, but an overall sorting of the two can be achieved. If specific 
topics are known, as they are here, these topics and others relating to them can 
be used to sort documents. Harris3 recommends no single approach to dealing 
with archives. Instead, he believes the researcher should decide the appropriate 
method for examination. He also notes the importance of the researcher studying 
secondary sources prior to archival research for an understanding of what work 
has been done before. Familiarity with previous studies helps the researcher to 
know what to look for and what sorts of questions to ask when perusing historical 
documents.4 
Fortunately, each document used in this research has a brief description 
listed in the table of contents of each volume. Documents are first flagged based 
on their association with relevant topics. This process narrows the search 
considerably, as the vast majority of documents in the collections are not 
relevant. However, after the initial sorting, hundreds of documents are left for the 
researcher to examine. The next step is the time consuming, but necessary, 
process of reading each document. 
Harris5 warns against preconceived biases regarding information. In the 
case of documents examined for this dissertation, such biases could include the 
argument that British oil interest was what denied the Kurds an independent 
homeland, or that British imperial arrogance divided Kurdistan. By the same 
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token, a belief in British benevolence toward the situation would qualify as a bias. 
Potential biases are something the researcher should be aware of to prevent 
clouding the meaning of data. A number of interpretations and assumptions 
should be made based on the same sets of information. Note taking should 
capture points from documents without changing the context of the source in the 
process.6 Sometimes quotes should be lifted to preserve their meanings. 
Because copying archival documents can be impractical and expensive, notes 
need to capture all pertinent information. 
Content analysis is an effective and efficient method for examining 
documents and extracting important information.7 The type of content analysis 
employed here involves taking notes and cataloguing information. Dibble8 
identifies four types of inference, which include testimony, social bookkeeping, 
correlates, and direct indicators. Testimony is defined as a document based on a 
single interview or an account of something.9 Testimonies used here include the 
memoirs of British officials and accounts of events recorded by officials in the 
Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Air Ministry. Social bookkeeping refers to a 
document or a series of documents produced by an institution or a group 
detailing events.10 Documents from the above-mentioned British governmental 
institutions may also fall under this type of inference because some documents 
are group efforts that involved information collection, analysis, and production. 
Correlates are data that do not deal directly with an event, but may be used as 
ancillary evidence to validate or invalidate historical claims.11 However, correlates 
are a type of data that the researcher may happen upon rather than seek out.12 
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An example of a correlate could be a travel account of an individual who 
witnesses refugees streaming across an international border from a rebellion. 
The account does not focus upon the rebellion, but could provide information on 
it where information is suppressed. This type of information is particularly helpful 
when official accounts lack information about activities in remote areas. The final 
type of inference is the direct indicator, which provides a direct answer to a 
historical question.13 Sources containing such direct answers are treaties such as 
the Treaty of Sèvres or the Treaty of Lausanne. These are agreements between 
conflicting powers that define conditions of peace, and they provide direct 
information on what was supposed to occur as a result of cessation of hostilities. 
Dibble notes that Foreign Office correspondences may also be considered direct 
indicators if the historical question asked is the theme of a correspondence.14 
While these categories are not mutually exclusive, they aid in organizing large 
volumes of information for historical analysis. 
The historical documents examined here contribute information pertaining 
to the activities of the Kurds and to the activities and ideas of the British and 
Turkish governments. These sources offer first-hand accounts of what took 
place. They also offer rumors and fears regarding the Kurds and the general 
geopolitical situation then. The information extracted from the documents is not 
necessarily factual, but it does lend itself to the British, Turkish, and Kurdish 
perspectives at the time. Many of these documents relay British officials’ 
conversations with Turkish officials and Kurdish nationalist figures. The British 
Empire as a world power enabled British officials to access a variety of people, 
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including non-state actors. Candid conversations are reported along with 
analyses of the interactions. Additionally, these British documents provide an 
inside view of the inner workings of the British Empire. Historical documents as 
textual representations of events should be understood through the lens of 
context in which they were written rather than as absolute historical fact.15  
Another useful method employed here is classification. This is used in 
association with content analysis. Classification aids organization of the large 
amounts of information.16 Documents that are useful may have a particular 
theme, or they may address several issues. Categorizing data according to 
different aspects of this research makes the data easier to locate and connect to 
other relevant information.17 General classifications used in this study are 
nationalism, territoriality, and geopolitics of states. More specific categories are 
direct relation with the Kurds, relationship to Kurdish lands, relationship to other 
governments regarding the Kurds, or relationship to other governments regarding 
Kurdish lands. 
Following extraction and organization of information, the data is 
interpreted through a series of theoretical frameworks involving nationalism, 
territoriality, and political geography. This analysis is accomplished through the 
construction of a political geographical history of the problem. The use of history 
here enables a reconstruction of events and how they played into the situation 
that resulted. 
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Advantages and Disadvantages of Historical Descriptive Research 
A benefit to researching historical questions is that the events are 
constrained by a period of time. The events in question are not continuing to 
unfold as the research is progressing; therefore, revision of analysis does not 
usually occur because of current events. Owing to the reliability of the sources, a 
reasonably clear picture of events and their significance can be constructed. 
Description allows for richness of interpretation of the problem, and it allows for a 
story to unfold. The results of this research may offer a reinterpretation of history 
as has been known or accepted. It is an opportunity to expand existing 
knowledge and invigorate further investigation into events of the past. This 
research does not merely involve reading historical documents and organizing 
them into a chronology on a given theme, but rather it analyzes information 
contained within the records against academic works and against theories in 
order to answer the research questions. 
Historical descriptive research offers a medium to explore the past in a 
way that promotes expanded inquiry. In geography, this type of research entails 
the geographical dimension in addition to events across time. Geographic 
thought regarding how nations coalesce and how the concept of territoriality rises 
among nations lends much to the understanding of these issues. Geopolitical 
positioning of competing states is also an area of contribution from geographic 
thought. This is the case with the British and the strategy behind their global 
empire. Geography played a major role in Britain’s securing of the perimeter 
around India. An understanding of how this positioning affected the Kurds and 
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their bid for independence is essential to understanding their position as a 
stateless nation today. 
An argument against historical descriptive research in geography is that it 
is more history than geography. Geography and history are intertwined, and to 
leave out history results in a one-dimensional understanding of the “Kurdish 
question.” Theories used in this dissertation are based in political geography, and 
this research is intended to be an application of that subdiscipline to the situation 
of Kurdish nationalism and territoriality during the interwar period. Geography’s 
cross-disciplinary ventures are frequent and necessary, and are in keeping with 
geography as a holistic discipline.18 
A disadvantage of historical research of this nature is that history is open 
to wide interpretation with biases in politics, economics, and various worldviews. 
Because this is qualitative research, there are many possible perspectives that 
could be held using the same sources. Sources may be skewed in favor of the 
prevailing power, namely the British. Because the Kurdish people lacked a strong 
voice at the time, no definitive history of events was chronicled from a Kurdish 
perspective. A British perspective on the Middle East is often met with 
accusations of orientalism, or emphasis of the exotic and “backward” aspects of 
Middle Eastern society. This is the criticism Edward Said levels regarding many 
western observations of the Middle East.19 However, the diplomatic and 
intelligence documents used here are of a nature that severely discourages 
sensationalism, since they were intended to inform policy makers and other 
officials. 
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Mindsets and biases are another difficulty to recognize when dealing with 
historical descriptive research. These can be linked to orientalism, or quite the 
opposite in attempting to glorify the populations being studied as being 
something they are not. An orientalist bias might characterize the Kurds as noble 
savages. Alternatively, Kurds could be characterized as ignorant hill people, as is 
evidenced in David Lloyd-George’s memoirs.20 Often, revisionists seek to rewrite 
history, only to do further harm to the record by introducing ideas from another 
period or values from another culture onto the people and the events of the past. 
These problems highlight why it is important to understand the perspective and 
motivations of the actors involved. While the totality of historical figures’ mindsets 
cannot be known, enough can be gleaned from documents to reconstruct those 
mindsets and how they related to the issues of their day. This problem may also 
be present in the narratives of secondary sources. By relying on these works, 
there is a degree of risk associated with an author’s bias toward issues. 
Finally, a criticism of historical descriptive research is that it is not rigorous 
enough. This accusation is misplaced because not all value is to be gleaned from 
hard science or mathematical calculations. Statistics can reveal some aspects of 
the past, but only within certain limitations. A historical approach involving 
events, policies, and human relation to geography may come across as being 
entirely subjective to some researchers. An absence of hard, agreed upon facts 
makes some scholars nervous about this type of research. However, this 
apparent absence offers a worthy challenge for objective research to be 
conducted, and to tell the most complete story possible while considering a 
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variety of relevant factors. Historical descriptive studies offer a wealth of 
information about the past that can be used as guides or lessons toward current 
or future problems. 
 
Content Analysis and Organization of Information 
The method of content analysis used here aims to bring out the meaning 
and importance of what is being said and who is saying it from the British 
documents, and serves as a means to organize the information for historical 
analysis. The method used here is used as a follow-on method after the 
appropriate documents have been pulled from the collections, and is meant to 
aid in collecting information from the documents regarding the intentions of the 
British and their perceptions from interacting with the Kurds, Turks, Arabs, 
Iranians, French and Soviets. Because the British Foreign Office, Colonial Office, 
and Air Ministry were the UK’s main foreign affairs instruments in the Middle 
East, the importance of the discussions and reports is paramount to this study.  
The content analysis performed on the primary documents focuses on 
what is being said about geopolitical, national, and territorial issues involving the 
Kurds and Kurdistan. Information gleaned from the documents is used to 
understand what influenced the British on Kurdistan and what in turn influenced 
other parties, especially the Turks, involved there. By understanding what the 
British and the Turks were focusing on in their geopolitical policies, an 
understanding of Kurdish actions can be constructed in terms of their emergent 
nationalism and territoriality. The benefit of using these declassified British 
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documents is that they yield an insider’s view to the geopolitical maneuverings of 
the British Empire, their adversaries, and would-be clients. 
To accomplish this content analysis, the documents are first read in full to 
examine them for information relevant to the themes. When information 
connected with these themes, directly or indirectly, is recorded, the information is 
used to construct an idea or set of ideas regarding British perceptions of the 
issues. The language the British use and the importance of the individuals writing 
gives insight into British policy toward the Kurds and the region. Even if ideas 
discussed were never put into practice, they still lend themselves to an 
understanding of what the influences upon decisions were. The reshaping of the 
lands of the Ottoman Empire was a dramatic change to the geopolitical 
landscape, and the British authorities held a great deal of power in the matter. 
Categories were chosen based on their relevancy to the research 
questions. These categories make the data easier to deal with by organizing the 
large volumes of information for historical analysis. The major categories are 
further subdivided to create an ease of use and to add extra dimensions to the 
catalogue of information. These further divisions, or subcategories, are based on 
themes discovered from reading the documents. Subcategories emerge as a 
mental construction of events and their significance becomes known from the 
data. While these categories are not necessarily perfect, they go a long way 
toward putting the documents in the proper context for this study. From these 
contexts, links can be drawn among the events that might not otherwise be 
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made. Subcategories are based on themes evident in the data; therefore, it 
follows that they should be organized accordingly. 
 The theme of nationalism applies mainly to the Kurds, but also to 
neighboring populations. Accounts of the activities of these other groups are 
important because they affect the Kurdish nationalist efforts. Nationalism is 
subdivided according to its relationship to the Kurds. Turkish nationalist efforts to 
subjugate Kurdish identity is an example of a subdivision. This is an important 
subcategory because so much of the history of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey 
across the twentieth century is tied to Turkish governmental suppression of 
Kurdish identity. Another example is Kurdish nationalism and Armenian 
nationalism working in concert. This subcategory is important, but limited to a 
certain period. It should be separated because it is a distinct theme within the 
context of nationalism, and represents a shift away from Islamic appeals to 
Kurdish identity. 
Territoriality is a theme based on the concept of Kurdistan as a 
geographical expression. This category is applied to characterizations of 
Kurdistan by the Kurds, Turks, and the British. The Kurdish perspective of 
Kurdistan is one of the major focuses of this dissertation, but the Turkish and 
British perspectives are valuable as well. Kurdish land claims is one subdivision 
of this category, and it involves the mental concept of Kurdistan as an entity, 
albeit an elusive one. Turkish and Iraqi claims to Kurdistan as integral parts of 
their state territories are another subcategory. These countries’ claims are linked 
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more to civic nationalism than to ethnicity, but their pull is powerful and integral to 
understanding why Kurdistan became divided politically. 
 Geopolitics applies to a wide spectrum of items. This category is intended 
to be general because it includes the various dealings of the powers involved. By 
organizing the information under this umbrella links may be determined about 
how one event influences another, and influences the Kurds in turn. Subdivisions 
of this category include British relations to the Turks regarding strategic territory 
and resources, British perceptions of Soviet intentions, Turkish relations to the 
British and Iraq, and Turkish perceptions of Soviet intentions. These 
subcategories are important to define because they provide a basis for linking 
events, policies, and ideas together. This research does not focus on the actual 
Soviet policies toward the lands south of the Caucasus, but the reported 
perceptions of the Soviets and what they might do is key to understanding the 
actions taken by the British and the Turks. 
 The information extracted from the sources is then assembled into a 
chronological sequence for analysis of how events were shaped and how they 
played out onto the political, cultural, and physical landscapes of Iraq and 
Turkey. This method eases organization and enhances clarity of the information 
for analysis with other sources used here. Additionally, this process helps 
manage information for use with the geopolitical and nationalist theories explored 
in this study. 
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Limitations of the Study 
This study faces several limitations. Most of the primary sources used are 
British, but as Great Britain was the main shaper of the modern Middle East’s 
borders, these documents provide a window to the inner workings of that 
shaping. Turkish and Kurdish perspectives on these events are limited. The 
Kurds do not have a national archive; therefore, there exist no official Kurdish 
histories of the events of the time. Turkish archives have only recently been 
opened to scholars. Most of the documents are in Turkish, some of which are in 
the Ottoman form of Turkish no longer understood by most contemporary Turks. 
Such sensitive issues as Kurdish nationalism and rebellions would not be a well-
received request for study in these archives, especially with the attention to the 
ongoing conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 
However, many authors whose works were featured in the last chapter have 
been able to access Turkish documents and other materials; therefore, 
confidence in these sources is accorded. These secondary sources provide a 
window into the Turkish archives and the perspectives of the Turkish 
administrations regarding the post world war situation. 
A similar problem exists with Iraqi records. However, with the British 
having run Iraq until 1932 and having held close cooperation with Iraq 
immediately thereafter, most of the records are covered by the Foreign Office, 
Colonial Office, and Air Ministry. Iraqi perspectives, apart from those reported in 
the British documents, are more difficult to come by; therefore, secondary 
sources have been used as a solution to this information gap. 
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Not all documents from the British Public Records Office have been 
examined for this research. That would be an impossible task for one person. 
However, the best available documents have been used. The primary source 
documents used here number in the hundreds. These documents offer a picture 
of the British perspective on many fronts as well as reporting conversations with 
other actors and the “feeling on the street” among local populations in Iraq and 
Turkey. While these documents provide most of what is desired to answer the 
research questions, they do not provide everything needed. Where there are 
primary source gaps, secondary sources are meant to fill these. By filling these 
gaps clear answers to the questions can be articulated. 
Finally, the historical period and the area of focus are limitations on the 
study. Kurdish populations exist in neighboring states, and have engaged in 
nationalist and territorial activities over the past century. However, this 
dissertation is limited in its emphasis on these communities because it focuses 
on Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, where nationalism and territoriality were most 
pronounced after World War I. This is also where an independent or autonomous 
Kurdistan was proposed by the Treaty of Sèvres. This focus is intended to be 
specific with regard to the research questions. By placing focus on Kurds in Iran, 
Syria, and the Soviet Union, the focus would be lost. These Kurds are relevant to 
this dissertation, but did not play a major role in the events that unfolded in Iraq 
and Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
KURDISTAN AND THE BIRTH OF AN IDEA 
 The end of World War I, the Paris Peace Conference, and the 1920 Treaty 
of Sèvres mark the beginning of attempts to define the boundaries of Kurdistan 
and the first instance of international promotion of the right of the Kurds to an 
independent homeland. The treaty and the ideas it embodied were adopted by 
Kurdish nationalists as justification for their efforts, both peaceful and violent, to 
achieve self-determination. British and Turkish geopolitical maneuvers in and 
around Kurdistan prevented the Kurds from obtaining their homeland. The Kurds 
themselves were unable to unite because of geographic, political, and cultural 
divisions. Despite these hindrances, strong Kurdish nationalist movements 
developed during this period that would serve as examples for later movements. 
During this period, British policy went through three stages with regard to 
the region and its peoples. The Kurds were affected by British policy because 
initially it provided for a Kurdish homeland. A postwar objective of the Allies was 
to break up the Ottoman Empire to establish a series of nation-states in the 
European mold, including a Kurdistan. The policy changed when Turkey 
emerged to become a regional power once again. The rise of Turkey brought 
confusion to London’s policy until George Nathaniel Curzon, the former Viceroy 
of India, gave it a new direction by brokering a peace with Turkey. Curzon was
 77 
influenced by Halford Mackinder’s geopolitical ideas regarding the Geographical 
Pivot/Heartland Theory. Both men recognized the importance of geography and 
its role in the Great Game. Curzon’s experience in India and Mackinder’s ideas 
led to a defined British policy of containing threats from the Soviet Union by 
surrounding the Heartland through British presence and influence. The Turks, 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, were attempting to create a new Turkish 
identity that included Kurds, as long as they adopted the new Turkish civic 
identity, to reassert Turkey’s position as a regional power. Some Kurds chose to 
follow Ankara’s new direction, while others sought separation from the Turks in 
favor of an independent Kurdistan. 
 Sharif Pasha, a Kurdish expatriate living in Paris, was the sole 
representative of the Kurdish people at the Paris Peace Conference, and the 
negotiators only briefly took him seriously. His spirited effort did little to influence 
the negotiations, as the Allies had planned to award a Kurdish state of some sort. 
However, his map of Kurdistan (Figure 4.1) became a visual representation of 
Kurdish territory that captured the imaginations of nationalists. The Allies had 
made up their minds to provide for a Kurdish state before negotiations even 
began. The British had already experimented with a Kurdish government in 
Sulaymaniyah prior to the war’s conclusion. 
 Kurdistan under the previous Ottoman regime had served as a guard 
against Russian expansionism through the Caucasus. The British renegotiated 
the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres with the Turks with the aim of restoring the 
Turkish buttress against the Heartland, at the expense of an independent  
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Kurdistan and Armenia. The Treaty of Lausanne established Turkey’s claims to 
Anatolia to the borders of the Soviet Union and Persia. The question of Mosul, 
then claimed by the British in Iraq, was left open for later settlement. Possession 
of Mosul by the Turks would have given Ankara control of most of the formerly 
Ottoman Kurdish lands, thus enabling the Turks to deal with the Kurdish 
nationalists without foreign interference. 
 A nationalist sentiment among Kurdish elites had occurred in the late 
1800s, and events during and after World War I had prompted a wider notion of 
nationalism and territoriality among Kurds. However, not all Kurds bought into 
these concepts, as some still clung to a pan-Islamic sentiment. As postwar 
events unfolded, more Kurds were brought into the fold. Kurdish elites needed a 
wider base of support, which rural sheikhs could provide. Some of these sheikhs 
sought to lead, themselves, instead of cooperating with the urban elites. The 
power shift that occurred in the 1800s from Kurdish princes to the sheikhs held 
fast as figures such as Sheikh Said emerged to lead a brief insurgency against 
the Turks. Similarly, Sheikh Mahmoud fought against the British and Arabs in 
Iraq. 
 
Kurdish Nationalism Versus Postwar British and Turkish Geostrategies 
 Kurdish nationalism following World War I was characterized by the 
emergence of territoriality. This rise in territoriality was precipitated by the Paris 
Peace Conference and the Treaty of Sèvres, particularly articles 62-64, which 
proclaimed the rights of Kurds to a homeland and self-determination in 
 80 
government. The Kurdish delegate at the conference, Sharif Pasha, following his 
sidelining presented a pamphlet with a map depicting a future independent 
Kurdistan, which is the first Kurdish inspired representation of Kurdistan.1 As 
such, the idea gained momentum with the Kurds of Kurdistan and those in the 
diaspora. 
 Factors influencing the rise of Kurdish nationalism and territoriality during 
this first stage were the British concern over Soviet control of the Eurasian 
Heartland and over the position of the emergent Republic of Turkey in relation to 
the Soviet Union. The British had planned to create a buffer against the 
Heartland by using Armenia and Kurdistan in the same fashion as Afghanistan 
relative to the Heartland and India. The gateway from the Caucasus into the 
Middle East was a natural route for the Soviet Union to take for a southward 
move. The security of the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula were essential 
for the British link with India, and London wished to protect it. 
 Though the Russian Empire had fallen and the communist revolutionaries 
were striving for control in Russia, communist intrigue in the Caucasus and the 
Middle East began to revive fears in the British Empire of the Great Game 
renewed. This fear was expressed in 1919 in correspondences between British 
Royal Navy officials who noted the Bolsheviks’ aim was to turn Muslims against 
the British Empire.2 How this could be achieved was addressed by British 
Oriental Secretary Andrew Ryan, who observed, "We cannot crush Pan-Islamism 
any more than we can crush the nationalisms of the West. Our aim must be to 
divide, to conciliate, and to rule. It is necessary to divide and to conciliate, 
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because we do not want Moslems to rally as a whole round the fundamental but 
at present half-forgotten principle that Moslems should not be ruled by non-
Moslems."3 Ryan recognized the strength of nationalism and religion, and it 
would be this very combination that Kurdish leaders would use to rally followers 
to their causes in the following years. 
 Ryan met with several Kurdish leaders as peace negotiations were still 
taking place in Paris. Seid Abdul Kadir sought the support of the British for 
Kurdish aspirations.4 Kadir expressed confusion over French designs in 
Kurdistan, and voiced Kurdish concern over Turks and Bolsheviks,5 as well as 
stating that the Kurds wanted British protection only, yet they would be content to 
remain under the Turkish flag with complete autonomy granted.6 He noted that 
the Turkish Grand Vizier made no distinction between Turks and Kurds.7 Kadir, 
like the British, sought a barrier against Bolshevik advances from the Caucasus.8 
He "insisted that all the Moslems this side of the frontier were Kurds, and that if 
they were to be used at all as a barrier against Bolshevism, it must be as 
Kurds."9 He acknowledged Kurdish disunity, but claimed that if the British helped 
the Kurds, the Kurds would serve the British.10 Kadir feared the partition of 
Kurdistan into several small states "based on a very definite prognostication in a 
letter from Sharif Pasha,"11 who thought Kurdistan was better undivided under 
the Turkish government, but with autonomy.12 Ryan thought the Turks had 
influenced Sharif Pasha into this conciliatory mindset, and wrote that Kurdistan 
should be separated from Turkey into British and French protectorates.13 British 
Foreign Secretary Curzon clarified Britain’s position on a future Kurdish state as 
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a policy for an autonomous Kurdistan, not British, French, or Turkish.14 
 Rifts in the Russo-Turkish alliance began to show. Curzon was made aware 
that conflict had emerged between the Kemalists (supporters of Kemal and his 
vision of a modern, secular Turkish republic) and the Bolsheviks, and that the 
Kemalists hated everything about the Bolsheviks, but took aid for their nationalist 
aspirations. 15 Curzon was informed that the Kemalists might be ready to drop the 
Bolsheviks as soon as Turkey established normalized relations with the Western 
powers.16 The subject of the Straits offered Turkey an opportunity for settlement 
with the West, and the head of London’s Commercial Mission in Moscow, R.M. 
Hodgson, alerted Curzon that "Russia would be opposed to Turks gaining a 
footing in Europe or controlling Dardanelles, and would accept a solution which 
would internationalise latter while respecting Turkish sentiment,” and that the 
Soviet Union might “act as intermediary."17 Curzon was wary of Soviet ambitions 
south of its borders when he wrote to the British ambassadors in Istanbul and 
Moscow stating that the Soviets were to propose an alliance with Turkey, Persia, 
and Afghanistan.18 The latter two countries were especially worrying because 
they were key to the protection of India. 
 Kurdistan was again up for discussion, and it again alarmed the Persians. 
The Persians asked the British, French, and Italians for admission to the 
Lausanne Conference because of Kurdistan and the potential effects on the 
Persian lands adjacent, but Curzon refused the Persians entry because there 
was to be no modification of boundaries with Persia.19 Curzon sought to allay 
Persian anxieties when he stated "there is no question of setting up a Kurdish 
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State or a Kurdish autonomous province under Turkey as was contemplated in 
Treaty of Sèvres."20 
 Though Kurdistan’s independence was no longer up for discussion, the land 
an independent Kurdistan would have encompassed was. The status of Mosul 
had become a contentious issue with the Turks, since the British had seized it 
after the armistice had taken effect. The Turks appealed to the French for Mosul 
with no results, and the British feared the Turks would ally with the Soviets and 
move southward.21 
 Curzon knew that the Turks had accused the British of causing agitation of 
Kurds in Iraq, which meant trouble in Turkey. However, the British intercepted 
Turkish commander Euz Demir’s communications with the Persians and the 
Kurdish leader in Sulaymaniyah, Sheikh Mahmoud, which indicated he was 
working with them to drive out the British.22 The British chargé in Istanbul 
observed that Ankara was seeking to restore Kurdish confidence in Turks.23 This 
was a new tactic by the Turks to gain control over Anatolia. Soviet sponsored 
communist activities uncovered in Anatolia and Istanbul began to concern the 
Turks.24 This concern was an opportunity the British aimed to turn to their 
advantage by obtaining peace and containing the Soviet Union. 
The end of this first stage of British policy marks the British attempts to 
reconcile differences with Turkey while maintaining order in Iraq with its Kurds. 
This also marks the shift of Turkey toward the West and away from the Soviet 
Union, which would transfer Turkey to a buffer against the Soviets and end the 
idea of Kurdistan as a state. However, the Kurds remained important to the 
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British, but they were a potential tool of the Soviets within border states. Because 
Turkish nationalism had clear leadership under Mustafa Kemal, and its 
organization was firm and objectives clear, Turkish nationalism trumped Kurdish 
nationalism. The British were entering a period of undefined, or perhaps flexible, 
policy toward the Kurds of Iraq. The Kurds were as yet unorganized and the 
establishment of new states and their borders would serve to keep the Kurds that 
way, or that was what the governments in those states believed. The next stage 
of British and Turkish policies toward the Kurds is also a stage for the beginnings 
of Kurdish mass organization and revolt. 
 
The Great Game, the Heartland, and the Geopolitics of Kurdistan 
 As a marchland between the Ottoman Empire and Persian empires 
(Figure 4.2), Kurdistan had a degree of autonomy. Kurdish principalities were 
allowed to thrive by the empires in return for not causing them grief. This 
changed when the Ottoman Empire removed its subsidies to the principalities 
and dismantled them in favor of centralization throughout the empire. An 
examination of the overarching geopolitical context of Kurdistan and the 
beginnings of Kurdish nationalism and territoriality provides insight into why an 
independent Kurdistan did not emerge, even after its being sanctioned by a 
treaty. 
Following the Russian Empire's defeat by the Japanese in 1905, the 
Liberal government in power in London felt that St. Petersburg no longer posed a 
threat to the British Empire. The British ended the competition for territory, 
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influence, and markets it had waged against the Russian empire, otherwise 
known as the Great Game, with the agreements reached at the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907.25 This entente involved the recognition of British and 
Russian spheres of influence regarding Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet26 (Figure 
4.3). Three years previously, Sir Halford Mackinder gave a lecture that was 
published in the Geographical Journal entitled “The Geographical Pivot of 
History.”27 
Early in his career, Mackinder noted that history without geography is a 
narrative without a context, arguing that geography and history are intertwined 
and lend insight into human-environmental interactions.28 Mackinder’s 
examination of the history and geography of Eurasia resulted in his Geographical 
Pivot/Heartland Theory. This idea, first introduced as the Geographical Pivot 
(Figure 4.4), stated that control of the interior lands of Eurasia, the Heartland, by 
a power could allow that power to control the whole of the continent and 
beyond.29 The Heartland is difficult to place exact boundaries upon, but 
Mackinder generally associated it with the European Plain and the steppes of 
Central Asia. These lands were suited to horsemen and camel-men, who had 
long roamed the region, sometimes with the purpose of conquest. The Silk 
Routes traversed these lands, thus connecting Asia with Europe and Africa. 
Across these lands, Genghis Khan launched his great empire, which eventually  
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spanned the continent. European discoveries of sea routes diverted commerce 
from the Heartland and led to the demise of the Silk Routes, but the physical 
geography remained unchanged. Technological advances in transportation  
during the late 1800s promised to connect more places and make travel faster. 
Curzon, then Viceroy of India, noted the potential of railroads to connect Eurasia 
after his travel on the newly opened Transcaspian Railroad in the Russian 
Empire in 1888. When he presented his observations and concerns to the Royal 
Geographical Society, his Oxford classmate, Mackinder, took interest in and 
shared his thoughts on the matter. Both Curzon and Mackinder agreed that the 
transcontinental linkage of the Russian Empire foretold of networks of rails to be 
built throughout Eurasia and the implied power this would entail. The two men 
found the prospect troubling, for if Russia could mobilize in such a way, it or 
another power held the potential to become the world’s most powerful state.30 
What troubled Mackinder and Curzon most was that this potential superpower 
was not likely to be the United Kingdom, but Russia, Germany, or an alliance of 
the two. Such a power posed a threat to the British Empire, especially its 
interests in India and, increasingly, the Middle East. 
Kurdistan, like Afghanistan, falls within both the Heartland and the coastal 
fringes of Eurasia, what Mackinder called the Inner Crescent and Spykman later 
called the Rimland.31 Kurdistan’s peripheral position became important to control, 
even if only through proxy. The region had served as a marchland between the 
Ottoman and Persian empires, and served as a gateway between the Heartland 
and Rimland. Kurdistan as an invasion route provided the Mongols and Turks 
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access to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. This was a 
troubling thought for Mackinder when he mentions the region, though not as 
Kurdistan, in 190432 and 1919.33 Indeed, Curzon regarded the Persian Gulf as 
India’s western maritime frontier.34 Kurdistan in Mackinder’s 1919 Democratic 
Ideals and Reality sits at the point where the Heartland meets the European 
Coastland and Arabia.35 Because of its location, Kurdistan was likely to be 
divided by the powers of the Heartland and Rimland. When Turkey began to 
reassert itself with Soviet help, it seemed very likely that this division would 
occur, with Turkey in the Heartland’s sphere. The political geography of the 
region influenced Kurdish territoriality by causing Kurdish nationalists to believe 
Kurdistan was not peripheral, but central, in regional affairs.36 The importance of 
Kurdistan at states’ peripheries did not lead to importance accorded to the Kurds 
and their bid for statehood. 
The events that transpired at Sèvres at first seemed to secure the Kurds a 
place of their own in the region. The terms of the treaty were also favorable to the 
British, who wished to enhance their interests in the region. This was all the more 
important since the fall of the Russian Empire, and London sought security for 
India against whoever came out on top in the Heartland. However, the treaty was 
never ratified, and its terms became unlikely to be implemented with Mustafa 
Kemal’s successes in establishing the Turkish republic and expelling foreign 
forces from Anatolia. The focus of the Allies changed from redrawing the region’s 
borders to obtaining a new peace agreement with Turkey. Kemal’s threat to 
British control over Mosul made the Turkish reclamation seem imminent. Kemal 
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felt that if he controlled formerly Ottoman Kurdistan, he could crush Kurdish 
nationalism without foreign interference, and make Kurds into Turks in the 
process, thus increasing the manpower of his new republic. A peace was 
negotiated with the Turks at Lausanne, with Curzon as London’s main negotiator, 
though the status of Mosul was tabled for later resolution. Turkey acted for a 
while as a buffer for the Soviets against Allied interests in Arabia. Moscow 
needed time to solidify its power, and did not wish to expose itself to the British or 
others seeking to redirect its future. Turkey provided a diversion. The Kurds were 
left further divided as a result. There was not to be a future Kurdistan as both 
components that were originally slated to be joined together as a Kurdish state 
were incorporated into Iraq and Turkey. Having achieved a meaningful peace 
agreement, the British and the Turks moved to consolidate their interests in their 
respective portions of Kurdistan, though they did so in different ways. 
For the Soviets, access to warm water ports through either Moscow’s 
direct control or a strong ally would insure their weight on the high seas. The 
Soviet Union had warm water ports on the Black Sea and at Vladivostok on the 
Pacific, thus leaving Moscow with a far-flung port at the eastern terminus of the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad and ports that were bottled up by a series of 
chokepoints. The British greatly feared that the Soviets would push southward to 
access the Indian Ocean. The invasion route most feared by the British during 
the Great Game was through Afghanistan into India. Another option that worried 
the British was a Soviet move through the Caucaus and Kurdistan, possibly with 
Turkish cooperation. This would give the Soviets access to the eastern 
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Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Adding to the troubles was 
the wealth of hydrocarbons beneath the soil, the extent of which had not been 
thoroughly evaluated. The British Royal Navy had recently switched from coal to 
oil to power its vessels, and was depending on these finds to fuel the British 
Empire. 
This Geographical Pivot, later renamed the Heartland, was loosely defined 
as the Eastern European Plain and Central Asia. This area, if properly exploited, 
provided a wealth of resources for an empire and opened to all points of Eurasia 
through gateways.37 Mackinder saw rapid transportation, particularly through 
railroad networks, as the driving force of a Heartland power.38 This was the first 
time in history in which world domination was becoming a possibility based on 
technological advancements in transportation, communication, and weaponry.39 
Mackinder’s warning was that those countries that had the means could place 
themselves in such a unique position to advance beyond being a great power to 
a superpower. 
 The British heeded this warning, and countered the potential threat from 
the Heartland by surrounding it with a presence in the Rimland. British policy in 
the Middle East was first and foremost oriented toward protecting India, the 
crown jewel of the British Empire. Britain wanted a connection to India from the 
eastern Mediterranean. This involved the Suez Canal as an outlet from the 
Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, but it also involved a chain of control and 
influence across the southern coastal fringes of Asia.40 This was partly aimed at 
providing a direct land and sea link from Europe to India, and partly to surround 
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the Eurasian Heartland.41 This second goal was tied to the first in that it sought 
protection for India from any power in the Heartland seeking to venture 
southward to threaten the British Empire.42 
Prior to World War I, the Ottoman Empire had become known as “the Sick 
Man of Europe” for all its financial troubles and inability to retain control of many 
of its territories from encroaching European powers in Europe, the Caucasus, 
and North Africa.43 The Ottomans had at one time held territories linking Europe, 
Asia, and Africa together. These lands had long been of strategic value to 
empires, and were becoming more important strategically and economically for 
the European empires. Transportation since the Industrial Revolution had 
become ever more rapid, and the use of machine transport was extended to 
Ottoman lands.44 The importance of oil was becoming evident, especially to the 
British Navy, but was still not clearly defined as an international interest.45 World 
War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire changed the British Empire’s 
interests as well as those of other countries in the more developed world. 
The British did not seek outright annexation of formerly Ottoman 
territories; rather they strived to create a string of friendly and supportive Rimland 
states to guarantee against a threat to India from the Heartland.46 What troubled 
the British going into World War I was the alliance between Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire because Germany had positioned itself not only to command 
Eastern Europe but the Middle East and Central Asia should Russia be defeated 
or somehow co-opted into their geopolitical scheme.47 Such an alliance posed a 
direct threat to India. The Germans knew how to develop and utilize a 
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transportation network of the kind that Mackinder described in the Geographical 
Pivot to dominate Eurasia.48 Adding to this threat was the power held by the 
Sultan of the Ottoman Empire as leader of the Muslim world. The British retained 
the memory of the 1857 Mutiny, reinforced the potential of a Sultan-proclaimed 
jihad.49 During the First World War, Germany attempted this plot, with the Kaiser 
allegedly proclaiming to the Ottoman people and Muslims in the British Empire 
that he had converted to Islam; but the strategy backfired.50 
The British remained concerned about threats to India, and Kurdistan 
became an area of interest akin to that of Afghanistan.51 Though the British knew 
they might not be able to control Kurdistan directly, they saw the region as a 
gateway to and from the Caucasus and into Russia.52 During World War I, the 
Russians had penetrated into southern Kurdistan from Persia.53 The political 
maneuverings of the Bolsheviks to make peace with the Turks following the 
Russian Revolution worried the British. The Russians under monarchic rule had 
continued expansion of their Asian empire, and the British did not believe the 
Bolsheviks’ anti-imperialist pronouncements.54 The British, particularly Curzon, 
feared the Great Game was to be renewed with Russia under a new guise.55 
 
Roots of Kurdish Nationalism 
 The idea of an independent Kurdistan had been promoted in the past and 
had been attempted four decades earlier in the 1880s, during the revolt of Sheikh 
Ubaydullah. He promoted the establishment of an independent Kurdistan 
consisting of territories then in the Ottoman Empire and Persia. His rebellion was 
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the first of its kind; therefore, it is necessary to turn to these events and others 
that led to the organization of the Kurds before proceeding to the matters that led 
to their nationalist efforts between world wars. 
Kurdish national consciousness dates back centuries before the rise of 
Kurdish political nationalism. Epic stories and poems, such as the Sharafnama 
and Mem-u-Zin, demonstrate this self-awareness and struggle.56 Kurdish political 
nationalism is mostly a phenomenon of the twentieth century, but it has roots in 
events of the late nineteenth century.57 The Kurds were never fully under the 
direct rule of any non-Kurdish authority despite foreign entities claiming Kurdistan 
as part of their territories.58 Kurdistan’s mountainous and remote setting afforded 
the Kurds a degree of isolation from foreign powers, but Kurdish communities 
were also isolated from one another.59 This geographical seclusion made it 
difficult for the Kurds to unify culturally and politically. With the rise of the 
Ottoman Empire and the Safavid and Qajar empires in Persia the Kurds became 
important as subjects of those foreign entities, particularly during conflict between 
the powers.60 The Kurds were fairly autonomous since Kurdistan served as a 
marchland between the empires.61 In competition for loyalty from the Kurds, the 
two empires set up feudal systems, which allowed for the establishment of 
several Kurdish principalities in the mountainous frontier area.62 
Turkish and Persian efforts to organize Kurdish allies represent the 
beginnings of Kurdish nationalism. These empires granted local powers to 
Kurdish chieftains, thereby allowing cohesion of Kurds within these areas to take 
place, albeit to a limited extent.63 It was during the nineteenth century that 
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Kurdish leaders began to recognize their people as separate from the groups 
surrounding them. Until the nineteenth century, organized Kurdish nationalism 
was absent, as most Kurds saw themselves as Muslims and thereby kin to Arab, 
Turk, and Persian alike.64 At the same time, these Kurdish principalities were at 
odds with one another, and on occasion a leader appealed to the Turks or 
Persians for assistance against their own family members.65 
 During the last phase of Ottoman control in Kurdistan, from Tanzimat 
(modernizing reforms, 1839-1879) until World War I, Kurdistan enjoyed 
autonomy as a buffer zone between the Ottoman Turkish heartland of Anatolia 
and the Persian Empire in the east.66 Kurdistan also served as a buffer to 
Ottoman-ruled Mesopotamia lying to the south of Anatolia and to the Russian 
controlled Caucasus to the north.  
The mountains of Kurdistan had never been subject to direct rule, 
because such a pursuit had proved fruitless time and again as a result of Kurdish 
superiority in alpine warfare.67 Indirect rule, through autonomous and semi-
autonomous principalities, allowed the Ottoman and Persian empires to maintain 
relative calm in their Kurdish borderlands over the centuries.68 
Two events in the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century led to the 
beginnings of Kurdish nationalism in the twentieth. The first element is the 
destruction of the Kurdish principalities in the frontier between the Ottoman and 
Persian empires.69 This change left a power vacuum in Kurdistan in which ruling 
Kurdish elites were replaced by religious leaders.70 The Russo-Turkish War of 
1877-78 devastated Kurdistan, and left the region in lawlessness and poverty 
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with little help from the Sultan.71 The resulting 1878 Treaty of Berlin brought 
peace between the empires but gave special protection to the Armenians, thus 
giving rise to suspicions among the Kurds and other Muslims of an emerging 
Armenian state.72 Kurdish sheikhs saw Ottoman policies as ineffective and un-
Islamic, thus they attempted to lead their faithful away from any allegiance to the 
Sublime Porte.73 The Kurdish leader Sheikh Ubaydullah sought a complete break 
of a united Kurdish population from Ottoman rule, thus severing the pan-Islamic 
ties that held the empire together for centuries.74 
 In 1879, tensions gave way to violence between the Kurdish and 
Armenian populations, and led Ubaydullah and his followers into a full-scale 
revolt against the Ottoman Empire.75 Ubaydullah also invaded Persia’s Kurdistan 
region seeking to unite both Ottoman and Persian Kurdish subjects.76 He failed to 
win the support he needed in the Kurdish populations of the empires and the 
revolt crumbled under combined pressure from Ottoman and Persian forces.77 
Where Ubaydullah did not succeed, his idea of an independent Kurdistan and 
pan-Kurdish unity endured. This rebellion was the first occasion in which the idea 
of an independent Kurdistan and unification of the Kurdish people was promoted 
in a far-reaching effort. Other groups met new Ottoman centralization plans with 
resistance, but Ubaydullah’s goal was the outright severance of the Kurdish 
people from the empire.  
The second development toward Kurdish nationalism came after the 
Ottomans crushed Ubaydullah’s revolt and saw the need to counter religious 
backlash.78 Sultan Abdulhamid II was still Caliph, the supreme leader of the 
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Islamic world, and his court in Constantinople wanted to reassert that authority 
over the Kurds. The Ottoman Empire was also trying to balance Islam with 
modernization.79 Officials believed that much of the religious backlash was out of 
simple ignorance of the ways of the rest of the world, and that by planting 
enlightened and modernized Kurds back into Kurdistan they could bring the 
majority of Kurdish society to their side.80 To accomplish this feat, the Porte 
devised an all-Kurdish cavalry, known as the Hamidiye Light Cavalry, later known 
as the Tribal Light Cavalry.81 The cavalry was created in 1891, and officials 
sought out officer recruits from influential Kurdish tribal populations.82 These 
officers were trained in Istanbul, thereby being educated and exposed to 
modernity and its values.83 The Ottomans attempted to instill loyalty to the state 
while addressing Kurdish pride through the creation of this new force.84 Thus, a 
corps of loyal Kurds was sent back to Kurdistan to act as a new elite, keeping 
check on unruly elements as well as an increasingly restless Armenian 
population. The Hamidiye was also designed to monitor Russian ambitions in the 
east; therefore, they served the dual purpose of early warning and frontier 
force.85 
 The irony of the Hamidiye was that it was created to instill a loyalty to 
Turkey but instead it gave some Kurdish nationalists military and organizational 
experience for their cause later in life.86 While serving with Ottoman forces in the 
Balkans, these Kurdish officers were exposed to nationalism of the Turkish and 
Arab officers as well as the various peoples of the Balkans. The cavalry provided  
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Kurds with a form of structured solidarity.87 This group of Kurds understood 
modern technology and how to use it to their advantage.88 
 Nationalism of groups surrounding the Kurds (Figure 4.5) had an influence 
upon the future of Kurdish nationalism. The Young Turks sought to modernize  
Turkey and base the new identity upon secularism and Turkish traditions rather 
than the Islamic cosmopolitanism that had prevailed for centuries in the empire.89 
A nascent Pan-Turanian, or Pan-Turkish, feeling was expressed among some 
individuals who turned toward other Turkish populations in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia.90 This sentiment affected the Kurds in two ways. It caused some to 
question the Pan-Islamic future of the Ottoman Empire, while in others it led them 
to consider the prospects of Kurdish identity and a united Kurdistan.91 
The Armenians also influenced the Kurds. Armenian nationalist groups 
had formed in the middle of the nineteenth century, and had been subverted the 
Ottoman Empire, often at the behest of the Russian Empire.92 The Armenians 
began pushing for greater rights, and secret societies such as the Dashnaksutiun 
(Dashnak) and the Hunchak Committee engaged in subversion and revolts 
against the Ottoman Empire.93 The nationalist boundaries of Armenia overlapped 
considerably with Kurdistan.94 Kurdish and Armenian interaction for centuries had 
been cordial, but the exchanges across the latter nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries became increasingly hostile and bloody.95 The Armenian nationalists 
both angered and inspired the Kurds around them. 
These various influences combined to push Kurdish identity toward 
political nationalism. The geopolitical context in which Kurdish nationalism and  
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Figure 4.5: The Kurds and neighboring peoples. 
Source: Bowman, Isaiah. 1921. The New World: Problems in Political Geography. New York: 
World Book Company. 
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territoriality rose and was challenged is essential to this discussion. The following 
section addresses the external influences involving strategic policies of major 
powers upon Kurdistan. 
 
World War I and Geopolitical Intrigue 
World War I brought calamity to Kurdistan, though it was not part of the 
main theater. Kurdistan had been swept through by Ottomans, Russians, and the 
British. Crops had been devastated because of the fighting and lack of attention 
to the fields.96 After bitter fighting between the Kurds and the Armenians, a circle 
within the Ottoman government plotted to ethnically cleanse the Armenians from 
Anatolia.97 Many Armenians fled to the Caucasus with hopes of Russian 
protection, while others were marched into the Syrian Desert, often being 
attacked and killed en masse along the way.98 However, these hostilities 
between Kurds and Armenians were to be short-lived. 
The British and the French thought they had the entirety of the Ottoman 
Empire within their grasp before the close of World War I. The Sykes-Picot 
Agreement was a secret arrangement between the British and the French, which 
parceled out the lands of the Ottoman Empire between them in the event of an 
Allied victory.99 The agreement was made in 1916, but was altered with the 
Russians to make the Sykes-Picot-Sazonov Agreement (Figure 4.6), thus giving 
Russia a share of strategic territory.100 Later, the Greeks and Italians made 
claims to the defeated Ottoman Empire’s territories, further complicating the 
scheme.101 Kurdistan was divided among the British, French, and Russians prior  
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to the Russian Revolution of 1917.102 The British and the Russians had put away 
their Great Game rivalry since 1907, though having a French buffer between their 
claims was likely satisfactory to both empires.  
A turning point in the Middle East’s future came with the Russian 
Revolution in 1917, when the Bolsheviks gained enough power to oust the 
monarchy and bring about a Russian withdrawal from the war. The Bolsheviks 
made a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire.103 Unbeknownst to the 
Ottoman Empire’s subjects, large swaths of Ottoman territory had been promised 
to the Russians including the straits and Constantinople as well as much of 
Armenia and the northern portion of Kurdistan by the Sykes-Picot-Sazonov 
arrangement. The Bolsheviks soon denounced and made public these secret 
agreements, much to the embarrassment and chagrin of the British and the 
French.104 This change affected the Sykes-Picot maps in that there was no 
longer a need for the French to hold the Mosul vilayet as a buffer zone between 
the British and Russian interests.105 Thus the area’s future was left in question. 
A new contest in the war’s eastern theater emerged with the removal of 
the Ottoman Empire’s most feared rival, the Russian Empire.106 Some Ottoman 
officials, however briefly, sought to build a new Turkish empire stretching from 
Anatolia to the Turkic areas of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, Mongolia, 
and Xinjiang.107 The Bolsheviks sought to spread their doctrine among the former 
Russian Empire’s territories.108 The British, fearing threats to India and its new 
security interests in the Middle East, wanted to defeat both Bolshevik and Turkish 
ambitions to attempt restoration of order surrounding the British Empire.109 The 
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Kurds were caught in the middle of this turmoil, and their future would be shaped 
by the outcome of the events to follow. 
The British had advanced inland from the Persian Gulf intending to drive 
the Ottoman forces out of Mesopotamia, but the resistance they met was firmer 
than expected. The British had been embarrassed by the incident at Kut in 1915, 
where forces had become stranded and encircled by Ottoman troops. The loss of 
thousands of British and Indian forces in attempts to lift the siege was a high toll 
the British wanted to insure was not wasted.110 After more resources were 
directed at the Mesopotamian problem, the British were able to push northward. 
British troops were stretched thin upon their entry into a largely deserted 
Baghdad, and their commanders knew they needed every advantage for control 
and stability they could muster.111 When Kurds hostile to Ottoman authority 
appeared capable of controlling southern Kurdistan, the British leapt at the 
opportunity to form a Kurdish autonomous government.112 
The British experimented with a Kurdish government based in 
Sulaymaniyah in 1918.113 They embarked upon this course to create stability in 
that portion of Kurdistan and as preparation for an independent Kurdistan to be 
carved out of the Ottoman Empire. The British saw an independent Kurdistan at 
that time as a potential buffer state at one of the gateways into the Heartland.114 
An independent Armenia would have served the same function, though Armenian 
ties to Russia troubled the British.115 The British had many other security 
concerns to deal with directly; therefore, an autonomous Kurdish area was 
welcome as long as it did not interfere with neighboring areas and peoples.116 
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 The Kurdish government in Sulaymaniyah was led by Sheikh Mahmoud 
Barzinji, an ambitious Kurdish leader who believed in uniting the Kurdish people 
under his rule.117 Mahmoud’s ambitions, however, undermined his cause as his 
attempts to incorporate more territory under his jurisdiction offended other Kurds 
and the British alike.118 A Kurdish revolt against the British in Kirkuk and 
Sulaymaniyah broke out in response to British efforts to limit Mahmoud’s power, 
and Mahmoud’s followers were able to briefly seize Sulaymaniyah, Rawanduz, 
and Erbil.119 Activities of the Kurds beyond the Persian frontier would eventually 
influence Kurds in the Persian Empire, thus raising the Persian government’s 
concerns over the sanctity of his territory. Any concerns Persian administrators 
had were also concerns of the British, as they wanted to maintain their influence 
in Persia.120 The British abandoned the Kurdish government only to resurrect the 
idea a few years later.121 
 British Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck voiced his concern to 
Curzon, then chief of the Foreign Office’s Eastern Department, that some who 
were representing the position of the British government were opposed to 
Kurdish nationalism and wishing to support its destruction. De Robeck went to 
great lengths to voice British non-interference and emphasized that Kurdistan 
should be decided by others.122 He also expressed his fear of a Pan-Islamist 
movement rising from the Ottoman Empire’s ashes and its implications for the 
British Empire in India. He expressed his weariness of the Bolsheviks in Russia, 
and informed Curzon of the many threats and challenges Britain faced in postwar 
Eurasia,123 all of which played heavily into British views on Kurdistan. 
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The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Sèvres 
 After the cataclysm of World War I, the Paris Peace Conference offered 
the opportunity for a new world. The optimism and idealism promoted by U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson aimed for a lasting peace reinforced by an 
international framework and fraternity of states.124 The principle of self-
determination from Point Twelve of Wilson’s Fourteen Points instilled false 
confidence in minority populations of the Ottoman Empire that they would soon 
be able to choose their own paths as independent nation-states.125 
 The British found the Ottoman theater of the war much more difficult than 
they had imagined. At war’s end, the British had a hard time maintaining troop 
concentrations in the Ottoman Empire.126 The cost of the war was enormous, and 
the politicians and population back in Britain sought to hasten troops’ return 
home.127 The Allies’ plans to carve up the Ottoman Empire were equally 
challenging to execute because the different peoples of the empire were seeking 
their own futures, rather than leaving outsiders or their old overlords to decide for 
them.128 
 During the war, more attention was paid to the Armenians than to the 
Kurds. This was likely because the Armenians were primarily Christian, and 
thereby more prone to identify with the West and vice versa. The Kurds were 
considered complicit in the atrocities committed against the Armenians within the 
Ottoman Empire during the early stages of the war.129 Little attention was given 
to Kurdistan until after the war when the prevailing thought was a realignment of 
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the Ottoman territories along the European model of nation-states in which 
Ottoman minorities each would govern their own people in their own territories. 
British Foreign Office documents of the time indicate a certainty of a future 
Armenian state, but leave out other parties such as the Kurds and the Assyrians. 
A sketch of the Draft Treaty of Peace between Turkey and the Allied 
Governments by Middle-Eastern Political Section of British Delegation130 and a 
map of the "Proposed Settlement of Turkey in Asia" depict various boundaries for 
Armenia, but make no mention of Kurdistan.131 
 U.S. President Woodrow Wilson went so far as to order a draft of 
boundaries for an Armenian state (Figure 4.7).132 This was the atmosphere going 
into the end of the war and into the peace conference. The horrors of the war 
pushed idealism to its extreme in the minds of some negotiators and some heads 
of states, while the reality on the ground was starkly different from their grand 
visions of a new world.133 Other statesmen, particularly Lloyd-George and 
Clemenceau, had imperial interests in mind rather than the international peace 
and reconciliation that Wilson professed.134 
After the surrender of the Ottoman Empire and the close of World War I, 
plans for the lands, resources, and people under former Ottoman jurisdiction 
were negotiated. While the U.K. and France were drawing their lines on the map 
of the Middle East, the Americans, whom they invited to take up mandates in 
Armenia and Kurdistan, refused to become involved on the ground.135 U.S. 
foreign policy appeared hesitant because policymakers feared the U.S. would  
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Figure 4.7: Woodrow Wilson’s plan for Armenia, 1919. 
Source: Martin, Lawrence. 1920. Map showing the boundaries of Armenia as awarded by 
President Wilson. Washington, DC: United States Department of State. 
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become entangled in a colonial-style scheme that ran counter to U.S. 
ideals and taxpayer wishes. According to Tejirian, “the internationalism of the 
1910s, which followed the first acquisitions of the ‘American empire’ after the 
Spanish-American War and led to U.S. entry into World War I, was followed by 
the isolationism of the 1920s, emphasized most dramatically by U.S. refusal to 
join the League of Nations.”136 Lack of international sponsorship was a problem 
that would plague the Kurds.137 
The Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence Department presented British 
negotiators with a thorough study of the Ottoman Empire’s lands and peoples 
before they attended negotiations in Paris.138 This document placed heavy 
emphasis on Armenia and commitments to the French and Arabs. The situation 
of Kurdistan was addressed with the statement, "We are thus committed to the 
partition of Kurdistan into three sections, in the two largest of which certain rights 
are secured to ourselves, the French, and the Arabs, but none to the Kurds."139 
The study noted the strategic value of Kurdistan thus: 
The Power paramount in this country will command the strategic approaches to 
Mesopotamia and control the water supply of the eastern affluents of the Tigris, 
on which the irrigation of Mesopotamia largely depends. It is therefore essential 
that the paramount Power in Kurdistan and Mesopotamia should be the same; in 
other words, that Great Britain should have an exclusive position in Kurdistan as 
opposed to any other outside power. At the same time, the arguments against 
annexation apply even more strongly to Kurdistan than to Mesopotamia. It is 
desirable that the county (sic) should form an independent confederation of tribes 
and towns, and that His Majesty's Government should assume functions 
intermediate between the administrative assistance, amounting to direct 
responsibility for the conduct of government, which they intend to undertake in 
Mesopotamia, and the mere control of external relations, to which they propose 
to limit themselves in the case of the independent rulers of the Arabian 
Peninsula. In the hills British control should be exerted with the least direct 
intervention possible. In the lowlands bordering on Mesopotamia, where there 
are important oil-fields and other natural resources, it may have to approximate 
to the Mesopotamian pattern.140 
 
 110 
The study further recommended that the Kurdish region in the upper valley of the 
Greater Zab River be formed into an autonomous enclave, “under the 
Government of the Nestorian Prince-Patriarch, with a constitution modelled on 
that of the Lebanon -- the necessary outside assistance to be given by Great 
Britain."141 Independence, with British administrative assistance, would be 
subject to no limitations of period or function in this situation. The study notes of 
Kurdistan, "It would be almost equally safe to rely here too upon the choice of the 
inhabitants, though it might also be well to point out that the country is bound up 
with Mesopotamia geographically and economically, and could not lead a 
satisfactory existence if dissociated from it."142 The office argued for southern 
Kurdistan’s attachment to Mesopotamia for economic convenience, since 
Kurdistan is landlocked. 
 A memorandum issued by the British Delegation in Paris on British Policy in 
the Middle East stated, "It is impossible to include all Kurdish tribes and 
settlements in a Kurdish State without violating the integrity of Persia; nor would 
the Kurds, if united, be capable of governing themselves."143 The delegation 
further argued that if Kurdistan was to be independent it would be bound to 
Mesopotamia for markets and would be dependent, as would Mesopotamia to 
Kurdistan for water; therefore, the delegation recommended that the mandate be 
extended from Mesopotamia to Southern Kurdistan.144 They attached a caveat to 
this recommendation, bearing in mind British experiences in India’s Northwest 
Frontier and Afghanistan, by emphasizing that any power involved should 
intervene with "mountain tribes" as little as possible.145 
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The peace negotiations dealt with territorial divisions, but many of the 
proposed states or protectorates had never been clearly defined by boundaries 
prior to the conference. For centuries, cartographers agreed on Kurdistan’s 
existence, but its boundaries had never been clearly defined. The British were 
the primary drivers behind determining where the potential country would be 
located. In one of the Foreign Office’s early descriptions, Kurdistan was defined 
“as the territory south of the Bohtan River, and east of the Tigris and the Jebel 
Hamim, which has hitherto belonged to Turkey, and is bounded on the east by 
the Persian frontier.”146 
 The Kurdish representative at the Paris Peace Conference was General 
Muhammad Sharif Pasha.147 After the Young Turk Revolution deposed Sultan 
Abdulhamid II and sentenced Sharif Pasha to death, he fled the Ottoman 
Empire.148 Sharif Pasha had offered his services to the British at the beginning of 
the war, but his offer had been refused because the British did not anticipate their 
being engaged with operations in Kurdistan.149 He spent the war years in Monte 
Carlo waiting for another opportunity.150 Despite his disappointment with the 
British, Sharif Pasha reestablished his contact with the British near the end of the 
war.151 In 1918, he began communicating with Sir Percy Cox, the head of British 
forces in Mesopotamia, to discuss establishing British protection over an 
autonomous Kurdistan.152 He argued for similar arrangements in Mesopotamia 
and elsewhere, describing something akin to the mandate system.153 He also 
argued for a British sponsored committee aimed at reconciling relations between 
the Kurds and the Armenians.154 Kurdish nationalist organizations nominated 
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Sharif Pasha as their representative at the Paris Peace Conference because of 
his strategic views and high level contacts within the British government.155 
At Paris, Sharif Pasha carefully laid out Kurdish claims to territory and 
constructed an argument for Kurdish independence. His claims were based on 
areas where Kurds constituted the dominant population.156 He included the 
Persian Empire’s Kurdish territories in addition to Ottoman lands. His inclusion of 
the Persian Kurdish lands was merely to make a point that the Kurds were a 
large nation spanning a large area, thereby worthy of a homeland free from the 
outside interference that had often plagued Kurdistan.157 
 Delegates representing the Kurds, the Armenians, and the Assyrians 
presented claims to territory and independence. Bughos Nubar, the chief 
Armenian delegate, had confided to Sir Louis Mallet of the British Delegation 
fears that the Allies were "abandoning Armenia to her fate."158 He worried about 
French ambition in Armenia, and sought British and US recognition for Armenian 
independence.159 
Sharif Pasha and Bughos Nubar agreed to support each other’s bid for 
independence even if there were disagreements as to the particulars of territory. 
The two presented overlapping claims and criticized each other’s demands, but 
the scheme worked.160 The negotiators were convinced that both the Kurds and 
the Armenians deserved homelands in the new Middle East, and granted 
provisions for statehood and self-determination in the resulting Treaty of 
Sèvres.161 
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Sharif Pasha grew frustrated with the Allies over his sidelining in 
negotiations and with the Kurdish League over his agreement with the 
Armenians, and eventually resigned his post.162 Following his marginalization, 
Sharif produced a pamphlet outlining the justification for Kurdistan’s territories.163 
He began with historical claims to the lands, noting many academic works on the 
geography of Kurdistan and taking care to distinguish between Kurdish and 
Armenian lands.164 His argument against the Armenian claims in Kurdistan is that 
greater Armenia is not “the ethnical cradle of their race.”165 In an unusual turn in 
his case, Sharif asserts that the Armenians in Kurdistan came as émigrés, 
abandoning agriculture in Armenia for urban life in Kurdistan.166 Sharif further 
accuses the European powers and Turkey of conspiracy against the Kurds by 
inventing Armenian history in Kurdish lands.167 He likely made this last statement 
out of anger from being sidelined at the conference. Nevertheless, Sharif Pasha 
made a difference in that his case for a Kurdish homeland was written into the 
peace treaty. The “Kurdistan” specified in the treaty did not include all of the 
Kurdish territories, but it contained a large portion of Ottoman Kurdistan. 
 Some groups formerly under Ottoman dominion desired reclamation of 
lands they perceived as their own. Greek irredentism gained the support of the 
British, thus enabling them to land Greek forces at Izmir.168 However, the Greeks 
became too covetous toward the Turks, and found themselves on the retreat 
before Turkish retaliation near the plateau of Ankara.169 The Turks had found a 
new nationalist leader, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire and its Sultanate was 
certain. 
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 Britain’s Prime Minister and chief diplomat, David Lloyd-George, 
summarizes and laments the difficulties in dealing with the post-world war 
Ottoman Empire: 
In some respects the settlement of the Turkish Empire presented greater 
difficulties than that of any other enemy country. There was a greater variety of 
races and religions to be dealt with. They were more hopelessly intermingled 
without any trace or hope of merger. There were historical complications which 
had never been unraveled. There were the jealousies of Powers, each of them 
with real or imaginary interests—historical, religious, financial or territorial—in 
some corner of this dilapidated Empire. There was a wilderness of decay and 
ruin, the result of centuries of misrule prolonged to the last hours of Turkish 
dominion, which had to be dealt with. There were whole provinces devastated 
and depopulated by butchery inspired, decreed and directed by the State. 
Records and ruins prove that during centuries of history there once existed in a 
vast area of this decadent Empire the most flourishing civilizations in the world. 
There was hardly one corner of it which would not have to be reconstructed and 
rebuilt from the foundation upwards to recall a faint memory of its pristine 
opulence and splendour.170 
 
The situation was indeed a difficult one to sort out, and any agreement was likely 
to anger the Turks. The idea of Kurdistan seems to be an afterthought with Lloyd-
George as he states, “Kurdistan was accorded local autonomy, with the right to 
secede in one year from Turkey.”171 This is his only mention of Kurdistan 
throughout his memoirs of the Paris Peace Conference. 
 The British viewed an independent or autonomous Kurdistan as a means of 
establishing a buffer, along with an independent Armenia, against Russia and 
any renewed territorial ambitions under the new leadership there. However, they 
did not wish to over-commit British involvement with the Kurds. The Foreign 
Office Oriental Secretary, Andrew Ryan, made clear the British policy of reserve 
toward Kurds and all minority groups to Reshid Pasha, the Turkish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.172 Ryan had been approached by the Kurdish Club, but stated 
the British government’s noncommittal response to their requests for 
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assistance.173 The Turkish minister asserted that he did not believe the Kurdish 
Club spoke for a majority.174 Ryan told Reshid Pasha that the Kurds were an 
"undoubtedly constituted nationality," and that they "had the same right as other 
nationalities to express aspirations."175 He noted that the Kurdish question was of 
"great interest" to Britain, and spoke of the importance of Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, 
and Syria. Reshid informed Ryan of Turkish fears of Britain dismantling Turkey, 
and asserted that the Kurds "were on too mediaeval a plane of thought and 
custom to make it possible to apply modern democratic criteria."176 
 Meetings on the Turkish settlement and the Ottoman minorities progressed 
with much favor given to the Armenians. French diplomat Philippe Berthelot 
communicated to Curzon that the French had great concern for the 
Armenians.177 Both Berthelot and members of the Political Section of the British 
Peace Delegation believed Armenian population numbers were underestimated 
noting, "the Armenian is more prolific than the Turk, or Kurd."178 This statement 
reveals a strong bias by Britain and France for the Armenian population. 
 The British Peace Delegation’s Political Section produced a memorandum 
on December 18 detailing provisions for an autonomous Kurdistan as part of the 
Turkish settlement. This was what the British were prepared to discuss with the 
French, and in turn the Ottomans:  
It is considered that there should be south of the above-mentioned Armenian zone 
an autonomous Kurdish zone, in which Turkish sovereignty should obviously 
cease to run. The eastern boundary of this zone should be the Turco-Persian 
frontier; the western boundary would run approximately south-west of Mush to 
Diarbekir, but would depend on the northern and eastern frontiers of the French 
mandatory zone (see below); details would have to be drawn by an expert 
commission. The southern boundary and size of the zone must depend on a 
decision regarding the northern frontier of Mesopotamia, which, in turn, must 
depend on British security and administrative convenience. It is understood that 
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this question has recently been discussed by the Eastern Committee, and, as far 
as we are aware, the three possible frontiers discussed are shown on the annexed 
map. It will be seen that the size of the autonomous Kurdish State must depend on 
the final choice among these frontiers, but after the experience of this war the 
safety of the Nestorian colony (to whom the Allies are under some obligation), on 
the upper waters of the Greater Zab, if included in an autonomous Kurdish area, 
would be precarious. Some preference is therefore felt on this score for the most 
northerly frontier.179 
 
The Anglo-French Conference on Turkey took place days later in four meetings 
across December 22 and 23, but Kurdistan was discussed only in the third 
meeting. In that meeting, Lord Curzon reviewed a note by M. Berthelot on 
Kurdistan, which “proposed that part of Kurdistan should fall within the British 
Mesopotamian mandate, but that the rest might be formed into a federation of 
Kurdish tribes under some form of loose Anglo-French control, but with the 
maintenance in theory of Turkish sovereignty."180 Curzon doubted the Sultan's 
control in Kurdistan even in name only, and considered the division of Kurdistan 
into spheres of influence or control between Britain and France to be a bad idea. 
He suggested to Berthelot that their governments pursue this outline in coming to 
a final decision regarding Kurdistan: 
1. No mandate, whether English or French, or Anglo-French, was possible or 
desirable for Kurdistan as a whole, except perhaps for the more settled areas in 
Southern Kurdistan. 
2. Turkish rule, for obvious reasons which past experience made clear, should not 
continue in Kurdistan in even a nominal form. 
3. The Kurds were quite capable of making (and according to his latest information 
were disposed to make) a working arrangement with the Assyrians on one side 
and the Armenians on the other. The Kurdistan question could not therefore be 
considered apart from the formation of the Armenian State on which the French 
and British were agreed. 
4. Lord Curzon's own idea was to allow the Kurds to decide whether they would 
form a single State or a number of small loosely knit areas. Time and non-
interference by the Turks could alone show what they were capable of. 
5. The Kurds should, if possible, be guaranteed against Turkish aggression, but 
should preferably not have formally appointed advisers, whether French or British. 
6. Both from the British and French points of view it was undesirable to create a 
frontier problem similar to that with which the British were confronted in India.181 
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These guidelines were used to shape the policies to be enacted toward the 
Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, and other minorities of the Ottoman Empire. 
Negotiations wound on until a final agreement was reached in August 1920. 
 The conclusion of negotiations regarding the Ottoman Empire resulted in 
the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres.182 The negotiations were viewed by many Turks as 
forced capitulations, exercised upon the Ottoman authorities who no longer held 
credibility as rulers.183 This treaty attempted to address all of the concerns over 
the status of the empire’s different nations. Articles 62 through 64 pertained 
specifically to the Kurds and Kurdistan.184 The Treaty of Sèvres was the first 
international recognition of the Kurds and their right to a homeland (Figure 4.8), 
and Kurdish nationalists immediately seized upon this as justification for their 
activities. 
 This article had been heavily influenced by the ideas of Woodrow Wilson. 
Point 12 of Wilson’s Fourteen Points “declared that non-Turkish minorities of the 
Ottoman Empire should be granted the right of ‘autonomous development.’”185 
Indeed, the Treaty of Sèvres included Article 62 providing the Kurds with 
autonomy, Article 63 forcing the Turks to honor that autonomy, and Article 64 
allowing for possible independence.186 These two articles became important to 
informed Kurdish leaders. Figures such as Mahmoud and Ahmed used the treaty 
and the articles to justify their causes, rally followers, and fight for control of 
territory. 
 The main problem with the success of the treaty was that the conditions 
imposed upon the Turks were too harsh to be implemented without Turkish  
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retaliation. Sections of Anatolia were set to become territories of Greece and Italy 
and Cilicia was to become a French controlled area.187 Had the Russian 
Revolution not occurred, much of Turkey, including the straits, would have gone  
to the Russian Empire as a strategic corridor from the Black Sea out into the 
Mediterranean.188 
 Something the Western delegates to the conference did not understand 
was that their ideas and agreements held no currency with Turkish nationalists. 
They expected the Turks to behave like schoolchildren at the direction of a 
headmaster, but the Turks had no intention of being directed so. To have 
expected complete capitulation on the part of Turkey based on agreements made 
with the Ottoman authorities was unrealistic. To the Turks, it was inconceivable 
that the Turkish people would allow their lands to be parceled out to European 
powers while they were left with a small territory surrounded by hostile 
neighbors.189 The British had found it difficult to maintain a troop presence in 
Turkish territories, and the question remained of how such agreements were to 
be enforced without force.190 The treaty did not delve into how this agreement 
was to be implemented or enforced, and was doomed from the moment of its 
signing.191 Stemming from the harshness of the treaty’s conditions and the 
naïveté of the Allied negotiators at Paris was the rise of a new Turkish 
nationalism under the celebrated General Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). He 
commanded respect among both Turks and Kurds throughout Anatolia and was 
able to gain a following from them.192 Mustafa Kemal believed the Ottomans had 
signed under duress, but had nevertheless sold out the Turkish people.193 To 
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many Kurds, this treaty represented success and a new beginning for the 
Kurdish people.194 Not all Kurds felt this, and some viewed any dealings with 
foreign empires with suspicion. It was this sentiment that Kemal sought to exploit 
in his drive for control of Turkey’s destiny.195 
 
Mustafa Kemal and the Republic of Turkey 
 The European powers had not foreseen the rise of the Republic of Turkey 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. His surprising gains in the west against 
the Greeks as well as his movements in the east caused the British and the 
French to take notice.196 Churchill argued early that by negotiating with Kemal, 
the British would be able to remove Turkey from the Soviet’s orbit, and “re-create 
that ‘Turkish barrier to Russian ambitions’ that had been the traditional British 
policy during the Great Game.”197 Lloyd-George refused to entertain the idea; he 
did not feel that British resources could be stretched any further than they 
already were, and placed his confidence in the Greek effort to capture 
Anatolia.198 
Like the Soviet Union in relation to the Russian Empire, the Republic of 
Turkey sought to undo the dealings of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres 
was never ratified, and Kemal wished to seek new terms of agreement. Kemal’s 
military victories allowed for the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which did away with 
“the hated regime of capitulations” that the Treaty of Sèvres stipulated.199 This 
new treaty made no direct mention of the Kurds or Kurdistan.200 
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 Mustafa Kemal was a man of singular vision for the future of his country. 
He sought to topple the Ottoman government and create a new secular Turkish 
republic, and he did just that.201 Kemal forced the French to relinquish some of 
their claims, notably Cilicia, and the British feared a Turkish invasion of Mosul. 
The French made peace with Kemal and began supplying the Turks with arms.202 
Because the British had seized Mosul after the armistice, the Turks claimed the 
British illegally possessed Turkish territory.203 Kemal’s gains in the east enabled 
him to turn his attention westward toward the Greeks and Italians.204 The Italians 
had a negligible force and did not pose a significant threat to the Turks.205 
However, the Greeks had been advancing from Izmir toward Ankara, and had 
plans to capture Constantinople. The British Foreign Office viewed Greek 
ambitions as reckless and greedy, and they apparently were because the Greek 
army crumbled before the onslaught of Kemal’s troops.206 He pressured the 
British and the Greeks into negotiations by surrounding their forces stationed at 
Chanak (Çanakkale).207 Kemal established the Republic of Turkey, moving the 
Turkish capital from Istanbul to the more central location of Ankara.208  
The Foreign Office caught wind that Kemal was organizing Turks, Kurds, 
and Arabs against Armenian statehood, and was launching his campaign from 
Erzurum.209 This location is significant because it was to be part of the Armenian 
mandate, and Kemal was sending a clear message to the Allies that it would 
remain Turkish. The British Ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Horace Rumbold, 
relayed to Curzon that the Greeks were possibly encouraging Kurds, and that 
Kemal was unwilling to allow Kurdish autonomy or independence.210 He also 
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reported a local insurrection in and around Dersim by the Alevi Kurds,211 a sect 
blending Islamic and Zoroastrian beliefs.212 These Kurds had not as yet identified 
with any nationalist elements, but their restlessness attracted the attention of 
Kemal and he would bide his time in dealing with them. The Kurds in general 
were becoming more agitated by the political developments around them. 
Ambassador Rumbold informed Curzon that Oriental Secretary Ryan had been 
visited by Emin Ali Bey and Jeladet Bey, both Kurdish nationalists. They sought 
British support for the Kurds and the Greeks, but Ryan had to disappoint them by 
stating that the British were to maintain neutrality in the matter.213 Rumbold 
reported that despite Kemal’s refusal to allow Kurdish independence, some 
Kurdish nationalists allegedly held a commission in Turkey's Great National 
Assembly to draw up plans for governance of Kurdistan.214 
 Kemal was proactive in establishing Turkey as a regional power. He 
forced a renegotiation of peace with the Allies, knowing their weakness in 
enforcing the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres.215 The treaty was never ratified, 
and Kemal argued it was a treaty signed by a government under duress that no 
longer existed, and did not represent the Turkish people.216 Kemal’s triumphs 
enabled Turkey to renegotiate a peace that Kemal considered a disgrace, 
brought by an inept Ottoman government and by overbearing Europeans who 
wanted to humiliate and reduce the Turkish state to insignificance.217 Kemal was 
able to capture much of Kurdistan before any provisions of Sèvres were put into 
practice.218 His dream was to create a modern state based upon Turkish 
heritage, but the problem with Kemal’s idea was that not all within Turkey had 
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Turkish heritage.219 The Kurds recognized this and many began to resist Kemal’s 
authority and his concept of Turkishness.220 The Turkish army had become a 
highly disciplined and capable fighting force that had already proven itself a 
challenge to Allied troops stationed on territory desired by the Turks.221 As their 
position became untenable and the Turks threatened further conquests of 
formerly Ottoman territories, the British sought reconciliation with Turkey.222 The 
previous promises that had been made to Ottoman minorities for self-
determination quickly began to seem ill conceived. 
 
The Aimless Drift of British Policy 
 Upon capturing Mesopotamia, the British had immediately set forth a 
policy for the Kurdish territories they controlled to be included in a future Kurdish 
state. The Treaty of Sèvres reaffirmed their commitment to establishing southern 
Kurdistan as a state that would be able to govern itself, though with British 
advisors. For the most part, the British felt that a friendly Kurdish state, along with 
Armenia serving as a buffer against the Caucasus, was acceptable and even 
desirable.223 It quickly became clear that the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres 
were not going to be met by the Turks. The Ottomans who made the agreement 
were forced from power, and Kemal and his newly formed government forced a 
new negotiation process.224 
Until the rise of Mustafa Kemal and the Republic of Turkey, the British had 
been readying southern Kurdistan for merger with Turkish-held northern 
Kurdistan.225 The changes that occurred so quickly caused the British confusion 
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over what to do with southern Kurdistan. The land around Kirkuk was supposed 
to be rich in petroleum, and the British Navy having recently switched from coal 
to oil power, desired its incorporation into British control.226 What remained to be 
seen was whether or not an armed conflict would erupt with the Turks seeking to 
reclaim the Mosul vilayet,227 which they considered to have been illegally seized 
by the British after the armistice.228 The British had indeed marched into a 
deserted Mosul days after the armistice.229 The British argued that word of the 
armistice had not reached their forwardly deployed troops, and that they, not the 
Republic of Turkey, had been governing Mosul since the end of the war.230 
 The British were not at odds with Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish cultural 
rights, but they realized the difficulties posed by a Turkey hostile to such 
things.231 Not only did the Turks challenge the notion of Kurdish independence or 
autonomy, but they also opposed cultural rights granted to Kurds outside Turkish 
territory. The Turks were creating a nationalism of their own, which was based on 
civic loyalty and Turkish culture.232 It was extended to the Kurds of Turkey, but it 
involved the Kurds abandoning anything Kurdish. The Turks felt the British were 
giving too much to the Kurds in Iraq, and that these freedoms would undermine 
Turkish sovereignty in Turkey’s southeast.233 
 In 1921, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, 
had at first been supportive of establishing an independent Kurdistan as a buffer 
against the Bolsheviks. The High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, thought 
southern Kurdistan should be incorporated with Iraq, and that the Kurds should 
be used against the Turks.234 In March 1921, Churchill called a conference in 
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Cairo to clarify British policy in the Middle East, and to “arrest the rather aimless 
drift that had started in 1920 and continued to characterize British policy in early 
1921.”235 The political committee for Kurdistan was comprised of Churchill as 
chair, Sir Percy Cox, Gertrude Bell, Colonel T.E. Lawrence, Major Hubert Young, 
and Major E.W.C. Noel.236 The committee was reviewing a memorandum by the 
Middle East Department, which stated that the British policy should be to support 
an independent or autonomous Kurdistan not attached to Iraq and to support 
Kurdish unity and nationality.237 All of the committee was agreed to these 
principals except Cox and his secretary, Bell.238 In June, Cox wrote Churchill that 
the decision made at Cairo assumed a friendly Turkey, which was no longer the 
case.239 He further argued that only a solid Arab nationalist front, along with 
Persia, would counter Turkish and Bolshevik aggression, but proposed using the 
Kurds as a distraction from Mosul against the Kemalists.240 In the middle of 
September, Cox wrote Churchill that the Turks were wary of Bolshevik intentions, 
and that the time to negotiate with Kemal was approaching. Negotiations started 
with King Faisal of Iraq.241 The British policy supporting the Kurds was trumped 
by the British need for peace with Turkey.242 Cox had succeeded in convincing 
Churchill to attach southern Kurdistan to Iraq.243 
In the Mosul vilayet, two Kurdish leaders emerged, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani 
and Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji.244 Mahmoud was far more charismatic than 
Ahmed, and was able to recruit followers outside of his tribe. This gained 
Mahmoud an audience with the British early on.245 Mahmoud’s relationships with 
the British and with rival Kurds were tumultuous, though he commanded much 
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respect and held a lot of promise to lead an independent Kurdistan.246 Both 
Ahmed and Mahmoud clashed with the British, but the U.K. gave Mahmoud 
several opportunities to lead the Kurds and hold a cooperative relationship with 
the Arabs and British. Mahmoud drew conflict by demanding territorial expansion 
of his authority and the right to command a Kurdish army.247 
 The first experiment at Kurdish statehood came in 1918-1919, when the 
British allowed a Kurdish government in Sulaymaniyah to form. Mahmoud was 
the key Kurdish player in this government.248 The British saw Kurdish self-rule as 
a way to bring the Mosul vilayet under control. Mahmoud’s government was 
dissolved in 1919 when the British decided the Kurds were too anti-British and 
did not need a government yet. Mahmoud led a revolt against the British, which 
was met with a swift response by the British Royal Air Force (RAF).249 When 
Mahmoud was captured, he reportedly recited Point Twelve of Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points and had on him a Qur’an containing a Kurdish translation of the Anglo-
French Declaration, which supported the Fourteen Points.250 Mahmoud was 
forced into exile, only to be welcomed back by the British for another opportunity 
at a Kurdish state in 1922.251 Sulaymaniyah had been left as an undecided entity 
for this purpose (Figure 4.9). However, Mahmoud ran into troubles with the 
British once again.252 Many, both within Kurdistan and the allied countries, 
viewed Mahmoud as the wrong leader for the Kurds. This was also the view held 
by U.S. President Wilson.253 However, Mahmoud had gained the allegiance of 
the Zanganah and Talabani tribes, and it was during this time that the enduring 
political rivalry between the Talabanis and Barzanis emerged.254 Winston  
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Figure 4.9: The undetermined status of Sulaymaniyah among planned mandates. 
Source: Allied and Associated Powers, (1914-1920). 1924. The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923. 
Vol. 2. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
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Churchill sought the creation of an independent Kurdistan to serve as a friendly 
buffer state between Turkey and Mesopotamia, but he was dissuaded from 
pursuing this.255 The U.K. opted to impose direct rule upon Kurdistan because of 
its instability and the threat the emerging Republic of Turkey was making to incite 
the Kurds there into rebellion. A sustained rebellion would have allowed for 
Turkey to reclaim the Mosul vilayet.256 British support for Mahmoud the second 
time “was simply for the purpose of preventing any strengthening of the Turkish 
position on the question of Mosul.”257 Mahmoud was ousted from leadership by 
the British after they caught him secretly dealing with the Turks.258 
 
Treaty of Lausanne 
 The Treaty of Lausanne codified the new geopolitical alignment in the 
region by settling most of Turkey’s boundary disputes (Figure 4.10) and 
acknowledging the republic’s right to exist. The Turks had powerful friends in the 
Soviet Union, and by pursuing that relationship they were able to throw off the 
European yokes that had hurried the demise of the Ottoman Empire and sought 
to confine any future Turkish state. Given that no Kurdish or Armenian buffer 
state was created to abut the Caucasus, the British had to rethink their strategy 
in terms of countering a threat from the Heartland. The Kurds of Turkey were left 
without a hope for international recognition of an independent Kurdistan, or at 
least a mandate, when the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified. The Treaty of Sèvres 
had been a hollow promise made to the Kurds, and the nationalists among them 
felt betrayed. This perceived act of bad faith led Kurdish nationalists to clamor for 
special rights that were not forthcoming from Ankara. 
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The London Conference of March 16-19, 1922 was the beginning of direct 
negotiations between the British and the Turks, and the Armistice of Mudanya 
was signed on October 11, 1922.259 Mustafa Kemal had forced the hand of the 
Allies with his gains, and a new conference for peace took place at Lausanne, 
Switzerland beginning on November 21. Lord Curzon was the British official in 
charge of new peace negotiations between the Allies and the Republic of 
Turkey.260 It was through Curzon and the events at Lausanne that British policy 
toward Turkey and the Kurds began to be clarified. The new treaty made no 
mention of the Kurds or of Kurdistan, and the Turks sought to include the Kurds 
in their republic as reinvented “Turks.”261 
 Lord Curzon had at first found Kurdish statehood desirable because it 
would keep the Turks and the Bolsheviks at bay from British interests, but Arnold 
Wilson convinced him that the British should maintain southern Kurdistan for 
incorporation with Mesopotamia.262 Curzon changed his mind out of fear that the 
Turks would continue their march into Mesopotamia, and he secretly became 
willing to transfer Mosul back to the Turks.263 Turkey had proven itself strong and 
the British and the French had already propped up the Arab-dominated 
governments in Iraq and Syria; therefore, it seemed only logical to continue on 
those paths from mandates to statehood.264 What brought Kurdistan’s division 
was the rise of Turkey and its threat to British gains. The Kurds were set to be 
minorities in every country in which they resided, though some segments of the 
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Kurdish population were prepared to fight it out before submitting to these new 
regimes.265 
 Two major issues still remaining were the finalized border between Iraq 
and Turkey and the status of Mosul.266 Southern Kurdistan was still unresolved, 
apart from there was to be no independent Kurdistan. Discussions between Lord 
Curzon and Ismet Pasha, the chief Turkish negotiator, highlighted the debate 
over what was to become of Kurdistan under a new treaty. Ismet stated that the 
Turks felt no obligation to recognize the mandates, and that they desired a 
plebiscite for the Kurds.267 Ismet said the Kurds would receive equal 
representation in government, but Curzon doubted this.268 Ismet Pasha argued 
that Mosul was in Turkish possession when the armistice was signed at Mudros, 
and that Mosul was an integral part of Turkey.269 Curzon believed the Turks 
wished to exploit the oil question, and he noted that there were no Kurdish 
representatives from Mosul in the Turkish government.270 Furthermore, Curzon 
thought the Kurds would vote for independence in a plebiscite, while the Arabs 
would vote for an Arab state.271 
 The future of the Assyrian minority in the region was left hanging in the 
balance by the indecisiveness of the British. They had not been granted a 
homeland under the Treaty of Sévres, and faced hostilities from surrounding 
populations, especially from the Kurds.272 Since the treaty did not grant any 
special territorial provisions to the Assyrians, the British made plans to give them 
a special position in northern Iraq. British Air Staff Intelligence in Baghdad 
reported that Assyrian chiefs distrusted the British, and the chiefs believed the 
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British were willing to hand over Assyrian territories in Mosul to the Turks despite 
British denials.273 The Air Staff feared that the Assyrians would try to take the 
Mosul vilayet by force, and suspected French and Bolshevik propaganda and 
interference was motivating Assyrian reactions.274 These suspicions were not 
entirely without merit as there had been many Assyrian refugees in the Soviet 
Union exposed to Bolshevik influence.275 To resolve the precarious situation, the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Victor Cavendish, recommended the 
High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, resettle and accommodate the 
Assyrians.276 The Assyrians were to be resettled in Iraq,277 and offered land 
grants.278 A small ethnic conflict erupted when Assyrians killed several Muslims 
in Kirkuk.279 The Muslims retaliated, and killed innocent Christians they mistook 
for the offending Assyrians.280 These developments put the British on edge, and 
they sought Iraqi cooperation on Assyrian settlement and accommodation in 
hopes of preventing further bloodshed.281 
 Rumors were circulating that the Turks were willing to offer the Kurds 
autonomy if Mosul was given to Turkey.282 The Turks wanted Kurdish portions of 
Mosul, because of "anxieties caused by Kurdish agitation in Anatolia."283 The 
Turks were convinced that Britain and Iraq were fostering Kurdish nationalism in 
Turkey, and the Turks believed Sheikh Mahmud and Sayyid Taha were the 
chosen leaders of the instigation.284 The Turks kept up a psychological campaign 
over Mosul and its Kurdish population. Reports that Turkish troops were moving 
in an easterly direction, though not definitely against Iraq, were attempts to 
pressure the French in Syria and the British in Iraq to acquiesce to Turkish 
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demands.285 The Turks established forward operating bases in Turkish territory 
opposite Mosul.286 Tensions over Mosul were aggravated by Turkish activities 
along the border and in neighboring Syria, where the French were allowing 
Turkish troops to move on the Syrian portion of the Baghdad Railway to access 
otherwise inaccessible rebellious Kurdish areas in Turkey.287 The British intended 
to use the RAF in Syria if the Turks threatened Iraq.288 London was concerned 
that the Turks were seeking "reacquisition of territory inhabited by people of other 
than Turkish race."289 
 The British strategy for retaining Mosul involved granting Iraq 
independence.290 London sought unity of purpose with Baghdad to strengthen 
Iraq's claims to Mosul.291 The British believed the Turks were seeking friendly 
relations with them, despite the contentious atmosphere of the Mosul 
negotiations.292 The Turks finally brought up the oil issue in negotiations for 
Mosul. A Foreign Office memorandum noted that oil in Mosul was of great 
interest to the Turkish Petroleum Company, but had nothing to do with frontier 
negotiations.293 The British blamed Turkey‘s unwillingness to negotiate Mosul on 
the oil question.294 
 The Treaty of Lausanne, when ratified, would obligate Turkey to arbitration 
at the League of Nations.295 The Turks drove a hard bargain and proposed the 
Turkish frontier line as the southern boundary of Mosul. Since the negotiations 
were dealing with the boundaries of Mosul, not Turkey, London was infuriated 
with Ankara’s inflexibility.296 The British offered justifications for Mosul's inclusion 
in Iraq. Included in these were that the Turks were a minority there and that 
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Mosul was geographically linked to Iraq rather than to Turkey. They further 
argued that if the Turks owned Mosul, Baghdad and Basra would be at Turkey's 
mercy for wheat. Furthermore, it was argued that winter makes communication 
between Mosul and Turkey nearly impossible.297 The Turks accused the Mosul 
Government of arming Christians for an offensive toward Van,298 and the British 
remained frustrated with the Turks at the negotiating table and on the ground.299 
Because no agreement on Mosul’s future had been reached with the Treaty of 
Lausanne, the final status of Mosul was to be left to the decision of the Council of 
the League of Nations.300 
 London accused the Turks of not complying with British demands for 
withdrawal from Iraq.301 The Turkish press, reflecting the views of the Turkish 
government, was in favor of resisting British demands.302 Turkish commanders 
claimed not to have been supplied with the correct boundary information by the 
Turkish government, thus border intrusions in Iraq by the Turks were frequent.303 
Border incidents between British and Turkish forces heightened the already 
strained atmosphere of the frontier dispute.304 The Turks still wished to retain 
Mosul because they stated they did not want the Kurds divided.305 The more 
likely story was that they wanted all of Kurdistan, so they could control the Kurds 
without concern for international incidents. 
The Treaty of Lausanne marked a shift away from the Wilsonian ideals of 
ethnic sovereignty represented in the Treaty of Sèvres. The new treaty aimed for 
regional stability over ideals, and embodies more realism in its purpose. 
Lausanne did not satisfy everyone, but it recognized the powers that would 
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endure rather than ethnic groups struggling, often among themselves, for 
statehood. One could conclude that the agreement reached at Lausanne was a 
triumph of realist policy. It lent itself to the conditions that were instead of those 
that were imagined in Paris years earlier. The period between the Treaty of 
Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne saw British policy change from supporting an 
independent Kurdistan to securing peace with Turkey by abandoning the idea of 
Kurdish self-determination.306 
The new British policy in the region was based on air superiority. The RAF 
could be scrambled to deal with the Turks, as well as troublesome Kurds and 
others, in comparatively little time as opposed to the more traditional naval and 
ground forces.307 By securing peace with Turkey, the British began to shift the 
buffer against the Soviet Union from an independent Kurdistan or Armenia to the 
Republic of Turkey. The British wanted Mustafa Kemal’s republic to become a 
bulwark against Soviet ambitions.308 The Kurds were divided between a desire 
for independence or to be left alone by their host governments. Many of those 
desiring independence from Turkey fought two violent conflicts during the period 
from 1925 to 1931. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
REBELLION AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
The period from 1925 to 1931 was characterized by two large Kurdish 
insurrections in Turkey, and by tension over the status of the mostly Kurdish 
Mosul vilayet in Iraq. The British and the Turks sought to normalize their 
relations, but British and Turkish policies toward the Kurds were vastly different 
and presented difficulties in reaching agreement. The Turks sought to dismantle 
any vestige of Kurdish identity in order to supplant it with a more secular, 
modernist Turkish identity in the name of progress. To the Turkish government, 
Turkey was not a land comprised of different nations, as it had been with the 
Ottoman Empire, but a country of one civic identity. In Iraq, the British had 
encouraged multinational character, including Kurdish identity, to a point. The 
British were sensitive to the Turkish perception and response to Kurdish national 
expression in Iraq. Both the British and the Turks became concerned about 
Soviet ambitions in the region, and their perceptions of Moscow influenced their 
policies toward the Kurds and each other. It was within this geopolitical context 
that Kurdish nationalism and territoriality developed, and from which violent 
action sprang. The idea of Kurdistan as a land for the Kurds became a symbol for 
the Kurdish rebellions that ensued, and the rebellions in turn became grounds for 
mythmaking to inspire future Kurdish movements. By this time, the Treaty of
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Sèvres and its provision for the Kurds had become well known throughout 
Kurdistan, but London’s commitment to the ideas had died with the rise of 
Ankara’s power. 
 In Iraq, the British were securing the new state’s borders and preparing 
the monarchy there for the end of the British mandate and entry into the arena of 
independent states in the League of Nations. This was challenging because of 
Turkey’s ambitions in the largely non-Arab Mosul province. The Kurds there 
presented a challenge to Baghdad’s authority, but also to Ankara’s authority in 
Turkey’s Kurdish areas. The Turks feared they would be hurt by Iraqi Kurdish 
nationalist efforts, and acted to counter such movements in Turkey in addition to 
threatening Iraq. However, diplomacy triumphed between Iraq and Turkey and 
tensions eased. Despite the fact that possessing Mosul would have given Ankara 
a relatively free hand to confront Kurdish nationalism in the region, Turkey 
ultimately respected the League of Nations’ decision to award Mosul to Iraq. 
London’s overall strategy was to leave Iraq’s administration to a pro-British 
monarchy under King Faisal, while reconciling differences with Turkey to form a 
barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Rimland. The British had already made clear 
that they would not support a Kurdish state in the region when they signed the 
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Other outstanding disputes were resolved, and led 
Ankara not to desert their benefactors in Moscow, but to distance themselves 
from the Soviet Union enough to serve as a friendly bulwark against the gateway 
through the Caucasus between the Heartland and Rimland. This was an ideal 
arrangement for the British, because the Turks did not represent a hostile 
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bulwark, merely a potential one, thus ensuring cordial but firm relations with 
Moscow. 
In Turkey, two different movements combined to revolt against Ankara’s 
authority through Sheikh Said and Azadi: an anti-Turkish pan-Islamic Kurdish 
movement and a secular Kurdish independence movement. Kurdish nationalism 
and territoriality reached new heights years later with the Khoybun rebellion 
around Mount Ararat. This rebellion was the most sophisticated to date, with 
support coming both from the Kurdish diaspora and from Armenian 
revolutionaries seeking to spite the Turks. The Khoybun introduced exclusively 
nationalist rhetoric and symbolism into the incitement as opposed to the tried 
method of declaring jihad to inspire the masses. Ankara gained difficult ground 
when it crushed the Mount Ararat rebellion, and planned to expand its gains in 
the next decade. 
 
The Rebellion of Sheikh Said and Azadi 
 
By 1925 Mustafa Kemal had made clear he was not going to tolerate an 
independent or autonomous Kurdistan. Previously, Kemal had given Turkey’s 
Kurds some leeway for cultural expression because of his need for Kurdish 
cooperation over the uncertainty of Turkey’s future.1 After the Treaty of Sèvres 
was cast aside in favor of the agreement reached at Lausanne, the sentiment 
among many Kurds in southeastern Turkey became ideal for conflict with 
Ankara.2 This, coupled with Mustafa Kemal’s radical measures for a new secular 
Turkish republic, brought a wave of Kurdish nationalism to the fore. Sheikh Said 
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took advantage of the situation to push his movement for an independent 
Kurdistan and began organizing Kurds in southeastern Turkey for a major revolt. 
The 1925 Kurdish rebellion, commonly referred to as the Sheikh Said 
rebellion, was the tipping point for Kurdish nationalist struggle in Turkey during 
the interwar period.3 The groundwork for this rebellion had been in the works for 
several years. An organization known as Azadi (Freedom), led by former 
Hamidiye cavalrymen and Kurdish officers in the Ottoman army, had formed in 
1921 for the purpose of establishing an independent Kurdistan.4 Sheikh Said, a 
religious elder from Piran, and the Azadi organization had common purpose, and 
they established contact to combine efforts. Azadi intended to launch a large 
rebellion throughout southeastern Turkey on March 21, 1925.5 However, Sheikh 
Said launched his revolt against the Turkish government prematurely on 
February 13.6 
 Sheikh Said was reported to have "proclaimed that he has a devine [sic] 
mission to establish Moslem religious law (the Shari) in Turkey."7 He appealed to 
religion in the face of emerging secularism emanating from Ankara allegedly 
stating, “Islam has been the sole bond of union between Turk and Kurd, and that 
the Turks having broken it, the Kurds must now ensure their own future."8 This 
was his effort to gain legions of followers, whether they understood nationalism 
or not. Martial law was declared in the southeastern vilayets of Mardin, Hakkari, 
Bitlis, and Van, as well as in 2 kazas (districts) of Erzerum.9 Ismet Pasha felt 
martial law should be more widely applied out of fear that Islamists would rally to 
the cause, but the Turkish government doubted there was a following outside of 
 161 
the Kurdish community.10 The Turkish press alleged that the British were behind 
the Kurdish revolt, but behind the scenes Turkish officials assured the British 
Foreign Office that they did not believe the press.11 The atmosphere of the 
rebellion was saturated with rumors and suspicions. 
 Kurdistan’s rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure prohibited Turkish 
forces from rapidly deploying soldiers in the southeast. The problem was solved 
when Ankara negotiated with the French in Damascus to allow the transport of 
Turkish troops along a portion of the Baghdad Railroad to reenter Turkey from 
Syria.12 The British gathered that the French were “suspicious that revolt is 
imaginary or exaggerated,"13 indicating that the French perceived the Turks to be 
staging theatrics in order to get their troops into the southeast. Nevertheless, the 
French allowed the Turks to move into the Taurus Mountains via Syria.14 The 
conflict was real and the movement was “religious, national and anti-republican,” 
but to the British it remained to be seen how much each of these factors 
influenced the situation.15 Many stories were floating about, and British fears of 
renewed conflict with the Turks were stoked when the German ambassador to 
Turkey reported a rumor that Turkish troops used against the Kurdish revolt 
might be used against Iraq.16 This rumor may have been spread to the Germans 
by the Turks to psychologically improve their position with regard to Mosul. 
 Sheikh Said was captured along with other sheikhs and followers on March 
15 and promptly taken to be tried in Diyarbakır.17 Days later, Turkish press 
reported that British involvement was proven by documents found on Kurdish 
detainees, “but the accusations, when they have any precision, seem to relate to 
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the period of 1919 and 1920, when ideas of Kurdish autonomy were very much 
to the fore."18 Turkish reports of Sheikh Said’s capture alleged that he was taken 
with large quantities of gold in saddlebags and documents linking him to British 
authorities in Iraq.19 The Turks had not finished examining the documents, “but 
the extracts published so far do not incriminate anyone except the Kurds 
themselves."20 By the middle of April, the Kurds lacked supplies to sustain their 
force against the better-equipped Turkish army, and would engage in guerilla 
warfare in the mountains where the Kurds had historically held the advantage.21  
 Prime Mininster Ismet Pasha made Ankara’s policy toward the Kurds clear 
while speaking to the Congress of Turk Ojaghi, the clubs that promoted Turkish 
culture throughout the country:  
We are frankly Nationalist....and Nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. Before 
the Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. At any price, we 
must turkify the inhabitants of our land, and we will annihilate those who oppose 
Turks or 'le turquisites.' They say we lack solicitude for religious currents; we will 
crush all who rise before us to use religion as an instrument.22 
 
These comments of Ismet’s left little doubt among the British, and likely among 
Kurds that read the speech, as to the direction the Turkish government would 
take in dealing with Kurdish grievances. This juncture marks the beginning of 
Turkey’s plan to eliminate Kurdish identity in favor of making Turks of every 
citizen of the republic.23 
 The Turkish press characterized Sheikh Said in the worst light possible by 
portraying him as a religious zealot, and an “uncouth, semi-idiotic individual, 
worthy only of ridicule.”24 He was made an example of in Turkey’s case for the 
virtues of secularism and modernity. The trial of Sheikh Said and many of his 
conspirators resulted in his death sentence as well as those in his inner circle.25 
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The informers among the defendants were acquitted, and lesser rebels were 
given prison and servitude as punishment.26 The president of the tribunal 
acknowledged that those on trial were fighting for an independent Kurdistan.27 
These were comments that had they been made years later would have been 
censored. The use of the word Kurdistan became taboo, because it was 
perceived by Ankara to be at least a tacit acknowledgement of the geographical 
entity associated with the Kurds. 
A period of silence fell over southeastern Turkey for the latter half of 1925, 
and precious little information was getting out. By the end of January 1926, it 
became evident that Turkish troops continued to suffer at the hands of the Kurds, 
and the Turkish government covered up news that the Kurds were still resisting. 
R.H. Hoare, the British counselor in Constantinople, observed, "There is little 
doubt that the Government will have to keep a firm hand on the Kurdish districts 
for a long time."28 Hoare’s observation proved correct. The organized insurrection 
led by Said was over, but that did not mean the nationalist ambitions for an 
independent Kurdistan had been crushed. 
 
The Final Status of Mosul 
 
In early 1925, the British and the Turks continued to dispute Mosul’s final 
status, and the British feared the Turks would invade Iraq to reclaim the territory. 
Negotiations between the two did not resolve the dispute, and the issue went to 
the Council of the League of Nations for resolution.29 The Turks proved stubborn 
in their efforts to regain the Mosul, citing the non-Arab parts of Iraq as integral 
parts of Turkey. Ankara’s aim was to maintain control over the Kurds to prevent 
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an independent Kurdistan from emerging.30 The Turks resented Britain’s 
allowance of Kurdish freedoms in Iraq, fearing it would encourage Turkey’s Kurds 
to seek similar rights that would undermine the new state and its Turkish 
identity.31 The Kurds of Mosul preferred British protection to that of the Turks, but 
some segments of the population still wanted independence or separation from 
the Arabs within Iraq.32 The Turkish government wanted to make proper “Turks” 
out of the Kurds, and continued to assert that the Kurds of Mosul wished to be 
part of the Turkish state.33 Ankara viewed itself as obligated to obey the League 
of Nations and did not wish to destroy its already tense relations with the UK.34 
 The oil issue in Mosul was never far away from discussions over the 
vilayet’s future status. It was at this time that the large extent of the oil fields was 
becoming known. The British already controlled the Persian oil fields around 
Abadan, and had not thus far pursued exploitation of those in Mosul. Ankara may 
have perceived the British motivation to capture and retain Mosul was to gain 
rights to the petroleum resources beneath the vilayet’s surface, and that if Ankara 
guaranteed those rights with the transfer of the land to Turkey the British would 
be satisfied.35 London’s position was that Turkey should not base its negotiations 
on assumptions that the British would "bargain away the rights of Irak, of which 
we were the trustees, in exchange for economic advantages to British 
subjects."36 The Turkish press attempted to force the issue by reprinting anti-Iraq 
British press articles with the aim of leading the Turkish public to believe the 
British were not serious about pressing claims to Mosul.37 
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The British Foreign Office thought that the Turks would likely be happy 
with a line tracing the Lesser Zab River as opposed to a boundary encompassing 
all of Kurdistan stating that the "Turks are concerned over the new form of their 
old minorities question,"38 and "if, furthermore, the republic could incorporate 
within its frontiers all Southern Kurdistan, then it would be in the most favorable 
possible position for dealing freely and undisturbed with its Kurds."39 The Turks 
would be unhappy with Iraqi Kurdish autonomy; therefore, Ankara would offer no 
voluntary settlement of Mosul’s status. The British admired Ankara’s desire for 
modernity and prosperity for Turkey, and understood that "Under the most 
favourable possible conditions there may have been just a chance that the Turks 
would succeed in Turkifying--perhaps even secularising--their Kurds, for the latter 
are a primitive race, and possess no strongly-marked culture of their own."40 One 
of the dangers of Turkey’s gaining Mosul was that if the vilayet became part of 
the republic, the city of Mosul would be eager to submit, but "Kirkuk would burst 
out in agitations, and that even further south unstable politicians would reinsure 
themselves by violent attacks on the mandate."41 Regardless of who controlled 
Mosul, Kurdish nationalism was going to present a challenge to that power. 
Major H.I. Lloyd made the case for Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq in his 
geographical study of Mosul in a 1926 Geographical Journal article, stating that it 
is "well known to all who have travelled in that area, the province of Mosul is an 
integral part of 'Iraq."42 Lloyd noted, “The Turkish government declared that the 
whole of Mosul province was Turkish in blood and sentiment, and if not Turkish 
was at any rate not Arab.”43 The disagreement between the Turks and the British 
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endured for the nine months after the ratification of the agreement at Lausanne, 
and as stipulated the issue went to the Council of the League of Nations.44 
 The Brussels Line, or Brantling Line, (Figure 5.1) was established in 
October 1924 by a sub-commission appointed by the Council of the League of 
Nations after Turkey expelled Nestorian Christians from a disputed area along 
the border between Turkey and Iraq.45 According to Lloyd, the Brussels Line 
"followed with minor modifications the old boundary of the Mosul vilayet."46 This 
line was intended to be the status quo line between the two countries. The British 
feared Turkish gravitation toward the Soviets, and hoped for a League of Nations 
decision for something like the Brussels Line.47 
Turkish movements through Syria, though French forces accompanied the 
Turkish troops, continued to worry the British.48 The British pressed the French 
administrators in Beirut for more information, and sought assurance that equal 
numbers of Turks would be headed westward.49 The British Air Ministry was 
placed on alert should the Turks venture into Iraq. However, the Air Ministry did 
not believe a Turkish attack was imminent.50 
 The Foreign Office’s Eastern Department and its legal advisor provided a 
memorandum on the frontier dispute between Iraq and Turkey noting the 
importance of the Kurdish issue: 
A second and more important consideration of internal politics is the question of 
Kurdistan. Kemal's policy is to assimilate the Kurdish population into the new state 
of Turkey. The Kurds are essential, both racially and militarily, as breeders of 
citizens and as defenders of the State. The policy of the Irak Government and of  
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His Majesty's Government, endorsed by the League Commission, is to plant the seeds 
of autonomy among the Iraqi Kurds. The inevitable result is that the Kurds over the 
Turkish border, always in a state of effervescence and at present openly rebellious, will 
be fortified in their resistance to the process of assimilation and sooner or later will claim 
their right to coalesce with their semi-independent brothers in Irak. This will mean the 
loss of valuable population and territory to Turkey--a threat which must be averted at all 
costs. This realisation probably explains the Turkish suggestion of a guarantee of the 
Turkish and Iraki frontiers, and it might go far to satisfy Kemal if we could in any way 
guarantee Turkey against this danger. But it is difficult to see how we can do so without 
betraying the unquestionable rights of the Kurds to national development and ultimate 
independence.51 
 
The memorandum also noted that Kemal probably wished Turkey to be accepted 
into the realm of civilized states and sought a guarantee against Soviet 
dangers.52 This line of thinking became a guiding principal of the British approach 
to Kemal and efforts to urge Ankara from Moscow’s orbit. 
 By October 1925, the Mosul dispute had become rhetorical, and the Turks 
were keenly aware of Russian activities within Turkey and the region.53 Ankara 
desired its relations with Britiain to be like the previous age when the two were 
allies. The Kurds were considered “a necessary evil" that Turkey and Iraq would 
have to deal with in their own ways since there would be no independent 
Kurdistan.54 The Turks would have considered any Kurdish political unit, be it an 
independent state or autonomous region, as “a direct menace to the very heart of 
Turkish policy,” and would see to it that no such entity would emerge.55 
 The British government was concerned that Turks along the border would 
launch an incursion into Iraq to reclaim Mosul, but realized that Turkish border 
officials were trusted men who were not prone to adventures.56 In late October 
1925, rumors of a planned Turkish assault on Mosul were rampant,57 yet the 
British believed that the Turkish force along the border was merely a bluff.58 The 
Turks possibly felt that they could pressure the British in Iraq to fear renewed 
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conflict and relinquish Mosul to avoid any confrontation. This would have been a 
mistaken assumption on Ankara’s part. In late November 1925, the British made 
clear to the Turks that there were no British plans for an autonomous Kurdistan, 
but Turks continued to believe there were.59 British pressure over Mosul was 
causing problems for the upstart Turkish republic, and Ankara argued that "the 
possession of Mosul is essential for the policy of modernization in Turkey."60 
Much of the rhetoric emanating from Ankara began to settle, and a change in 
tone embodying an "atmosphere of dètente" with the British on Mosul was 
evident in a speech by Ismet Pasha.61 Ankara appeared to resign to itself that the 
decision was in the League of Nations’ hands, and that regardless of the 
outcome it would abide by that ruling. 
 The treaty between the UK and Iraq allowed for Iraq’s eventual 
independence and League of Nations membership.62  An unsigned Foreign 
Office memorandum held a note of caution stating, “Regard must be paid to the 
desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed 
for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice and teaching in 
the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these 
services.”63 These measures were to be applied to the Kurdish dominated areas. 
The memorandum stated that the Kurdish language was not widely used prior to 
the war, while Persian, Turkish, and Arabic were. Everything was being done to 
develop its use, thus encouraging Iraqi Kurdish identity.64 These were measures 
that troubled the Turkish government. Ankara feared a strong Kurdish identity in 
Iraq would spark Kurdish demands for similar rights in Turkey, thus undermining 
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Turkification. 
 When the League of Nations ruled in favor of Iraq’s retention of Mosul, 
Ankara and the Turkish general public were dismayed. Indeed, Turkish officials 
were disappointed but relieved to be done with the Mosul question.65 When the 
status of Mosul was referred to the Council of the League of Nations, the British 
in Iraq feared Turkey would become emboldened with its successes in Anatolia 
and force Britain’s hand by invading and taking Mosul. The Turks had sent troops 
into southeastern Turkey via Syria to crush Sheikh Said’s rebellion, and the 
British caught rumors that the troops would be used against Mosul next. Such 
was the atmosphere heading into negotiations at Geneva. The main problems 
Ankara had with London and Baghdad were the possibility of an autonomous 
Kurdistan in Mosul and the encouragement the British gave to Kurdish identity. 
To the Turkish government, these problems weighed heavier than controlling 
Mosul. However, this did not prevent Ankara from trying to win back the territory 
at the council. The leadership in Ankara was disappointed, but on the other hand, 
they understood the ruling and were content to leave it at that. 
 
Turkey’s Changing Kurdish Policy 
 
Turkey was becoming a regional power once again, thanks in large part to 
Soviet assistance. Kemal’s reforms gave Turkey a more modern, westernized 
outlook. As such, Turkey’s position as a potential bulwark against the Soviet 
Union became recognized by the British, and was to be exploited to such an end. 
Ankara attempted to win over the Kurds by offering development in the 
southeast. The government considered all citizens of Turkey to be Turks, but this 
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designation ignored cultural differences. Many Kurds that had been sent to 
western Turkey following Sheikh Said’s rebellion were allowed to return to the 
east as an intended sign of good will from the government in Ankara. These 
Kurds were not from notable families and posed no threat to the state. In another 
effort to incorporate Kurds into Turkish society, Ankara granted amnesty to all 
Kurds provided they submit to the state. 
 In early December 1927, Turkey’s new inspector-general of the eastern 
vilayets gained expanded powers including control of the gendarmerie and the 
military.66 The inspector-general’s area of responsibility included El Aziz 
(Kharput), Urfa, Bitlis, Hekkiari, Sirt, Diarbekir, Mardin, and Van as one 
province.67 A new law allowed Kurds that behaved well after being transferred to 
the west to return home to the east.68 In January 1928, Ankara released the 
names of some 781 Kurds who could return east with their families at the behest 
of the Popular Party.69 Many outside government believed conciliation would not 
stand a chance as the Kurds were greatly embittered.70  
 In late March 1928, the British Consulate in Trabizond reported that 
returning Kurds passing through the city were commoners, not leading families.71 
Thus, these Kurds posed no threat to Ankara’s writ in the southeast. Some Kurds 
were unable to continue journey for want of resources, which Ankara had to 
provide before they could continue.72 In early April, Kurds were returning from 
Sheikh Said’s rebellion through what appeared to be a change of policy toward 
pacification by Ankara.73 The British believed most Kurds returning were to be 
individuals of no consequence to Turkish writ in the east.74 There was no 
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indication that this policy was working, or would be able to work. The Inspector-
General at Mardin allegedly was laying plans for the development in the east.75 In 
May, Ankara instated another new law to grant amnesty to Kurds, in which those 
wishing to take advantage of this seeming change had three months to submit 
themselves to authorities.76 By late June, it had become clear that the amnesty 
program was not a great success, and most Kurds transferred west had not 
returned. A proclamation by Ibrahim Tali, Turkey’s Inspector-General of the 
Eastern Vilayets, offered “the surprising candour to admit in such a document 
that any backsliding in the future on the part of the "amnestied" will meet with a 
punishment corresponding with the magnitude of the offence which is now being 
pardoned.”77 In August, the Turkish press stated that both Sheikh Abdurahim and 
Sheikh Mehdi, brothers to Sheikh Said, had been pardoned and allowed to 
return, and that Ibrahim Tali "expressed himself as completely satisfied with the 
Kurdish policy of Iraq" to the Iraq Chargé d'Affairs,78 thus pushing Turkey toward 
improved relations with Iraq. 
 In early November 1928, Turkish press accounts indicated that Ankara’s 
Kurdish policy was successful.79 More Kurds were returning from temporary exile 
in Iraq. Among these Kurds it was again reported, perhaps for emphasis, that the 
sons of Sheikh Said, the brother of Sayid Taha, and other notables returned to 
submit to authorities.80 Construction projects, particularly roads, were ongoing in 
Turkey’s southeast as part of Kemal’s plan for development there.81 There were 
difficulties getting doctors and teachers for Kurdish areas, as the area remained 
volatile.82 Ankara’s new policy toward the Kurds aimed to divorce the Kurds from 
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their Kurdish identity and the identity’s association with the concept of Kurdistan 
in favor of a new Turkish identity associated with Anatolia and the Republic of 
Turkey. Turkish efforts to recreate the Kurds as Turks extended from legal 
measures and from Turkish ojaks, or cultural clubs, set up throughout Turkey. 
Kurds relocated to western Turkey often found a more prosperous situation than 
in southeastern Turkey, and opted to remain in the west adopting a new Turkish 
identity, which suited Ankara in its push to reinvigorate the country through 
Turkish nationalism. A change in policy came when Turkish officials began 
denying the existence of Kurds in Turkey, citing a Turanian origin for Anatolia’s 
inhabitants. 
 
Rumors of Intrigue and Renewal of the Great Game  
 
The British viewed Turkey and Persia as a buffer against the Russian 
Empire when the Great Game began in earnest during the late 1820s.83 One 
hundred years later, London still perceived the two to be important against 
aggression toward India from the Heartland. The British recognized the 
importance of Turkey’s position between the Russians in the north and Western 
powers in the south.84 The buffer zone the British imagined Kurdistan or Armenia 
filling vanished, leaving only Turkey, then receiving aid from the Soviet Union. 
The relationship between Ankara and Moscow disturbed the British, who feared 
the rise of the Soviet Union as a new Heartland power. However, the British 
discovered that Ankara had become friendly with Moscow because Turkey had 
no other ally and no financial or material support from other countries. The Turks 
were suspicious of Soviet intentions and were willing to distance themselves from 
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Moscow if positive relations were established with the British and other former 
enemies.  
 To the British perception, the Persians seemed more likely to assist the 
Turks than to assist the Iraqis with the Kurds.85 According to one British observer, 
the Persians seemed to be helping the Kurds of Iraq.86 The Persians were 
concerned over the status of Mosul, and they wanted to know how to shape their 
future plans with regard to who would control the territory.87 
 In late August 1925, Sheikh Said's son, Ali Irza, visited the British consulate 
in Tabriz to request passage to Baghdad to discuss with the British the 
establishment of "an independent Kurdish State."88 Ali Irza stated that the Kurds 
were beaten by better-armed Turks in the last revolt, and sought British help and 
protection for Kurdish nationalism, but he did not believe the French would favor 
it.89 The consul's assistant, Mirza Ali Khan, thought Ali Irza may have been 
smoking opium, and suggested the whole thing may have been a “feeling out” of 
the British by Bolsheviks or Persians.90 Ali Irza was bold in asserting, “that 
whether or not the desired help would be forthcoming, the Kurds intended to 
continue the fight for their national independence, led by their sheikhs, and by his 
family and himself."91 
 In September, the Turkish press was reporting on British intrigues, which 
the press argued threatened Persia via its Kurds.92 This was an attempt by 
Ankara to get Tehran on its side against the British. In early October, the Turkish 
embassy in London let the British know they were prepared to fight if necessary. 
The British believed Turkey planned to ally with the Soviet Union, and that the 
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Soviets wanted the Turks at war with the British.93 However, London required 
more definite information on Russian intentions and actions than mere rumors.94 
 Another turn of events came in September 1927, when the Turkish press 
hinted that the Turco-Russian Treaty of Friendship of 1921 might not be 
renewed, which appeared to contradict previous messages of positive Turkish-
Soviet relations.95 Turkish press stories turned their attention to Bolshevik agents 
in Turkey and police investigations associated with the agents’ activities.96 In late 
November, the British gained more concrete information that the Turkish police 
were arresting communists. Investigations revealed that Soviets were working 
with foreign workers in Turkey, mostly Hungarians.97 All the while, Ankara 
publicly stated that they desired good relations with Moscow, but wanted no 
communism in Turkey.98 Despite this, the Soviet Union was still Turkey’s main 
ally, and any wrong step by the British could undo London’s efforts to move 
Ankara from Moscow’s orbit. 
 In September 1928, Russia and Turkey renewed a reciprocal exports and 
imports agreement as a sign of continuing economic ties.99 However, tensions 
ran high between Ankara and Moscow, and the Turks responded to Turkish 
property confiscations in the Soviet Union by confiscating Soviet property in 
Trebizond.100 Turkish authorities made more arrests of communists or those 
suspected of such.101 The façade of good Turkish-Soviet relations was beginning 
to crack, and presented an opportunity for the British. 
 By the middle of December, the British Foreign Office had noticed that 
"Russian influence in Turkey has been declining slowly but steadily since the 
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settlement of the Mosul question in the summer of 1926," and advised that "A 
step tending towards the consolidation of Russia's neighbours, either internally or 
in their mutual relations, should proportionally contribute towards weakening the 
power of Russia for intrigue and intimidation in this domain."102 The British 
perceived that when the Turks said they loved Russia, they actually feared it, 
remembering how they faired during the days of the Russian Empire.103 The 
Turks were delighted to be friends with the Soviet Union since "The bullying of 
the Tsars is not forgotten."104 Despite appearances, Ankara was being pragmatic 
with its relations with Moscow. The Turks had only the Soviet Union willing to 
support their reemergence, both through material and moral means, following 
World War I, and until the situation changed to where Turkey was accepted 
among states the Turks would keep to the partnership.105 To the Turkish public 
the Turkish-Soviet relationship was thought to be “a kind of vassalage,"106 and 
the Turks were “uneasy about the strength of Russian influence in North-Western 
Persia, where they have affinities with most of the population, or where the Kurds 
may be used to make the Kurds on the Turkish side of the frontier disaffected."107 
The relationship was one of convenience and momentary necessity that could be 
changed with geopolitical shifts in the region. 
 The British perceived that the Soviets were trying to cause trouble between 
Turkey and Persia,108 perhaps to reassert the deteriorating relationship between 
Moscow and Ankara. In August 1930, the Russian newspaper Izvestiya 
published a story in Moscow accusing the British, singling out T.E. Lawrence, of 
inciting Turkey’s Kurdish rebellions. The article went on to state: 
The aim of the rebellion -- the independence of the Kurds -- coincides with the 
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interests of the English Imperialists, who dream of forming a strategic point in this 
region against the U.S.S.R. The suppression of this rebellion has cost the Turks 
very dear. It is intended by this means to weaken the Turkish economic situation in 
such a manner that she will be more dependent on the offer of England of financial 
assistance. By this means, thanks to the revolt of the Kurds, it was possible to kill 
two birds with one stone. The second advantage was the chance of disturbing the 
relations between Turkey and Persia.109 
 
The article concluded that the Kurdish conflict in Turkey was intended by the 
British as a diversion, “and that the principal object is the preparation for a war 
with the Soviet Union, for which purpose her enemies are ensuring for 
themselves a suitable strategic position."110 
 By the middle of March 1931, the Soviets and the Turks announced a new 
commercial treaty and supplementary naval protocol between them.111 The 
agreement railed against "Imperialist States" preparing a new world war against 
the Soviet Union.112  The Russo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
was signed on March 16, 1931, and represented the balance the two states 
struck with each other despite a decline in political ties.113 The Turkish press 
seemed pleased with the treaty.114 
The British perceived the Soviet Union to be reigniting the Great Game by 
extending its influence to Turkey and among populations in Iraq and Persia. This 
frightened the British because such influence could have cut off India from the 
link the British had built from the Mediterranean. The British believed that the 
Soviet Union, like the Russian Empire, sought warm water ports and friendly 
neighbors to counter British influence. Indeed, the British move to connect India 
with Europe was an early form of containment against Soviet, or any other 
country’s ambitions in the Middle East or South Asia. 
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Improved Relations Between Turkey and Iraq 
 
 Ankara and Baghdad sought good relations with each other, thus aiming to 
marginalize Kurdish nationalist efforts to drive a wedge between them. The Turks 
had been concerned about how the British were handling the Kurds in Iraq, and 
felt the British were giving Iraqi Kurds too many cultural rights such as Kurdish 
language education.115 They feared this would invite Kurds in Turkey to seek the 
same treatment, which was not forthcoming from Ankara.116 Ankara was still 
uneasy over the Kurdish situation in October 1925.117 The Dersim Kurds stood 
down from revolt, but the Turks attempted a precautionary removal of the Dersim 
Kurds from power lest rebellion erupted again on a grander scale.118  
 Autonomy and cultural rights granted to Iraqi Kurds worried the Turkish 
government, but the British were committed to this path. The British had been 
concerned that the Turks would still move on Mosul, and made plans to blockade 
the Dardanelles in the event of war.119 After the November decision by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice to bind Ankara and London to the 
League of Nations ruling on the final status of Mosul, many powers thought 
Turkey might defy the move. This was especially a concern after Turks signed a 
Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship with the Soviet Union in December.120 
 The British position was to be made clear to the Turks that there was “no 
idea in this of creating anything in the nature of an autonomous Kurdish State for 
the Kurdish districts of Irak or of reviving the policy contemplated in the Treaty of 
Sèvres."121 A thawing of relations came in April 1926, when bilateral talks 
reopened between the British and the Turks, and led to an agreement in which 
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Turkey would receive ten percent of oil royalties from the Mosul oilfields for a 
period of 25 years.122 This was an opening move by the British to bring the Turks 
into their orbit and away from the Soviets’. 
 As late as December 1928, the British felt that if they withdrew, Iraq would 
collapse or cling to a small territory along the Tigris from Samarra to Kut.123 The 
British Administrator of Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs asserted, "The strength of the 
administration rests almost solely on the knowledge of British support and control 
and on the fear inspired by British aeroplanes and armoured cars in the plains 
and by the Assyrian Levies helped by British aeroplanes in the Kurdish hills."124 
Dobbs went on to detail his ideas for how the British should deal with the Kurdish 
situation in Iraq: 
The question of the maintainance of a special regime in the Kurdish districts needs 
no long discussion. It is a clear obligation towards the League of Nations on the 
part of both the British and Iraq Governments, and no other regime would abate 
the traditional dislike of the Kurd for the Arab and secure the retention of the 
Kurdish tracts in Iraq. Even Turkey and Persia, which had at first hoped to 
suppress the Kurdish spirit by force, have now been compelled to adopt much the 
same policy as has been followed in Iraq. If the Kurdish tracts were to get out of 
hand, the Kurds of the foothills would harry all the northern plains and the main line 
of communications through Kirkuk and Arbil to Mosul would become untenable. 
The Arab politicians, however, believe that they could hold the Kurdish hills by their 
own force, and they have greatly disliked my insistence on the rule that officials in 
the Kurdish districts shall, where possible, be Kurds. I fear that, if Arab conceit 
were ever given its head, South Kurdistan would be lost to them for ever, and a 
grave blow would be struck at the security and prosperity of Iraq. The oil industry, 
with all its promise, would certainly become impracticable.125 
 
 Large numbers of Kurds had been deported to western Turkey over a 
period of two years. Ankara was likely moving Kurds to the Konya plain hoping to 
settle them into peaceful agrarian lives. They claimed there was calm in the 
east.126 
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In late March 1928, Ankara became concerned with what they called 
brigands who were trying to incite ignorant Kurdish tribesmen and villagers into 
uprising in Iraq.127 The threat of a Kurdish rebellion in Iraq appeared to the Turks 
as though it might sweep northward. In May 1928, the British position on the 
handling of border incidents was stated as a problem to be solved by border 
authorities instead of through diplomats, thus reducing distractions for high-level 
diplomatic interactions.128 Leo Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, noted 
the difficulties of holding Iraq together in the face of an assault from within or 
without stating: 
Iraq is still scarcely more than a geographical expression. The different races 
which inhabit the country have not yet been welded into a single Iraqi nation. A 
Kurd is still primarily a Kurd and only secondarily (if at all to his own mind) an 
Iraqi.129  
 
Amery understood the difficulties rising from the newly artificial boundaries and 
identity of Iraq. The formation of an Iraqi identity that trumped all other identities 
would be a troublesome project Baghdad would struggle with into the twenty-first 
century. 
 King Faisal was suspicious of the Kurds and of British support for them. The 
British wanted to remind him of his obligations to the Kurds and that the British 
were seeing that those commitments were met.130 Despite Turkish assertions to 
the contrary, the British were also trying to prevent Iraq from becoming a base for 
Kurdish nationalism. In February 1929, all British passport officers were 
distributed “a special list of Kurdo-Armenian Nationalists to whom visas for Iraq 
should be refused."131 By September 1929, the British were prepared to support 
Iraq for League of Nations candidacy in 1932.132 
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 Neighborly relations had not been quick in coming for the states of Turkey 
and Iraq. Animosity lingering from the demise of the Ottoman Empire, especially 
regarding Mosul, still held some sway. However, the governments in Ankara and 
Baghdad, as well as London, knew they would have to work together 
economically, politically, and socially. The Kurdish issue was a stumbling block 
for the governments. Neither Iraq nor Turkey wished to see an independent 
Kurdistan rise between them. Both governments sought Kurdish integration into 
their national societies, though they took very different approaches. 
 
The Khoybun and the Mount Ararat Rebellion 
 
The late 1920s witnessed a culmination of the Kurdish nationalist efforts of 
previous years. Kurdish nationalist activities had continued to simmer after 
Sheikh Said’s rebellion was crushed with small clashes persisting from 1925 
through early 1927 in southeastern Turkey.133 An organization called Khoybun 
(Independence) became the beacon for united Kurdish nationalism. According to 
Izady, “the earliest Kurdish political party in the modern sense is the Khoybun, 
established by Kurdish aristocrats and intellectuals in Paris in 1918,” and 
“included tribal leaders, and some descendents of the old Kurdish princely 
houses.” 134 The Khoybun merged various Kurdish organizations under its banner 
with Jaladat Badr Khan as its president.135 The Badr Khan family had long been 
involved in Kurdish intellectual circles from the Ottoman Empire to Egypt to 
Europe.136 For years the family ran a newspaper known as Kurdistan, which was 
distributed among the same intellectual circles.137  
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In August 1927, the Khoybun, under the guise of the Kurdish National 
Congress, met at Bhamdoun, Lebanon, in the mountains east of Beirut to 
proclaim a Kurdish government in exile and present a united Kurdish nationalist 
force in the region.138 The Khoybun established its headquarters at a forward 
operating location of Aleppo, Syria, where there was a large presence of Kurdish 
and Armenian refugees.139 The organization opened offices in Paris, London, 
and Detroit.140 This was likely to raise funds among Kurds in those cities for 
operations against Turkey. The Khoybun also opened clandestine offices in Iraq, 
Syria, and Turkey;141 likely seeking a broad support base aimed at Kurdish 
independence in formerly Ottoman Kurdish lands. However, the Khoybun’s 
leadership understood it was not wise to anger Persia, Iraq, or Syria with its 
moves against Turkey. 
The Khoybun emerged as an organization no longer of Kurdish exile 
elites, but of tribesmen, urbanites, and seasoned rebels as well.142 The Khoybun 
invoked the territorial image of Kurdish land, seeking to drive the Turks from 
Kurdistan.143 The organization had to strike a delicate balance in maintaining 
friendly relations with Persia, Iraq, and Syria – all countries with Kurds who might 
seek independence.144 Two main paths for Kurdish nationalism would exist if the 
Khoybun won independence for Kurds in Turkey. The movement would either 
expand its efforts to Persia, Iraq, and Syria, or it would take a diplomatic 
approach seeking cooperation for an independent Kurdistan through the 
framework of the League of Nations. The latter path was likely what the Khoybun 
sought. By presenting a unified Kurdish movement to the international 
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community, the Khoybun would make its case for Kurdish independence by 
pointing to its victory over the Turks and to the unfulfilled promise for Kurdish 
independence outlined in the Treaty of Sèvres. The Khoybun’s partnership with 
the Armenian Dashnak may have reassured the British of Kurdish intentions 
regarding the Soviet Union. If the British were worried about Soviet influence in 
the Khoybun, the Kurds would have noted the Dashnak’s anti-communist 
sentiment and the fact that the organization had been banned from the Soviet 
Union.145 Despite their distrust of Bolsheviks, the Khoybun did accept aid from 
the International Minority Movement based out of Odessa.146 
Khoybun efforts began in earnest in 1928, when the organization declared 
the region around Mount Ararat (Figure 5.2) to be an independent Kurdish 
republic.147 The Khoybun established a government, a military, and equipped 
itself for its coming struggle against Ankara.148 Flags were hoisted above Kurdish 
held areas in an effort to create a rallying symbol for Kurds involved and those 
who would be inspired in the future.149 
 The first signs of trouble in Turkey’s east appeared when Turkish-Persian 
frontier negotiations were interrupted by a new Kurdish revolt in February 1929: 
The report is to the effect that at Ari Dagh, in the Hekkiari Vilayet, 5000 Kurds 
have risen against the Government and have wiped out a battalion of troops 
which was sent against them. This disaster is said to have decided the Turkish 
Government to deal energetically with the rising in the spring. But any action 
against the Kurds of Hekkiari may have repercussions outside the frontiers of 
Turkey, and the Government is therefore anxious to settle the frontier dispute 
with Persia during the next few months.150 
 
Since Shiekh Said’s revolt in 1925, Kurdish nationalists had become restless. 
The Kurds rose in revolt near the end of February, and the Turks were "afraid of 
collaboration by Russian Armenians and Persian Kurds."151 Because of these 
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 fears, Ankara attempted a rapprochement with the Kurds, part of which involved  
amnesty for past transgressions against the republic.152 The Khoybun used the 
time to better prepare itself for the coming conflict, while accusing Ankara of 
trickery.153 
 Counted among the Kurdish nationalists were Ibrahim Bey (Celali chief), 
Halis Bey (son of Sheikh Abdul Necit), Selahettin (son of Shiekh Said), and the 
sons of Kör Huseyn, the chief of Haydoranli.154 The Ararat revolt had been 
organized by Halis, who had been deported from Bayazit to Bursa three years 
prior.155 Selahettin had been arrested in February, along with “the Seal-maker,” 
of which the arrests had been the first report of Kurdish trouble in the press.156 
This seemingly strange mention of a seal maker being arrested indicates that the 
Khoybun was attempting to create an official icon, or icons, symbolic of the 
Kurdish people and their struggle. Halis was captured, but escaped while being 
transited from Erzerum to Trebizond and fled to Persia,157 and attempted to 
recruit Kurds there.158 
 About 90 other Kurds were arrested with Halis and Ankara charged them 
with perpetrating the "'Kurdistan Committee's' program for a rising."159 Soon after 
the incident, Celali tribesmen began raids around Ararat.160 The Turkish 
commander, Asim Pasha, thought that the extermination of the Kurdish rebels 
was impossible because of the rugged and remote geography.161 Asim worried 
that Persian Kurds and Russian Armenians would join the fray, if they had not 
already.162 
 In early May, Armenians were being targeted by the Turks once again, and 
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a “fear of Armeno-Kurdish intrigues has made the authorities at Diarbekir, 
Kharput and elsewhere give the local Armenians to understand that they would 
be well-advised to leave."163 By this time, Asim had been replaced by Zeki Pasha 
and a very large Turkish force numbering around 15,000 was being sent against 
"a few hundred Kurds."164 Fleeing Armenians were refused entry to the Soviet 
Union, entering Persia instead.165  
 Turkish Ojaks, or cultural clubs, were established with the intent to bring 
"civilization" to the Kurds and to liberate women.166 The Turkish army’s role, 
apart from defense, was to make citizens, and one British official noted, "Kurdish 
soldiers are sent to Western Anatolia, to be turned into good Turks."167 The 
soldiers were being taught to read and write in Turkish, and when they returned 
home, they were to get good jobs like headmen.168 This was a revolutionary 
change for the Kurdish southeast in terms of realigning the socio-economic 
structure. Ankara was investing time and effort in the southeast intending the 
region to no longer be a place of banishment, but rather a prime focus for 
development. Ankara viewed the Kurds as integral for agriculture and population 
stability.169 
 The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or Dashnaksutiun (Dashnak), was 
willing to put aside Kurdish-Armenian hostilities lingering from Armenian ethnic 
cleansing in the Ottoman Empire during World War I.170 The Dashnak lent its 
support to the Khoybun, believing that the Kurds would succeed in gaining their 
independence from Turkey, or that they would cripple Ankara by drawing the 
Turks into fighting against costly mountain guerilla campaigns.171 Indeed, a 
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Dashnak leader, Vahan Papazyan, had been present at the Khoybun’s founding 
of a government in exile at Bhamdoun, Lebanon.172 The Dashnak connected the 
Khoybun to funding from the Greek and Italian governments, who hoped to use 
the Kurds to undermine Kemal.173 An Armenian, Reuben Pasha, claimed to 
"have been a Minister of War in Armenia in 1914," and was assisting the 
Khoybun with training and arms acquisitions.174 As an Armenian advisor to the 
Khoybun, Reuben Pasha claimed to have been on a secret mission to Tehran to 
acquire arms for Kurds at Ararat.175 According to Reuben, the Khoybun had been 
fighting for the last three years, "at present, more or less independent, in spite of 
the efforts of the Turks to subdue them."176 Reuben stated that the Turkish 
offensive around Ararat began June 10. He detailed the Khoybun’s plans: 
The Kurds control two spheres -- one to the north of Erjish, and the other, the area 
of the Mounts Ararat and to the west. They wish to absorb the region between 
these two spheres, and make the whole into one revolutionary area. The Turkish 
forces are divided into two groups, one operating from south of Erzerum towards 
the Ararats, and the second from north-west of Lake Van towards Erjish and 
Bayazid. The area of operations is very difficult for regular troops, and the Turks 
have much difficulty in maintaining forces in this region.177 
 
Reuben addressed the British concern about Soviet ambitions, knowing this 
would hold their attention and possibly influence London to support the Kurds. He 
argued that the Turks were merely the Moscow’s “catspaws,” and that their 
objective of helping Ankara rein in the Kurds held “the object of eventually 
themselves absorbing this area by peaceful penetration; the Soviet [sic] would 
then be in a position to extend their influence eastwards to the southern shores 
of the Caspian Sea, and southwards and into Iraq.”178 The Soviet Union was 
allowing the transit of the Turks' supplies through their territory. Reuben claimed 
that the Kurds only needed arms to hold off the Turks.179 The British refused to 
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help Reuben on the grounds of, besides his trustworthiness, it being too 
dangerous a gamble.180 
 As of July, the Khoybun was reportedly planning to march on Diyarbakır.181 
A fierce battle raged from 5-9 July, scattering remnants of the Khoybun’s forces 
in hills north of Lake Van.182 Kurds had expected wider support, and had 
reportedly used religious propaganda hoping to rally Islamist forces to their side. 
The Turkish Air Force bombarded and machine-gunned Kurdish positions.183 It 
was reported that at least three planes were downed, and "The airmen were 
killed and mutilated by the Kurds."184  
 Turkey was seeking to solve the eastern frontier question once and for all, 
and Ankara’s goal was “to complete the liquidation of the Kurdish revolt of 
1925."185 Combat as of July 7 involved 10,000 Turkish troops, 100 casualties, 3 
planes downed.186 As with the 1925 Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish press began 
“to insinuate that Great Britain, who has always wished to create an independent 
Kurdish nation in Northern Iraq, may be connected with movement near Mount 
Ararat."187 
 The British gained information from a Greek source on activities along the 
Persian frontier stating that the Turks began operations in April, and that fighting 
began in May and June with the Turks incurring a hundred casualties and three 
airplanes lost.188 Some Kurds fled toward Lake Van, while others fled toward 
Lake Uramia across the Persian border.189 The area where the Kurds were 
fighting was “in country eminently suited to guerilla tactics,” and they “could 
hardly be dislodged for so small a price" as the Turks were willing to pay 
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initially.190 
 In the middle of July, the Turks were having difficulties with the Soviets over 
refugees from the Caucasus being allowed to enter Turkey.191 The refugees were 
going into Persia instead making the Persians nervous about Soviet "aggression 
in the northwest."192 A British official observed, “The truth lies possibly in a 
Persian hope that a Kurdish rising would make it difficult for the Turks to enforce 
their claim to Persian territory in the Ararat district."193 
 The Shah of Persia believed the Soviets had been trying to create trouble 
between Turkey and Persia.194 The Shah emphasized Persian distrust of 
Russians "whether Tsarist or Communist," noting that "Both were equally 
unreliable and untrustworthy."195 According to an extract from the Tehran 
Newspaper Iran, dated July 10, 1930, Persia demonstrated friendliness toward 
Turkey: a common policy toward Kurdish rebels, Persian closure of the frontier, 
ordering Persian Kurds away from the Turkish border, expulsion of Turkish Kurds 
from Persia, prohibiting Persian Kurds from aiding rebels, ordering Persian 
border authorities to cooperate with Turks.196 The newspaper claimed that Persia 
and Turkey sought similar policies in centralization and modernization for 
prosperity.197 
 The Turks were unhappy with Iraq's lenient treatment of Kurds, and Ankara 
believed it must be a British conspiracy to harm Turkey.198 In late July, troop 
trucks were moved from Tabriz to Maku after Turks accused Persian Kurds of 
crossing the border.199 In late July, a fight between Iraqi Kurds and Turkish 
troops set the Turks and the British on edge.200 In August, the British tried to 
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reassure Ankara that London was not supporting Kurdish revolts.201 Trouble 
between the Turks and Sheikh of Barzan's followers led Ankara to cast doubt on 
these reassurances.202 
 Border disturbances abounded when Turkey attempted to pursue Kurds into 
Iraq, Persia, and Syria.203 A Kurdish leader from Syrian Kurdistan known as Hajo 
was going to launch his own assault against the Turks from Syria in a bid to 
plunge the region into a Kurdish war for independence. Hajo was alleged “to 
have issued a manifesto announcing that he is working for Kurdish 
independence, and calling on the Kurds to avenge the massacres of the bothers 
by the Turks."204 However, Hajo failed to win local Kurds' support, and was 
quickly arrested by the French in Syria.205 Events such as this fueled Ankara’s 
paranoia toward the Kurds and the British. 
 At the end of July, there were many casualties among Kurds at Eraciş, and 
the remaining Kurds had taken refuge on the upper slopes of Ararat. British 
officials argued that the Persian conspiracy theory was destroyed, because the 
rebels were almost entirely Kurds from Turkey. The only incident involving other 
Kurds was a raid by Barzanis from Iraq.206 It was still unclear to the British 
exactly who was involved in the insurrection in eastern Turkey. The Foreign 
Office identified three Kurdish nationalist groups it believed to be involved in the 
insurrection around Mount Ararat: 
(a) Kurd Ta'ali, in Northern Kurdistan, comprising the sons of Sheikh Said. They 
are said to be in close touch with the Bolsheviks. 
(b) Khayboun, in Syria, whose head office is in Beirut, and who have enlisted the 
support of the Armenian Nationalist Society, called  'Tachmak.' 
(c) Khalaskaran, in Turkey and Persia, of which many leading Turks and Persians 
are said to be members.207 
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The British were perceptive to detect these currents, but the groups were all 
Khoybun. The Foreign Office noted that Syrian Kurds were paying close 
attention, "waiting and hoping for the rallying cry of independence," and that the 
French authorities were watching them closely.208 The Turkish 53rd Regiment 
had been deployed against the revolt, but had suffered major defeats, thus 
Ankara was moving larger numbers of troops into the southeast.209 By early 
August, villages around Mount Ararat had been abandoned. The supreme 
commander of the rebels was reported to be Ibrahim Bey of the Jalali Kurds. 
Ibrahim’s chief of staff was Ibsan Nuri (Ihsan Nuri), and his chief adviser was 
Shiekh Khalil, which Palmer believed to be an alias.210 The Jalali Kurds and the 
Persians had been battling near Maku, and many Persian casualties had 
resulted.211 By the middle of August, the Turkish strategy appeared to be to drive 
the Kurds into Persia and clear Ararat districts.212 
 Tehran had become angered by Turkish and Soviet border incidents. Persia 
sought League of Nations’ assistance to prevent its territory from being violated 
and to prevent its own Kurdish population from being agitated.213 The Turks 
sought an exchange of territory with Persia and proposed joint operations against 
Kurds. 214 In late August, Tehran rejected Ankara’s proposal for frontier 
rectification near Ararat in addition to rejecting the Turks' right to pursue Kurds 
into Persia. The Persians wished to deal with Kurds on Persian territory.215 
 In late August 1930, there were reports that T.E. Lawrence was running the 
rebellion from northwest of Aleppo.216 French authorities did not believe it, but the 
Syrians did. They believed his headquarters was in Maku, Persia, adjacent to 
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Ararat.217 Similarly, the Shah of Persia was fearful that Colonel Lawrence was 
behind Kurdish nationalism, and that Sheikh Mahmoud had gained British 
support for leadership.218 The British had abandoned Mahmoud years before, 
and reassured the Shah that they did not support the rebellion nor was Lawrence 
involved.219 
 Tehran believed all Kurds should be Persian subjects, according to the 
Shah’s minister of court, Abdolhossein Teymurtash.220 Tehran, like Ankara, 
feared the Wilsonian ideal of self-determination of minorities.221 In August, the 
Shah of Persia expressed his worries about a united Kurdistan and an 
independent Armenia, claiming that there existed "a so-called Kurdish 
Government in the neighbourhood of Mount Ararat, which even included a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs."222 Among the Armenians observing events there 
was “certainly an important section who would welcome a combined effort with 
the Kurds."223 
 Toward the end of August, the Turks appeared successful in containing the 
Mount Ararat rebellion despite setbacks.224 The Kurds had been successful in 
battles at Aralik and Bayazit.225 Turks based at Kara Kilissa numbered 10,000-
15,000, while Kurds led by Ibrahim Beg of Jalali tribe numbered 5,000-8,000.226 
The Turks were using around 15 planes, but several had been shot down by 
Kurdish sharpshooters.227 He noted that the Kurds captured sophisticated 
weaponry from Turks, but lacked ammunition.228 The Kurds had divided into 
small guerilla bands in an area that would prove "most difficult for regular troops; 
a great scarcity of good water, no local supply,” and “very bad communications 
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and an extremely difficult terrain, particularly in the vicinity of the Ararats."229 The 
Kurds were being driven up Greater and Lesser Ararat’s slopes, although some 
fled into Persia where they were ordered back across by Persian forces.230 When 
later the Persians were drawn into conflict with Kurds resulting in four officers 
and around a hundred men killed, Persian leniency toward Kurds ended.231 The 
Persians were frustrated with the Turks for bringing them into the Kurdish 
conflict, while on the other side, the Turks felt the Persians had been inadequate 
at the border.232 Press reports claimed the Turks were occupying Persian Kara 
Dagh as a result, and the Persians immediately denied the claim.233 Ankara 
accused Tehran of selling the Kurds ammunition and supplies at Tabriz, and the 
Turks threatened to occupy Persian territory.234 The situation escalated when the 
Persians sent reinforcements to Maku.235 The British Foreign Office was aware 
that "the Russians are working in close liaison with the Turks on the Erivan 
border, and it is probable that, in the event of serious trouble between Turkey 
and Persia, the latter would find themselves seriously hampered by the thinly-
veiled or even open hostile action on the part of Russia."236 
 The Turks claimed no outstanding troubles with the Persians except that 
two prominent Kurdish chiefs from Turkey settled in Persia and had not been 
removed. Because of accidental territorial intrusions by the Turks into Persia, 
Ankara viewed rectification of the Ararat frontier as essential to prevent conflict 
between Turkey and Persia.237 Turkey under Ismet Pasha "frankly wanted to 
annihilate the Kurds"238 Persia wanted all parties with Kurdish populations to 
leave their Kurds alone, and not annoy them or accommodate for fear of the 
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effects on Persia's Kurds.239 
 The Turks, led by Salih Pasha, gained the ground between Ararats and won 
decisive victory on September 10, leading the Kurds to flee toward Persia.240 
A week later, calm appeared to have descended to Turkey’s east, but the British 
Foreign Office believed “Kurdish revolt and nationalism are only too likely to raise 
their heads again, and, unless the Turkish Government can substitute something 
more reasonable for its recent policy of stern repression, the process of the 
“Turkification" of the Kurds may not prove so easy, nor their subjugation so 
complete, as seems to be assumed to-day."241 
 An extract from "Tabriz Political Diary and Military News," No. 8, for the 
period from August 7 to September 6, 1930, detailed the Kurdish situation.242 The 
clipping stated that five Turkish airplanes had been lost, and that there were 
Kurdish successes around Aralik.243 According to the article, the Turks were 
driven across the Araxes into the Soviet Union, where the Soviets were helping 
Turks, supposedly joining the fight across the river.244 It noted that Persian 
reinforcements had been sent to the northwest to create a cordon from Sakiz to 
Sauj Bulak.245 
 The Khoybun released a propaganda report in October that was 
disseminated as far as the U.S., claiming 40,000 Turkish casualties among 
government troops, and accused the Turks of razing 500 villages and 
massacring 12,000 innocent Kurds.246 This was a last effort at rattling the Turkish 
public’s confidence before the rebellion was completely destroyed. 
 By late November, major operations had been concluded at Ararat. 
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Posts were established along Soviet and Persian frontiers to prevent Kurds from 
returning. The British also received reports of operations “being carried out 
against the Kurds of the Dersim region in a manner which resembles the 
operations against the Armenians in 1915."247 
 In September 1930, the British Foreign Office had assured Nuri Bey of the 
Turkish General Staff that Iraq would not become a base for Kurdish 
nationalism.248 This move likely made him more comfortable having candid 
conversations with the British. Nuri Bey took a negative view of Kurds, 
questioning the validity of their origins and culture by suggesting "they derive 
very largely from Seljuk Turks, who preceded the Ottoman invasion."249 Nuri 
asserted that Kurds were formerly exempted from military service, thus leading 
many Turks to identify themselves as Kurds. Nuri stated that most of the 
insurgents were from Persia, suggesting Tehran had a hand in Turkey’s troubles. 
Nuri Bey turned his attention to Ihsan Nuri, one of the main Khoybun military 
commanders: 
Ihsan Bey, who had been one of the leaders in the Agri Dag rebellion, was a 
Turkish captain, who had deserted during the Nestorian troubles. He doubtless 
hoped in the recent revolt to attain a high position amongst the Kurds. Nuri Bey 
does not know if Ihsan is at liberty in Tehran, but thinks, in any case, that his 
power to do harm is exhausted.250 
 
Nuri Bey stated that Ankara and Tehran had established garrisons around 
Greater and Lesser Ararat believing that no uprising would occur the following 
spring.251 Nuri Bey perceived that villagers in the east had been angered by 
trouble the rebels had caused for them, and would not tolerate further 
disturbances.252 Nuri Bey noted that "Complete pacification of the tribes is 
impossible as long as they can cross the boundaries with an impunity which is 
 196 
not shared by their opponents."253 
 In March 1931, punishments were meted out for the Kurds arrested in 
connection with the Khoybun. Selahettin was condemned to fifteen years hard 
labor, which was a reduced sentence because he was not quite twenty-one at 
the time of the Erzerum conspiracy.254 Others received mild sentences as 
conspirators because not much could be proven in court.255 These light 
sentences are in stark contrast to the "wholesale hangings at Menemen."256 
Nevertheless, Ankara was attempting to place itself as a humane state dealing 
fairly with its problem population, likely in an effort to further distance itself from 
the horrors of the Armenian ethnic cleansing of World War I. 
 That same month, the Turks were reported to advance 24 kilometers into 
Persia in pursuit of Kurds from the Ararat rebellion.257 Persian troops were sent 
to Maku, where Ankara wanted Tehran to round up fleeing Kurds for extradition 
back to Turkey.258  A subsequent clash between Kurds and Persians occurred at 
Maku.259 
 In late September 1931, the British consul in Trabzon reported that Kurds 
were arriving there from the areas around Ararat, and that they were being sent 
by steamship to western Turkey for resettlement.260 In early October 1931, Kurds 
crossing the Persian frontier petitioned Ankara for settlement in western Turkey, 
particularly the Halikanli tribe, a branch of Jalali tribe.261 According to the British 
consulate at Trabzon, in late October 1931 the Halikanli tribe fled from Persian 
territory occupied by Turkish forces and was sent west to Bursa.262 
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Turkey’s Consolidation of Control 
 If the Khoybun set out to draw Turkey into conflict with its Persian 
neighbor via the Mount Ararat rebellion, then that objective was almost met. 
Ankara and Tehran accused each other of grave offenses that almost led to an 
armed conflict between them.263 The Turks accused the Persians of allowing the 
Kurds to use Persian territory to launch attacks into Turkey, while the Persians 
accused the Turks of violating Persian territory in pursuit of the Kurds. The 
situation was diffused when Turkey and Persia agreed on a territorial swap 
involving lands around Ararat (Figure 5.3).264 
The Khoybun rebellion around Mt. Ararat was crushed by the Turks thanks 
in large part to the Turkish Air Force (TAF).265 The RAF had previously used 
airplanes to stamp out Kurdish resistance in Iraq.266 Air power enabled the British 
and the Turks to extend their authority into the difficult terrain of Kurdistan. These 
areas were prohibitive of the movement of large ground forces because of their 
lack of transportation infrastructure and the Kurds’ extensive local knowledge of 
the terrain for use in guerilla warfare. Without air power, the British and the Turks 
likely would have been at the mercy of Kurdish ground superiority, and their 
efforts to subdue the Kurds would have been more costly if successful at all. 
The Khoybun succeeded in putting forward vigorous Kurdish 
ethnosymbolism to challenge Turkish assertions against Kurdish identity. The 
Khoybun’s secular appeals for Kurdish nationalism gained footing among a  
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diverse group of Kurds. The area around Mount Ararat was chosen as the 
bastion of the Khoybun’s rebellion, because it embodied several important  
geopolitical characteristics. The area was a part of historical Armenia as well as 
Kurdistan, hence the Dashnak’s interest.267 Greater and Lesser Ararat presented 
rugged terrain on which the Kurds were well suited to fight large contingents of 
Turkish forces. Mount Ararat’s remote location in Turkey’s far east along the 
borders of the Soviet Union and Persia gave the Kurds time to establish their 
government and to prepare their defenses. The Khoybun’s leadership knew it 
would take a supreme effort on Ankara’s behalf to mobilize forces. The Khoybun 
may also have wanted the risk of conflict spilling across international borders in 
an attempt to either embarrass Ankara or to draw the Turkish government into 
conflict with either of its two eastern neighbors. The Dashnak agreed to set aside 
animosities with the Kurds to embarrass Turkey and to reclaim Mount Ararat and 
its significance to Armenian identity. Ankara won on the battlefield, but would not 
be able to prevent Kurdish nationalist sentiment from simmering after the 
violence had subsided and scores of Kurds were removed from Turkey’s 
southeast. The Turkish government had taken the fight out of most Kurds for the 
time being, and it would seek to take it out of all Kurds in the following years. 
Kurdish challenges to Ankara’s and Baghdad’s authority remained in Iraq, but the 
Turkish government was content to leave the problem to the British and Iraqis to 
deal with for the time. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
STATE OVER NATION 
The years from 1931 to 1938 witnessed a weakening of Kurdish 
movements in Turkey and a change in Kurdish leadership in Iraq. Regional 
borders had taken shape to exclude Kurdistan (Figure 6.1). Turkey had 
demonstrated its strength by crushing the Khoybun’s military capabilities at 
Mount Ararat, and simultaneously scuttled Kurdish nationalist aspirations in 
Turkey for decades. Kurdish nationalism in Turkey largely became an 
underground movement, and would not emerge again until the 1970s. However, 
Ankara took the opportunity to ensure that all Kurdish elements were quieted by 
pouncing on a group of fiercely independent Kurds belonging to the Alevi 
religious minority living in and around the Dersim area. 
In Iraq, the final defeat of Sheikh Mahmoud in 1931 left a sense of 
uncertainty among many Kurds about how to proceed with their nationalist 
aspirations. Mahmoud had been the primary separatist in Iraq pushing for an 
independent or autonomous Kurdistan under British auspices. Unhindered by the 
British and barring intervention from Turkey or Persia, Mahmoud was the figure 
most likely to have formed a Kurdish state. For British officials in London and in 
Baghdad, he had been too effective for their comfort in consolidating territory and 
power. Under Mahmoud’s persuasion, Kurds in Iraq made another attempt to
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gain independence through the League of Nations. This effort intended to use an 
international legal system to establish a British mandate for Kurdistan, at least 
the Iraqi portion, and to bring attention to the Kurds’ denial of statehood as 
invoked by Wilson’s Fourteen Points and promised in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. 
The attempt, though native this time, met with even less success than that at the 
Paris Peace Conference of over a decade previously. Mahmoud had been 
stopped multiple times, and by 1932 the British had dealt with him for the last 
time, forcing him into retirement. However, the sheikh of Barzan, Ahmed Barzani, 
soon was able to mount his own campaign. The region of Barzan and the city of 
Arbil soon became another center for Kurdish nationalism, rivaling that of 
Sulaymaniyah. 
It was during this time that the British strategy for containment of the 
Heartland was coming to fruition. The British had largely quieted Iraqi Kurdistan 
and readied Iraq for the end of the British mandate there. London also had forged 
friendly ties with Ankara, and sought to cultivate the new relationship to counter 
the Soviet Union’s influence in the region. Turkey’s role as an empire state was 
diminished, but its position as a regional power was again on the rise. British 
officials frowned upon Ankara for its harsh treatment of Turkey’s Kurdish 
population, but recognized their balancing power for overall regional stability. It is 
for this reason that London became measured in its criticisms toward Ankara 
over its dealings with the Kurds. 
Signs of a coming large-scale conflict were emerging in Europe and 
threatened the region once again. Though the British off-loaded Iraq when the 
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kingdom gained independence and entered into the League of Nations, London 
maintained a far-reaching presence in the region through the RAF. The British 
continued to aid Iraq via air power. Air supremacy gave the British the ability to 
police large areas without commitments of large numbers of troops. 
 
The Kurds and the League of Nations 
 
 Some Iraqi Kurds continued to push for independence. This push was by 
no means unified, and was centered directly on Sulaymaniyah and Shiekh 
Mahmoud. His vision of an independent Kurdistan still included British support. 
Many Kurds in Iraq did not share Mahmoud’s enthusiasm and viewed him as a 
troublemaker bringing hardship upon all Kurds. The British, against the wishes of 
Arab officials in Baghdad, wanted to let the Kurds have their say even if nothing 
was to be done with Kurdish requests. British officials wisely believed 
crackdowns would alienate Kurds regardless of their political inclinations. 
 The Turks were still angry with the British for their leniency and 
accommodation regarding Iraq's Kurds, and Ankara accused the British of 
encouraging Kurdish nationalism.1 The British were planning to transfer power 
over to King Faisal’s government, raising concerns among Kurds over what their 
future held under Arab domination. The nationalists among the Kurds feared 
oppression by Baghdad, and demanded from the British local autonomy in 
Kurdistan.2 These Kurds wanted some sort of safeguard, recognizing that their 
Arab, Turkish, and Persian neighbors would likely crush a nascent Kurdish state. 
Because the British had many interests in the region, and because Kurds in Iraq 
had already had dealings with the British, the Kurds felt that London would be the 
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best choice for their guardian. 
 It was clear to the Colonial Office that the Kurds were unhappy with the 
government in Iraq, and that many among the Kurds wanted to establish a new 
mandate. The British perceived this as a unanimous request coming from 
Sulaymaniyah, but believed, at the time, that Kurds in Arbil and Kirkuk felt no 
such sentiment.3 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the British advisor to Iraq’s interior 
minister, complained that Baghdad’s policy toward the Kurds would lead to 
troubles.4 This was especially problematic because the British were readying Iraq 
for independence and entry into the League of Nations. Cornwallis disagreed 
with the Iraqi minister’s aggression in seeking to clamp down on contrary Kurds 
for two reasons: military operations were a drain on Baghdad’s resources and 
any arrests would alienate even moderate Kurds.5 In August 1930, Brook 
Popham, the Acting High Commissioner of Iraq wrote the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Lord Passfield, expressing a dim view of Baghdad’s approach to 
incorporating the Kurds, stating, "I am informed by Cornwallis that the Minister of 
the Interior who is more stupid and conceited than actively vicious has stated his 
intention of embarking upon a forward policy in the Kurdish area; replacing 
Kurdish officials by Arabs and prosecuting those Kurdish leaders who expressed 
at Sulaymaniyah their desire for independence during our recent tour."6  
 In August 1930, Kurds from Kirkuk and the Dauda tribe petitioned the 
president of the League of Nations, via the High Commissioner for Iraq, for 
support of demands for a Kurdish state.7 They claimed mistreatment by Arabs 
and Turcomans, and argued that the Kurds were the original inhabitants of the 
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region.8 The Kurdish petition to the League of Nations asserted that the Kurdish 
people had the ability to build a successful state separate from Iraq. The 
petitioners placed emphasis on Kurdistan’s resources noting, "Our land, if it is 
tendered, can in short time become a second Switzerland, or give a daughter to 
Switzerland."9 
 In September 1930, a general election of deputies was being held 
throughout Iraq. The Sulaymaniyah Council, comprised mostly of members of the 
Kurdish National Committee, decided to boycott the election in protest for 
Kurdish autonomy.10 When officials decided to hold the election there, a crowd of 
protestors marched through the streets toward Government House gathering 
people along the way.11 The protesters doubled from two hundred in short order, 
and soon became violent with police guarding the building.12 When the dust 
cleared, several demonstrators and police lay dead or wounded.13 A crackdown 
against the demonstrators ensued with around four hundred people arrested, 
though most were acquitted and released.14 This incident put the British and Iraqi 
officials on the defensive, while some Kurdish nationalists began to use the 
events in attempts to rally a greater following against Baghdad. 
 The Kurds in Sulaymaniyah had been excited by the Khoybun revolt at 
Mount Ararat in Turkey,15 and likely had been inspired in their own right to do 
something. The telegraph line to Kirkuk had been severed, which led British and 
Iraqi administrators to anticipate an insurrection there.16 Kurdish tribes and Kurds 
in other cities were watching for the outcome of events in and around Kirkuk 
before making their own moves, and British aerial reconnaissance was watching 
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for any massing of Kurdish forces.17 
 The British received reports that Sheikh Ahmed was in correspondence with 
Sheikh Mahmoud, allegedly seeking cooperation for Kurdish autonomy, but no 
further information could be derived.18 Nevertheless, this piece of information 
was enough to worry the British that a wider Kurdish nationalist movement was 
afoot in Iraq. 
 In late September 1930, Shiekh Mahmoud crossed the border from Iran 
back into Iraq through Awroman country.19 He reached Pizhder while avoiding 
authorities in Sulaymaniyah, and was believed to be discussing an insurrection.20 
Iraq sought to gain control of the Pizhder tribal area on the Lesser Zab River, 
which had not been controlled since 1922.21 Mahmoud began reaching out 
beyond his urban power base to gain rural loyalties. It was one thing to control an 
urban area, but quite another to command the countryside as well. 
 The British intention was to be firm but calm with Mahmoud. A British official 
noted that Mahmoud, in his petition to the British, wished to "point out that it is no 
good dreaming of independence, and that the welfare of the Kurds is bound up 
with that of 'Iraq and the only hope of prosperity and happiness for the Kurds is to 
work with the 'Iraq Government and not against it."22 Mahmoud professed the 
loyalty of the Kurds to the British, but wanted separation from the Arabs. He 
sought British protection for Kurdistan, stating, "In the name of this Aryan nation, 
the Kurds as a whole request that you will liberate and separate them from the 
Arabs."23 Perhaps Mahmoud was attempting to appeal to Indo-European kinship 
with the British, or was acting in hope that he would strike a chord with British 
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elitists who viewed the world’s peoples as races of varying quality with the Indo-
Europeans at the top. Regardless, of the underlying reason, Mahmoud was 
making the case that the Kurds were a separate people from their neighbors, 
thus in need of self-governance. 
 In October 1930, Kurdish chieftains of Pizhder, who were associated with 
Sheikh Mahmoud, made formal petitions to the secretary-general of the League 
of Nations seeking a British mandate for Kurdistan.24 After repeated denied 
requests, these Kurds sought separation from Iraq altogether. They emphasized 
that the violence at Sulaymaniyah had been a wholesale massacre, and that they 
should be separated from the Arabs in Iraq to prevent further bloodshed.25 They 
listed several demands, including establishing a Kurdish state “within its natural 
boundaries stretching from Zakho to the districts beyond Khanaqin," the 
evacuation of Arabs from Kurdistan, a League of Nations approved British 
mandate for the state, the release of Kurdish prisoners from the Sulaymaniyah 
riots, and the transfer of all Kurdish officials in Iraq to the Kurdish state.26 
Essentially, this state would stretch from the area around the Turkish-Syrian 
border with Iraq straddling the mountains to the southernmost part of the 
mountains on the Iraq-Iran border. 
 One petition came from the “Tribal Chiefs of the Maiwan tribes and the 
Kokhas of villages inhabited by Fatali Begi tribes now settled along the Persian 
border,” stating, “We also demand to have His Highness Shaikh Mahmud the 
ruler of all Kurds to the exclusion of any body else and any other 
administration."27 Another followed from “Ja'far Sultan, Paramount Chief of the 
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Awaman tribes and other Kurdish Chiefs,” declaring, "We recognize no body as 
our Hukmudar (ruler) except Shaikh Mahmud, the famous Kurdish leader, under 
whose rulership we wish to live."28 The British Foreign Office characterized the 
Kurdish demands as "an erroneous interpretation of the decisions reached by the 
Council on December 16th, 1925, when the area in which the petitioners live was 
assigned to Iraq."29 To Mahmoud and his followers, this was not a 
misinterpretation; these demands were based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points and 
the Treaty of Sèvres. The League of Nations took no action in consideration of 
the Kurdish demands. 
 In January 1931, London was considering what political and military steps 
would be taken to reduce the risk of a serious outbreak of unrest in Kurdistan in 
the spring in order to "detach all potential supporters from Shaikh Mahmud during 
the next two months."30 The British needed to win the support of moderate Kurds 
to resolve all genuine grievances quickly. Failure to achieve this jeopardized 
Iraq's admission into League of Nations.31 London was keen to get out of 
everyday administration of Iraq, while still exercising military control through the 
RAF. They wished to maintain only a small presence to police the region from the 
air. The RAF’s continued pressure in concert with Iraqi ground forces on 
Mahmoud and his followers contributed to his surrender.32 The British succeeded 
in marginalizing Mahmoud, and though he remained in Iraq for the remainder of 
his years his ability to rally followers to the Kurdish cause was no more.33 
 In early 1931, the Turks were having problems with Kurds from Persia, 
while the Persians were having problems with Kurds from Iraq.34 By March, the 
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Turkish government suggested that a joint protest should be addressed by the 
governments of Turkey, Persia, and Iraq to the League of Nations with regard to 
the Kurdish petitions.35 These early troubles that the states had with the Kurds 
foretold of prolonged difficulties to come. 
 
Turkey’s Drift from the Soviet Orbit 
 Although the Soviet Union was the only ally Turkey had initially, the Turks 
recognized the relationship as a dangerous one. The Soviets supplied the 
Turkish government with money and arms while at the same time organizing 
labor and pushing communist ideology among Turkish and foreign workers.36 
The Turkish government realized that the Soviets were trying to undermine 
Turkish sovereignty by sowing seeds of revolution right under their noses.37 The 
Turks began to view their problem with the Soviets as more damaging than any 
outstanding issues with the British and other Western powers. Kemal valued the 
modernization and scientific thinking of the West as models for the Republic of 
Turkey to follow,38 and sought to develop new relationships with these states. 
 An abandonment of the Soviets would have drawn Turkey toward the 
West, but it posed a problem for the positive aspects of the Turkish-Soviet 
relationship. By leaning westward Turkey would force the British to accept a new 
relationship in the defense of India and other British strategic interests. This was 
something the British wanted. Turkey would help shore up the Rimland to the 
UK’s favor. Officials in Ankara were aware of the storm clouds gathering above 
central Europe, and sought to remain out of a coming conflict. The Turks feared 
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what they saw taking shape in Germany and Italy, and hoped that cultivating ties 
with the British and the French would keep German and Italian ambitions in 
check.39 By maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union, Turkey hoped to 
protect its northern approaches.40 
The Kurdish bid for independence was effectively lost upon the removal of 
Turkey’s threat to Mesopotamia and former Ottoman territories south of Anatolia. 
The change in relations between Turkey and the UK guaranteed that the Kurds 
of Turkey and Iraq were to remain fractured politically and culturally. Though the 
borders between the two countries are artificial, northern Kurdistan had long 
been separated from the southern portion by mountain ridges and economics. At 
this time in history when nationalisms were awakening and transportation and 
communications undergoing revolutionary improvements, the Kurds were 
prevented from organizing as others around them had done. 
 To the British, the Turkish government’s change of attitude toward the 
Soviet Union was precisely what was needed. Turkey fit neatly within Britain’s 
array of Rimland states surrounding the Soviet Union. It seems as though the 
British were heeding Mackinder’s warning and seeking a counter to the threat. 
Any post-Lausanne thoughts of Kurdish independence were sacrificed to create 
a balance of power in Britain’s favor. While the British still granted Iraqi Kurds 
rights that Turkey denied its Kurds, the British were vigorous in stopping Kurdish 
nationalist momentum. The containment of riots surrounding the 1930 elections 
in Sulaymaniyah demonstrated these measures. The British wanted the Kurds to 
be active in Iraq, but as Iraqis, not exclusively as Kurds. British moderation with 
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Iraqi Kurds demonstrates the compromise between domestic politics of Iraq and 
the relations of the UK and Iraq with Turkey. 
 The British were readying Iraq for the end of its mandate and the Kingdom 
of Iraq’s admission into the League of Nations. Turkey was cooperating with this 
transition, and was also preparing to enter the League. Toward the end of 1931, 
treaty negotiations between Iraq and Turkey were going smoothly. The 
negotiations covered a range of issues from commerce to extradition,41 and led 
to an agreement for most-favored-nation treatment between Iraq and Turkey.42 
Both countries joined the League of Nations in 1932.43 The Turks grew more 
comfortable with Iraq’s measures to curb Kurdish nationalist activities from 
spilling across into Turkey, and viewed Assyrians in Iraq as a check on Kurds.44 
This was to cause sectarian violence between the Kurds and the Assyrians, in 
which the Kurds would ultimately triumph. 
In early January 1934, plans for a non-aggression pact among Turkey, 
Persia, Iraq, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan were being pursued.45 This may 
have appeared to London as though Moscow was attempting to pull the carpet 
from under the feet of the British. This move served to add to British paranoia 
toward the Soviets, as well as to motivate London’s strategy of blocking Moscow 
in the Rimland. 
 By the middle of November 1936, Turkey declared that there would be no 
disturbances to take place between it and the transition government in Iraq.46 
Ankara and Baghdad both perceived themselves to have a “Kurdish problem,” 
and peaceful relations would pave the way to cooperation on the matter in the 
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future. At this point, the Kurds had largely become marginalized from the regional 
agenda. Turkey had effectively silenced its Kurdish population. Iraq would still 
have difficulties with the Barzanis, but could contain those difficulties. 
 The Turks realized their position in the region, and no more wanted to be a 
pawn of the Soviet Union than to be at the mercy of the Europeans. Leadership 
in Ankara, particularly Kemal, wanted Turkey to stand on its own. They also 
wanted to shed any signs of “backwardness” from Turkey’s image, thus moving 
the country onto the level of more developed European states. Kemal and those 
around him carefully packaged the process as modernization rather than 
Westernization. All of this involved engaging with the Europeans and surrounding 
countries, including Iraq. It would not have served Turkey well to continue 
antagonistic relations with these states after obtaining the security and most of 
the territory they desired. 
 
The Rise of the Barzanis 
 In late March 1935, British officials met with Kurdish chiefs from Kirkuk, 
Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah, who were seeking to present to the Iraqi government a 
petition for reforms.47 The Kurdish petition listed several grievances (Appendix C) 
the chiefs wished to see rectified.48 Most of the demands were intended to 
improve economic and political opportunities for Kurds, but many also aimed to 
secure cultural rights and preservation of Kurdishness.49 While these grievances 
dealt with some Kurdish cultural issues, they were mostly pragmatic affairs 
involving development of the region and betterment of society.  
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 After the petition, the Kurdish chiefs did not seem to succeed in gaining 
anything definite from Baghdad, though discussions were ongoing among 
them.50 A deputation of aghas from Dauda, Jaf, Dizdai, and Talabani tribes came 
to Baghdad for a discussion of Kurdish candidates for the next election.51 These 
aghas frequently gathered at Sheikh Mahmoud's house, and Mahmoud was 
warned against any tribal activities.52 He heeded these warnings for the rest of 
his life. Pan-Iranian propaganda by the Persians was aimed at recruiting Kurds, 
but Kurds seemed unreceptive to the appeals.53 
 Another Kurdish nationalist leader emerged in Iraq in the sheikh of Barzan, 
Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, who held the allegiance of the Barzani tribe.54 The 
Barzanis included Kurds from other tribes who had sought protection within this 
powerful tribe.55 The Barzanis were considered outcasts because of their 
heterodox religious beliefs, and had been accused of having reverted back to 
paganism by mainstream Muslim Kurds.56 
 The RAF carried out aerial operations against Ahmed in April 1932. The 
British sought to bring the areas of Shirwan and Barzan under Iraqi control.57 
Ahmed agreed to cooperate with the British, but he did so only in word. The 
Kurdish attacks were demoralizing for the Iraqis, and Baghdad had requested 
intensive RAF operations against the Kurds. The planes were used initially to 
drop cease and desist proclamations from the air.58 Kurdish guerilla warfare 
ensued, and the RAF engaged the Kurds with aerial bombardment. Iraqi forces 
indiscriminately attacked Kurds and their property, and mistreated those Kurds 
who surrendered, creating further resentment by the Kurds toward Arab 
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authorities.59 
 By January 1933, British officials had come to view the Barzanis as a 
potential threat to Iraqi stability. Ahmed's brother Mohammad Sadiq was leading 
organized bands of rebels. However, the British felt the Turks had no reason to 
be alarmed at the moment, as Kurdistan was under massive snow cover.60 RAF 
operations during 1932 had largely quieted Iraq during the summer. However, 
Ahmed had refused to yield territories being brought under central control. British 
officials considered Ahmed a coward with few supporters, yet the RAF could not 
root out all of the rebels.61 While Ahmed did not have all of Iraqi Kurdistan on his 
side, he had enough to gain an enduring foothold for his family in the Kurdish 
nationalist struggle. Two of Ahmed’s brothers, Mohammad Sadiq and Mullah 
Mustafa, gathered followers near Barzan in March 1933.62 By May 1933, the 
situation had become so frustrating that the Iraqis sought Turkish cooperation 
against the Barzanis.63 
 In June 1933, RAF planes dropped copies of a proclamation and amnesty 
law on the Barzanis. This amnesty required them to report themselves to 
authorities and return to their homes within ten days. It also stipulated that the 
chiefs had to reside outside of the Barzan area. A report came that Sheikh 
Ahmed's brothers Sheikh Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa along with Oula Beg and 
Ahmed Nadir and around 100 forces had surrendered at Shirwan-i-Nazin Police 
Station for amnesty. The Ministry of Interior planned to furnish an agriculture 
grant for Barzanis.64 This was probably in hopes that they would take interest in 
tilling the earth and profiting from farming instead of fighting. However, by late 
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June, it became clear that the Ministry of Interior had assumed too much as the 
report that Barzanis had surrendered was proven to be false. The Barzanis had 
actually been guests of Subi Beg, Director-General of Police, where they had 
been negotiating an agreement.65 A surrender agreement was reached, though 
Sheikh Ahmed would be dealt with separately. Everyone amnestied was required 
to swear an oath of allegiance to the king of Iraq.66 The authorities in Baghdad 
were attempting to create a civic national identity akin to what Ankara had 
engineered, but the Iraqi Kurds had rights as Kurdish people and could not be 
forcibly assimilated. 
 According to British officials, several factors led to Ahmed’s surrender. The 
Barzanis were starving because Iraqi police were able to control supplies into the 
region.67 With large numbers suffering, the rebellion could not last. Sheikh 
Ahmed was pressured by the Turks to surrender. Ankara was sending forces to 
secure their side of the border, and to possibly conduct joint operations with 
Baghdad against Ahmed.68 The British observed, "The Iraqi Government on their 
side appear to have been only too glad to put a stop to the mountain guerilla 
warfare, as their troops and police are the kind that prefer to retreat from rather 
than march towards the sound of the guns."69 By late October 1934, the Barzani 
rebellion had been put down, and Ahmed returned to Iraq under watch of 
authorities. However, the British were wary that he was becoming too friendly 
with those authorities.70 Complete Iraqi security in the Barzan district was not 
achieved, and though the Barzanis were closely monitored the groundwork for 
further Kurdish nationalist struggle was established.  
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Dersim and Turkey’s Illusory Solution  
 By crushing the Kurds in the vicinity of Dersim (Figure 6.2), Ankara was 
demonstrating the lengths it would go to enforce the republic’s “Turkish identity.” 
The Kurds of Dersim were of the Alevi religious sect,71 and had long been known 
for their fierce sense of independence.72 Turkish authorities would not tolerate 
other identities, and would destroy them accordingly. Ankara had the reach to do 
so with modern military technologies such as airplanes, chemical weapons, and 
sophisticated small arms and artillery. Dersim was a demonstration that quieted 
the Kurdish areas of Turkey for decades. 
 In retaliation for the Mount Ararat rebellion, Ankara enacted a law on May 5, 
1932, divesting the Kurdish tribes of any legal standing.73 The Turkish 
government set out to completely erase Kurdish identity from Turkey by inventing 
a myth that the Kurds were really Turks that had lost their way.74 Turkish 
nationalist symbolism had by this time worked its way throughout society, and 
emblems began appearing on stamps and money.75 The Kemalists probably 
believed if it was repeated enough that Kurdish identity did not exist, then it 
would vanish. 
 It was also during this time that Kemal, now known by the honorific title 
Atatürk, created the division between the Turkish government and the military, 
thus intrusting the military to act as guardian of the republic.76 Acting as 
guardians, the Turkish military embarked upon a campaign to root out all 
elements and potential elements of Kurdish nationalism through mass  
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deportations of non-Turks, removal of Kurdish officials from within the 
government, and arrests of anyone suspected of Kurdish activism.77 Ankara 
continued to characterize Kurdish nationalists as religious reactionaries,78 thus 
also promoting Kemalist virtues of secularism with the anti-Kurdish agenda. 
 In Turkey’s East, Ankara had two problems: the status of Alexandretta 
(Iskanderun) and the Kurds in Dersim. Ankara was interested in incorporating 
Alexandretta, then under the French mandate of Syria, and surrounding lands 
because of its sizable Turkish population and its militarily and economically 
strategic position along a bay in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. 
The Turkish government was focused on Alexandretta as the French were 
readying Syria for independence in 1935. The Dersim Kurds may have decided 
to revolt while the Turks and the French in Syria quarreled over Alexandretta.79 
Ankara decided in 1935 to stamp out Dersim’s troublesome Kurds, and began 
preparing for major military operations there.80 The region around Dersim had a 
history of military operations against the Kurds with eleven since 1876.81 The 
region became its own vilayet, though it was in effect a military containment area. 
The Turkish government renamed the city and vilayet with the Turkish name 
Tunceli, thus erasing Kurdish identity from maps.82 The following year Ankara 
declared a state of siege in Tunceli and named a military governor, General 
Aptullah Alpdogan, who spent the year building roads and infrastructure to 
support military operations.83 When the Kurds attempted to negotiate with the 
general, he promptly had the Kurdish emissaries executed.84 This move 
provoked the Dersim Kurds into open rebellion, and allowed the Turks to proceed 
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with their campaign.85 This was the excuse Ankara had been waiting for to move 
on Dersim. 
 Military operations began in May 1937 after Kurds inflicted major casualties 
on Turks at Dersim.86 Airplanes were used to bomb Elaziz (Elazığ), a city 
perched across the valley from Dersim.87 Fighting intensified and more Turkish 
aircraft were called in. Three Kurdish villages were leveled, and one airplane was 
lost.88 In June 1937, a Turkish press correspondent published telegrams, which 
accused British spies of inciting the Dersim rebellion.89 Per the normal 
atmospherics, rumors and conspiracy theories had developed surrounding 
another Kurdish conflict. The press named the Kurdish chiefs involved as Hassan 
Mekki and Sayyid Riza.90 By July, it was reported that the uprising had been 
crushed and martial law was in force in Dersim.91 Sayyid Riza was still on the 
loose, but Ankara was already enacting a policy of assimilating Dersim’s Kurds 
by force.92 However, fighting continued around Dersim throughout the month. 
General Alpdogan was given a free hand to do as he saw fit.93 Reportedly, he 
regretted that there had been too much violence toward the Kurds in the past, 
and that was what led to these uprisings.94 According to that same report, he 
blamed the gendarmerie for unrest. Turkish casualties were higher than those of 
the Kurds because of snipers.95 
By November 1937, captured Kurdish leaders had been executed, 
including Riza. Others were being tried.96 Turkish General Aptullah Alpdogan 
remarked to British officials that Tunceli’s inhabitants were Turks, not Kurds, and 
of Central Asian stock, to which Lieutenant-Colonel Ross remarked, "This by no 
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means plausible theory is, of course, a convenient peg on which the Turks may 
hang the policy of nationalism."97 Ankara carried out deportations of Kurdish 
chiefs and suspected followers to other parts of Turkey. According to General 
Alpdogan, Turkish developmental plans were in the works, including dams and 
the creation of a "Little Switzerland" in southeastern Turkey.98 Eastern Turkey 
was silenced for several decades, but no “Little Switzerland” was created. The 
region remains the poorest in Turkey to the present. 
Ankara’s “solution” to its troubles with the Kurds ultimately led to the rise 
of a more violent and widespread movement under the Kurdistan Workers Party, 
or Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), which formed in 1978 and took up arms 
against the government in 1984.99 Turkey’s effort during the 1920s and 1930s to 
create a nation based on one civic identity may have appeared successful for a 
while, but it would not last. 
 
Prelude to World War II 
 By 1938, the region was becoming a hotbed for foreign intrigue, and the 
Kurds would be involved once again. Turkey kept its distance from the war as 
much as possible, and Kurdish nationalist currents within the country would 
remain silent until decades later. In Iraq, the Barzanis launched a rebellion during 
the war, only to be defeated and exiled in Iran where they would join Iranian 
Kurdish nationalists in the abortive Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic. While at 
the time considered by Kurds to be a triumph, the republic was a tool Moscow 
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would use to gain energy concessions from Iran. The Kurds were once again 
caught between empires and interests of outsiders. 
 The geopolitics of the region, especially the rivalry between the Soviet 
Union and the US and UK, overshadowed any effort for Kurdish independence 
from World War I until the Soviet dissolution. The move to contain the Heartland 
was also the move to maintain stability in the states that surrounded it. This 
directly impacted Kurdish nationalist and territorial ambitions. Relationships 
between the British, later the Americans, and the states of Turkey and Iraq 
trumped any would-be Kurdish state. Such a state would have created instability 
in the Rimland, thus opening a vacuum for Soviet interests. It was a delicate 
balance that the Turks walked, but they triumphed in maintaining their equilibrium 
in domestic and foreign policies for the continuation of their republic. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research has demonstrated that the geopolitical problems the Kurds 
faced in seeking Kurdish unity and independence were in large part 
encapsulated by the maneuvers of the British Empire and the Republic of Turkey 
and both states’ perception of threats from the Soviet Union. The Kurds had not 
been and were not united at the end of World War I, and the actions by the 
British and the Turks further complicated Kurdish convergence. Had it not been 
for the Sublime Porte’s maneuvering to begin with, the Ottoman Empire would 
not likely have thrown its lot with Germany against the Russian Empire and 
against the British Empire encroaching upon Egypt and Arabia. The Sublime 
Porte might have avoided the conflict altogether, thus putting off the question of 
Kurdish independence for the more distant future.  
The convergence of events that occurred following the war doomed a 
Kurdish state from becoming a reality by overtaking the issue as it had been 
presented at Sèvres. The document resulting from the Paris Peace Conference 
and maps associated with its idea of Kurdistan were symbolic in recognizing the 
Kurds as a people with a right to a homeland. The treaty was used as a rallying 
point for future Kurdish nationalist movements by reinforcing ideas of nationalism 
and territoriality. The sense of betrayal attached to the Treaty of Sèvres
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was profound, though at the time not all Kurds were concerned with obtaining 
independence. The interwar period was a time for mythology building for the 
Kurds. Stories of rebellions fought and foiled became inspirations for future 
political and armed struggles. 
 Disunity among Kurds because of competing locally oriented loyalties, in 
part a result of centuries of limited interaction among the pockets of Kurdish 
populations throughout the mountainous region, prevented a united front from 
emerging to accept the responsibility of a nation-state. The fast-paced 
geopolitical events in the region and in Europe closed the window on both the 
Kurds and other peoples from obtaining statehood, or even autonomy. Turkey’s 
reemergence as a regional player helped turn away the minds of the European 
powers and the League of Nations from sponsoring Kurdistan. Under British and 
French mandate systems the region was carved up among multiple new Arab 
majority states, but a landlocked Kurdish state became an unappealing prospect. 
Another important reason Kurdistan failed to become a state was the renewal of 
the Great Game between the British and the Soviets. Sir Halford Mackinder’s 
thesis regarding the potential power from the Heartland alarmed many British 
officials, notably Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, into a policy of containment 
toward communism and the spread of Soviet territorial projection toward warm 
water ports and resources of the coastal fringes of Asia, what Spykman later 
named the Rimland. Negative perceptions of the Soviets by London and Ankara 
factored heavily in their actions within the region. Both governments sensed that 
Moscow was undermining their authority among the general populations. The 
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Kurds themselves were divided, and efforts to create a united movement among 
the various groups were halting and short-lived. The British and the Turks took 
advantage of divisions among the Kurds to advance their agendas.  
Kurdistan’s location in a strategic corridor of the Middle East was 
important during the early twentieth century and remains so today. The land 
holds the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as well as agriculturally 
productive lands. The oilfields around Kirkuk are important to global petroleum 
consumers. However, Kurdistan is a landlocked area, despite propagandist 
cartographic attempts to give it outlets to the Mediterranean Sea and Persian 
Gulf. 
 The Great Game had been resolved when Britain reached détente with 
the Russian Empire in 1907, but Britain had no such agreement with the Soviet 
Union. Prior to the First World War, the British feared a repeat of the Indian 
Mutiny, this time instigated by German agitation of Muslims there. When the 
Ottoman Empire sided with Germany in the war, the British feared a proclamation 
of jihad by the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople would lead to a Pan-Islamic 
insurrection that would bring the British Empire to its knees. Though a number of 
such plots were attempted, the cataclysm never materialized. When the 
Bolsheviks took power in Russia and began campaigns of influence in the 
Caucasus and in the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the British fear of mass 
insurgency quickly rematerialized. This motivated the British to reexamine their 
geopolitical position and security. The Caucasus was a flashpoint and a gateway 
from Russia into Anatolia and the Middle East. Further aggravation of the British 
 255 
came when Kemal Atatürk began accepting aid from the Soviets. British fears 
were somewhat misplaced because Atatürk did not support the Soviets or their 
ideology, but he was more than happy to accept monetary and material 
assistance in his nationalist dreams for a Turkish republic when no other 
assistance was forthcoming. Kurdish leaders sought to be a bulwark against the 
Soviets in return for support of Kurdish nationalist aspirations against the Turks. 
Though this was an appealing idea to the British, they pursued a policy of non-
interference in Turkey’s internal issues. British support of the Greeks advancing 
from Smyrna (Izmir) had embarrassingly backfired and was on the minds of 
British decision makers. The stated British policy toward the Kurds was for an 
autonomous Kurdistan severed from Turkey. How this was to be achieved was 
vague; therefore, it was not a realistic policy but one of ideals. 
 Turkey provided the right balance for the region to keep the Soviet Union 
in check. The Turks controlled the Straits allowing the Soviets access to the 
Mediterranean and beyond when their ports outside the Black Sea were frozen. 
Ankara’s go between status would prove satisfactory to both the British and the 
Soviets, thus preventing unnecessary escalations in their rivalry in the region. 
Turkey would not become a Soviet adversary until after World War II. This was a 
long-term goal of the British to bring the Turks over to their side. 
Kurdish efforts to secure an independent Kurdistan failed because of their 
lack of cohesion and the overwhelming geopolitical forces surrounding the rise of 
Kurdish nationalism and territoriality. Kurdish movements and rebellions were 
fractious affairs that gained no serious momentum throughout Kurdistan. The 
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geopolitical setting involved a renewal of the Anglo-Russian competition known 
as the Great Game and the creation of Arab states and the rise of the Republic of 
Turkey from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Kurdistan, like Afghanistan, is a 
region that has been swept through by numerous invasions, but that no single 
force could maintain a hold upon. The Kurds had traditionally been able to 
defend mountainous strongholds through superior guerilla fighting methods. The 
introduction of the airplane against Kurdish rebellions enabled both the British 
and the Turks to quickly put down revolts that would have otherwise been costly 
to the governments in Iraq and Turkey and may ultimately have led to Kurdish 
independence. 
 The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres had a significant impact on Kurdish identity 
and political cohesion, but it was a constant theme among the political 
movements. The treaty became a symbol for Kurdish nationalists to remember 
and to denounce the powers involved as promise breakers. However, Kurdish 
nationalism was hampered by a lack of a clear direction. Had an agreed upon 
course been determined among Kurds, leadership would have emerged to unite 
a following moored together in confidence and purpose. Vague notions of an 
independent Kurdistan were enough to ignite rebellions, but how the rebels 
would obtain independence and build a state proved elusive. In the case of 
Kurdistan and several neighboring states, governments had been built atop 
previous governments or on institutions established by the British and the 
French, and backed by their militaries. The Kurds had no such sponsor. The 
French had no interest in the Kurds, as Syria and Lebanon only included small 
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Kurdish populations, and the British felt a Kurdish state would be more 
troublesome than to simply include Kurdish territory in Iraq.  
Kurdish political nationalism springs from several sources. The nations 
surrounding the Kurds such as the Armenians, Arabs, and Turks inspired the 
Kurds with their own movements. These movements had been inspired by 
European encouragement, and the Kurds had their own interactions with the 
British to lead them toward a nationalist path. Another source influencing 
nationalism was from the diaspora of Kurdish elite, especially from Paris and 
Istanbul. This last influence is demonstrated by the foundation of the Khoybun 
political party. The Kurds also had native sources for nationalism, what Smith 
calls ethnie and Hobsbawn calls proto-nationalism. These are elements of culture 
and history that provide feelings of kinship among a population. Prior to 
revolutions in communication these roots of Kurdish nationalism were limited. 
After World War I, these elements were enhanced by mythology to promote a 
greater sense of Kurdish identity among a wide group of Kurds. The sense of 
struggle was a powerful connection for Kurds divided among empires and, later, 
states. This helped Kurds define themselves by who they were not. 
 Fragmentation of Kurdish identity existed prior to World War I, but was 
enhanced by the political and territorial divisions instated following the Treaty of 
Lausanne. In many cases around the world, borders mean very little, and people 
are largely free to move back and forth between states. In the case of Turkey and 
Iraq, the physical geography precluded very much movement to begin with. 
Movement of pastoral Kurds between Turkey and Iran, however, was more 
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prevalent. The Kurds have been both blessed and cursed by the land they 
inhabit. Kurdistan was for centuries a place where armies passed through rather 
than occupied. Invaders found themselves at the mercy of Kurdish guerilla 
warfare if they stayed too long. The saying that the Kurds have “no friends but 
the mountains” rings true in this sense; they could rely on the terrain and their 
highly adapted mountain fighting skills to preserve their livelihoods for centuries. 
The terrain had proven an ally to the Kurds when they were threatened by 
outsiders, but it was a curse when the opportunity for independence came 
because the rugged mountains divided the Kurds into various groups with little 
communication among them. This lack of contact, along with differences in 
religious interaction, dialect, and tribal affiliations, crippled attempts to unite all 
corners of Kurdistan. Disunity prevented the Kurds from seizing their claim to 
independence, and led powers to abandon the Treaty of Sèvres’s provision for a 
Kurdistan as unpractical. Many including British Prime Minister David Lloyd-
George and American geographer Isaiah Bowman believed the Kurds were 
incapable of governing themselves. True or not, the perceptions of decision 
makers shaped the future of the region. 
 In Iraq, two Kurdish groups emerged to promote the nationalist cause, with 
one based out of the area of Sulaymaniyah and the other from the area of Arbil. 
These divisions endure to the present, though their rivalry is more a product of 
the 1970s than the interwar period. In both Turkey and Iraq, Kurdish nationalism 
contained an Islamic element, but as influence flowed from urban elites and the 
diaspora a more secular appeal emerged. Kurds involved in nationalist 
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movements in Turkey also realized they could not be overly selective of which 
Kurds were welcome and which were not. Desperation tended to create a 
cooperative environment among Kurdish nationalists, be they religious or not. 
 Kurds in both countries understood the Islamic tradition among the 
majority of their people, but also came to recognize the older religious traditions 
and the fact that the Kurdish people had held out against Arab-driven attempts at 
Islamic conquest for centuries. In their mountain strongholds the Kurds had been 
reluctant to adopt Islam. 
 The differences that emerged between competing Kurdish factions in Iraq 
and Turkey led to many differences in nationalism expressed by the groups. 
Efforts to bring as many people as could be defined as Kurds into a Kurdish 
identity resonated well with some but not with others. The different nationalisms 
are not based on country affiliation. In both Iraq and Turkey, there arose different 
movements often at odds with each other. The rival movements of Mahmoud and 
Ahmed demonstrate this type of competing nationalism. 
The fragile armistice with the Ottoman Empire led to negotiation of the 
Treaty of Sèvres. The Ottoman authorities were in no condition to bargain with 
the Allies, and the treaty’s conditions left very little territory for the Turkish people. 
The new maps of the region were devised to give the Ottoman Empire’s 
minorities states of their own. The Allied powers decided the Kurds were one of 
the larger minorities, and resided in a geopolitically strategic corridor in the 
empire’s east. Because the Kurds were legendary mountain fighters, the British 
viewed them as a valuable frontier buffer against Russia. The British viewed the 
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Armenians similarly, but realized Russian influence was greater among them. 
These plans were the ideals, not the practical solution to the postwar landscape. 
London thought it understood, through realism, what the best solution was for 
handling the postwar geopolitical reorganization of the region. They viewed the 
issue in the context of the Great Game and the continued economic success of 
their empire. Countering Soviet ambitions was more important to the British than 
providing a state where the Kurds would be free to rule themselves. 
Another problem contributing to Kurdish independence was that their 
demands were not fully articulated in the matter of the peace process. Only one 
delegate claiming to represent the Kurdish people was present at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Sharif Pasha was a Kurdish exile living in Paris, but he held 
limited influence in Kurdistan’s urbanites. However, he was favored by the Allies 
at the beginning of negotiations. The favor quickly waned, and Sharif lost his 
ability to influence decisions being made by the Allies. As a result, the status of 
Kurdistan was left to the Allies. The British, in particular, misunderstood the 
problems emerging from including multiple peoples in states where one people 
was to dominate. The cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire, in which multiple 
peoples lived in relative peace, was dead. Both Iraq and Turkey embodied new, 
exclusionary states. Identities apart from that of those in power were either 
accorded a diminished role or none at all. 
The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres impacted the Kurds by putting the concept of 
Kurdistan as a nation-state into the minds of Kurdish nationalists. The problem 
with this concept was that there was no strong unified movement by the Kurds 
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with this end in mind. The Kurds were fractured and often at odds with one 
another. Many Kurdish leaders may have believed that the idea presented by the 
Great Powers was set in stone and left to be executed by the Kurds. Agreements 
are not absolute and are especially problematic when they must overcome 
conflicting territorial claims and strategic concerns. 
Despite the failure of a Kurdish state, the idea remained within the minds 
of various Kurdish leaders as a goal and a motivation for their struggles and 
abilities to rally followers. Evolution of Kurdish tribal politics into a party system 
came at a later period than the focus of this study, but the difficulties faced by 
Kurdish nationalists between world wars made the pursuit of a Kurdish state a 
worthwhile and honorable cause given the sacrifices made. 
It is not likely that a single source sparked Kurdish nationalism, and it is 
more appropriate to declare that the combination of forces served as a catalyst 
for the movements that followed World War I. Though the movements were 
unsuccessful at uniting the Kurdish people and in obtaining an independent 
homeland, these movements inspired later efforts that persist to the present. 
Perhaps it will be the case that these early efforts demonstrate to the present and 
future nationalists how to learn from past mistakes and how to finesse rights and 
territory in the future. 
The reason why the British disallowed an independent Kurdistan was that 
circumstances changed regarding British relations with Turkey. The Turks had 
been quick to rise and reassert their control of the eastern reaches of Anatolia. 
This unexpected event was coupled with a Turkish alliance with the Soviet Union, 
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and ultimately led the British to reconsider Kurdistan. The Kurds living in the 
Mosul vilayet were disconnected from those in Anatolia geographically and 
economically. These factors led influential British figures such as Sir Percy Cox 
and Gertrude Bell to advocate southern Kurdistan’s attachment to Iraq. Cox was 
able to convince Winston Churchill to make it so. As noted in a later article on the 
potential of the Middle East to splinter along enthnonational lines in the coming 
decades, Winston Churchill recognized that including the Kurds in Iraq was one 
of his “worst mistakes.”1 By the time the mistake of disallowing Kurdish statehood 
was realized, it was far too late for the British to change course. 
The Turks disallowed Kurdish statehood because they believed the Kurds 
to be essential to their new Turkish republic. The Kurds are a largely Islamic 
people, provided large numbers of laborers and soldiers, and possessed lands 
rich in resources and important to the political security of Turkey. Some within the 
Turkish government attempted a new identity for the Kurds as “Mountain Turks” 
in an effort to cloud the past and recast the Kurds as Turks, thus making Turkey 
a solid nation-state. The Turks used the Soviet Union as a financial ally in the 
absence of other friends. Once the West seemed ready to welcome Turkey into 
its midst, Turkey began to detach itself from Moscow’s orbit. Another factor 
motivating Ankara was Moscow’s clandestine activities among Turkey’s worker 
populations. 
The Kurds were left with few options given the turn of events. International 
recognition of the Kurds as a people deserving of a state of their own died with 
the Treaty of Sèvres. Though some Kurdish representation sought forum with the 
 263 
League of Nations, the two most immediate courses of action were rebellion or 
participation in politics. The latter option involved pretense of being a Turk in the 
case of Turkey. Kurds there were not excluded from politics, but the Kurdish 
identity was. The Turkish government attempted to deny the existence of the 
Kurds by creating an improbable history that Kurds are really wayward Turks. 
This scheme was attacked in the West, especially by the British, as shameful and 
amateurish. One of the most biting critics of the Turkish policy on Kurdish identity 
was Lord Curzon, who at the Lausanne Conference chided the Turkish 
representatives on their “discoveries.”2 Ankara’s denial of Kurdish identity would 
haunt the Kurds until the early 1990s when Turkish President Turgut Özal, 
himself of partial Kurdish descent,3 publicly stated that the Kurds were one of 
Turkey’s peoples.4 
The Kurds of Iraq and Turkey have endured difficult times under hostile 
governments. The situation has changed dramatically for what seems the better 
for Kurdish people in Iraq over the past two decades. In Turkey as well, the 
situation has changed from denial to hesitant recognition. Some authorities there 
still fear that any reconciliation between Ankara and Kurdish identity will unravel 
the republic. In both countries, the Kurds are well aware of the sacrifices, 
missteps, and legends born of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish dreams 
of independence will likely persist through the twenty-first century, and may 
eventually begat a reality. 
                                                
1 Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2008. After Iraq. The Atlantic 301 (1): 71-72. 
2 Ali, Othman. 1997. The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-23. Middle Eastern 
Studies 33 (3): 521-522. 
 264 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Randal, Jonathan C. 1997. After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness?: My Encounters with 
Kurdistan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 281-282. 
 
4 Aral, Berdal. 2001. Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politiics and International Society during 
the Özal Decade, 1983-1993. Middle Eastern Studies 37 (1):72-88. 
 
 
 265 
REFERENCES 
Ahmad, Kamal Madhar. 1994. Kurdistan During the First World War. Translated 
by A. M. Ibrahim. London: Saqi Books. 
 
Ali, Othman. 1993. British Policy and the Kurdish Question in 'Iraq, 1918-1932, 
Department of Middle East and Islamic Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto. 
 
———. 1997. The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-23. Middle 
Eastern Studies 33 (3): 521-534. 
 
———. 1997. Southern Kurdistan During the Last Phase of Ottoman Control: 
1839-1914. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17 (2): 283-291 
 
Allied and Associated Powers, (1914-1920). 1924. The Treaties of Peace, 1919-
1923. Vol. 2. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. New York: Verso. 
 
Aral, Berdal. 2001. Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politiics and International 
Society during the Özal Decade, 1983-1993. Middle Eastern Studies 37 (1): 72-
88. 
 
Atarodi, Habibollah. 2003. Great Powers, Oil and the Kurds in Mosul. Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America. 
 
Beck, Peter. 1981. 'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the 
Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926. Middle Eastern Studies 17: 256-
276. 
 
Bell, Gertrude. 1927. The Letters of Gertrude Bell, Selected and Edited by Lady 
Bell. Vol. 2. New York: Boni and Liveright. 
 
Bialer, Uri. 1983. Telling the Truth to the People: Britain's Decision to Publish the 
Diplomatic Papers of the Inter-War Period. The Historical Journal 26 (2): 349-
367. 
 
 266 
Bidwell, Robin, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and 
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 1 The End of the War, 
1918-1920, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, 
Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 2 The Allies Take Control, 1920-
1921, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 3 The Turkish Revival, 1921-1923, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 4 The Expansion of Ibn Saud, 
1922-1925, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, 
Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 5 The Syrian Revolt, 1925-1927, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 6 Eastern Affairs, Jan. 1928-June 
1930, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Fredrick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 7 Eastern Affairs, June 1930-June 
1932, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 8 Eastern Affairs, Dec. 1931-June 
1933, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 9 Eastern Affairs, June 1933-May 
1934, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America. 
 
 267 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 10 Eastern Affairs, Dec. 1933-
June 1935, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, 
Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 11 Eastern Affairs, June 1935-
Dec. 1936, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, 
Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 12 Eastern Affairs, June 1936-
June 1938, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, 
Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 13 Eastern Affairs, Dec. 1937-
Sept. 1939, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, 
Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 20 Persia V: The End of the 
Qajars, Nov. 1924-Dec. 1925, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. 
Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 23 Persia VIII: Apr. 1928-May 
1929, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 24 Persia IX: May 1929-July 1930, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 25 Persia X: July 1930-Dec. 1931, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 29 Turkey, Aug. 1922-July 1923, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
 268 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 30 Turkey, July 1923-Mar. 1927, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 31 Turkey, Mar. 1927-Dec. 1929, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 32 Turkey, Jan. 1930-Dec. 1932, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 33 Turkey, Dec. 1932-Nov. 1935, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 34 Turkey Turkey, Jan. 1936-Dec. 
1937, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America. 
 
———, ed. 1985. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 35 Turkey, Jan. 1938-Dec. 1939, 
Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East. Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America. 
 
Blacksell, Mark. 2006. Political Geography. New York: Routledge. 
 
Bowman, Isaiah. 1921. The New World: Problems in Political Geography. New 
York: World Book Company. 
 
———. 1926. The New World: Problems in Political Geography. 3 ed. New York: 
World Book Company. 
 
———. 1928. The New World: Problems in Political Geography. 4 ed. New York: 
World Book Company. 
 
Blouet, Brian. 2001. Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century. 
London: Reaktion Books. 
 
 269 
Bozarslan, Hamit. 2003. Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to 
Rebellion (1919-1925). In Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, edited 
by A. Vali. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda. 
 
Catherwood, Christopher. 2004. Churchill's Folly: How Winston Churchill Created 
Moder Iraq. New York: Carroll and Graf. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. 1986. Kurdish Areas in the Middle East and the 
Soviet Union. Washington, DC. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. 2002. Eastern Turkey and Vicinity. Washington, DC. 
 
Chaliand, Gerard. 1993. A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. 
New York: Olive Branch Press. 
 
Cruz, Consuelo. 2000. Identity and Persuasion: How Nations remember Their 
Pasts and Make Their Futures. World Politics 52 (3): 275-312. 
 
Culcasi, Karen. 2006. Cartographically constructing Kurdistan within geopolitical 
and orientalist discourses. Political Geography 25: 680-706. 
 
Cuthell, David. 2004. A Kemalist Gambit: A View of the Political Negotiations in 
the Determination of the Turkish-Iraqi Border. In The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, 
edited by R. Simon. and E. Tejirian. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Dahlman, Carl. 2002. The Political Geography of Kurdistan. Eurasian Geography 
and Economics 43 (4): 271-299. 
 
Dastani, Bejtullah, ed. 2006. Minorities in the Middle East: Kurdish Communities, 
1918-1974. Vol. 1: 1918-1930. Chippenham, United Kingdom: Archive Editions. 
 
———, ed. 2006. Minorities in the Middle East: Kurdish Communities, 1918-
1974. Vol. 2: 1931-1940. Chippenham, United Kingdom: Archive Editions. 
 
Dibble, Vernon. 1963. Four Types of Inference from Documents to Events. 
History and Theory 3 (2): 203-221. 
 
Dockrill, Michael, ed. 1991. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and 
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Vol. 11: The Turkish 
Settlement and the Middle East; the Far East, Part II: From the First to the 
Second World War Seires I: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Frederick, 
Maryland: University Publications of America. 
 
Dodge, Toby. 2003. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History 
Denied. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
 270 
Edmonds, C.J. 1971. Kurdish Nationalism. Journal of Contemporary History 6 
(1): 87-97, 99-107. 
 
Entessar, Nader. 1989. The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord. Third World Quarterly 11 
(4): 83-100. 
 
———.1992. Kurdish Ethnonationalism. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc. 
 
Eskander, Saad. 2000. Britain's Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The Formation and 
the termination of the First Kurdish Government, 1918-1919. British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 27 (2): 139-163. 
 
———. 2001. Southern Kurdistan under Britain's Mesopotamian Mandate: From 
Separation to Incorporation, 1920-23. Middle Eastern Studies 37 (2): 153-180. 
 
Fieldhouse, D.K., ed. 2002. Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace 
Lyon in Iraq, 1918-44. New York: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Fromkin, David. 1989. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Owl Books. 
 
———. 2004. Britain, France, and the Diplomatic Agreements. In The Creation of 
Iraq, 1914-1921, edited by R. Simon and E. Tejirian. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Fuccaro, Nalida. 2003. Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism in Mandatory Syria: 
Politics, Culture and Identity. In Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, 
edited by A. Vali. Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers. 
 
Geertz, Clifford. 1994. Primordial and Civic Ties. In Nationalism, edited by J. 
Hutchinson and A. D. Smith. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
———. 1996. Primordial Ties. In Ethnicity, edited by J. Hutchinson and A. D. 
Smith. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Geographical Review. 1923. Geographical Elements in the Turkish Situation: A 
Note on the Political Map. Geographical Review 13 (1): 122-129. 
 
Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2008. After Iraq. The Atlantic 301 (1): 68-79. 
 
Goldstein, Erik. 2002. The First World War Peace Settlements, 1919-1925. 
London: Longman. 
 271 
 
Gottmann, Jean. 1942. The Background of Geopolitics. Military Affairs 6 (4): 197-
206. 
 
———. 1951. Geography and International Relations. World Politics 3 (2): 153-
173. 
 
Gruen, George. 2004. The Oil Resources of Iraq: Their Role in the Policies of the 
Great Powers. In The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921, edited by R. Simon and E. 
Tejirian. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Gunter, Michael. 1990. The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press. 
 
———. 1997. The Kurds and the Future of Turkey. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
 
Hale, William. 2002. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000. London: Frank Cass. 
 
Harris, Cole. 2001. Archival Fieldwork. Geographical Review 91 (1 and 2): 328-
334. 
 
Hartshorne, Richard. 1950. The Functional Approach to Political Geography. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 40 (2): 95-130. 
 
Helmreich, Paul. 1974. From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman 
Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920. Columbus: The Ohio State 
University Press. 
 
Hofmann, Tessa and Gerayer Koutcharian. 1986. The History of Armenian-
Kurdish Relations in the Ottoman Empire. Armenian Review 39 (4): 1-46. 
 
Hopkirk, Peter. 1994. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. 
New York: Kodansha. 
 
———. 1994. Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire. New 
York: Kodansha. 
 
———. 1995. Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia. New 
York: Kodansha. 
 
Hoxie, R.F. 1906. Historical Method vs. Historical Narrative. The Journal of 
Political Economy 14 (9): 568-572. 
 
Huntington, Ellsworth. 1907. The Anglo-Russian Agreement as to Tibet, 
Afghanistan, and Persia. Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 39 (11): 
653-658. 
 272 
 
Ingram, Edward. 1979. The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828-1834. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Izady, Mehrdad. 1992. The Kurds: A Concise Handbook. Bristol, Pennsylvania: 
Taylor & Francis. 
 
———. 2004. Kurds and the Formation of the State of Iraq, 1917-1932. In The 
Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, edited by R. Simon and E. Tejirian. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
James, Lawrence. 1994. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. New York: St. 
Martin's Griffin. 
 
Jwaideh, Wadie. 2006. The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and 
Development. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Kendal. 1993. Kurdistan in Turkey. In A People Without a Country: The Kurds 
and Kurdistan, edited by G. Chaliand. New York: Olive Branch Press. 
 
Klein, Janet. 2002. Power in the Periphery: The Hamidiye Light Cavalry and the 
Struggle over Ottoman Kurdistan, 1890-1914, The Department of Near Eastern 
Studies, Princeton Universtiy, Princeton. 
 
Knight, David B. 1982. Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on 
Nationalism and Regionalism. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 72 (4): 514-531. 
 
Lattimore, Owen. 1953. The New Political Geography of Inner Asia. The 
Geographical Journal 119 (1): 17-30. 
 
Lewis, Bernard. 1968. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Lloyd, H.I. 1926. The Geography of the Mosul Boundary. Geographical Journal 
68 (2): 104-113. 
 
Lloyd-George, David. 1939. Memoirs of the Peace Conference. Vol. II. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Mackinder, Halford. 1887. On the Scope and Methods of Geography. 
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of 
Geography 9 (3): 141-174. 
 
———. 1904. The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal 23 
(4): 421-437. 
 273 
 
———. 1919. Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of 
Reconstruction. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
 
MacMillan, Margaret. 2003. Paris 1919. New York: Random House. 
 
Mango, Andrew. 1999. Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey. 
New York: The Overlook Press. 
 
Martin, Geoffrey and Preston James. 1993. All Possible Worlds: A History of 
Gegoraphical Ideas. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Martin, Lawrence. 1920. Map showing the boundaries of Armenia as awarded by 
President Wilson. Washington, DC: United States Department of State. 
 
Marx, Anthony. 2002. The Nation-State and Its Exclusions. Political Science 
Quarterly 117 (1): 103-126. 
 
McDowall, David. 1996. A Modern History of the Kurds. New York: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Meinig, Donald W. 1956. Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History. The 
Western Political Quarterly 9 (3): 553-569. 
 
Meyer, Karl and Shareen Blair-Brysac. 1999. Tournament of Shadows: The 
Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia. Washington, DC: 
Counterpoint. 
 
Murphy, Alexander B. 1989. Territorial Policies in Multiethnic States. 
Geographical Review 79 (4): 410-421. 
 
———. 1990. Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 80 (4): 531-548. 
 
Natali, Denise. 2005. The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, 
Turkey, and Iran. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. 
 
O'Shea, Maria Theresa. 2004. Trapped Between the Map and Reality: 
Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan. New York: Routledge. 
 
Olson, Robert. 1989. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh 
Said Rebellion, 1880-1925. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
———. 1990-1991. The Churchill-Cox Correspondence Regarding the Creation 
of the State of Iraq: Consequences for British Policy Towards the Nationalist 
Turkish Government, 1921-1923. International Journal of Turkish Studies 5: 121-
136. 
 274 
 
———. 1991. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion, 1880-1925. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
———. 2000. The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), 
and Dersim (1937-38): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force 
and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism. Die Welt des Islams New Series., 40 
(1): 67-94. 
 
Olson, Robert and William Tucker. 1978. The Sheikh Sait Rebellion in Turkey 
(1925): A Study in the Consolidation of a Developed Uninstitutionalized 
Nationalism and the Rise of Incipient (Kurdish) Nationalism. Die Welt des Islams 
18 (3/4): 195-211. 
 
Otucu, Filiz. 2004. Severe Ethnic Violence: An Integrated Explanation of the 
Turkish-Kurdish Case, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 
Lexington. 
 
Özoğlu, A. Hakan. 1997. Unimaginable Community: Nationalism and Kurdish 
Notables in the Late Ottoman Era, Department of History, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus. 
 
Palmer, Alan. 1994. The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. New York: 
Barnes and Noble. 
 
Parker, William. 1982. Mackinder - Geography as an Aid to Statecraft. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Pasha, General Sharif. 1919. Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People. 
Paris: Imprimerie A.G. L’Hoir. 
 
Pasha, Sharif. 2001. Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People, General 
Sherif Pasha, President of the Kurd Delegation to the Peace Conference, Paris, 
March 22nd, 1919. The International Journal of Kurdish Studies 15 (1 and 2): 
130-136. 
 
Pasley, Kaye. 1998. The Collapse of British Imperialism in Turkey, 1919-1923, 
Department of History, Mississippi State University, Mississippi State. 
 
Perkins, Reverend Justin. 1843. "Portions of Turkey and Persia" in A Residence 
of Eight Years in Persia, Among the Nestorians; with Notices of the 
Muhammedans. Andover, United Kingdom: Allen, Morrill and Wardwell. 
 
Polk, William. 2005. Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from 
Genghis Khan's Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the 
American Occupation. New York: HarperCollins. 
 275 
 
Preston, Zoe. 2003. The Crystallization of the Iraqi State: Geopolitical Function 
and Form. New York: Peter Lang. 
 
Prior, Lindsay. 2004. Following in Foucault's Footsteps: Text and Context in 
Qualitative Research. In Approaches to Qualitative Research, edited by S. 
Hesse-Biber and P. Leavy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Randal, Jonathan C. 1997. After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness?: My 
Encounters with Kurdistan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
Rothwell, V.H. 1970. Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914-1918. The 
Historical Journal 13 (2): 273-294. 
 
Royal Geographical Society. 1911. Turkey in Asia: Sketch Map of Dersim. 
London. 
 
Rubin, Michael. 2003. Are Kurds a Pariah Minority? Social Research 70 (1): 295-
330. 
 
Sack, Robert. 1983. Human Territoriality: A Theory. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 73 (1): 55-74. 
 
Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Shields, Sarah. 2004. Mosul Questions: Economy, Identity, and Annexation. In 
The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, edited by R. Simon and E. Tejirian. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Simon, Reeva and Eleanor Tejirian, ed. 2004. The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Sinnott, Peter. 2004. Russia from Empire to Revolution: The Illusion of the 
Emerging Nation State in the South Caucasus and Beyond. In The Creation of 
Iraq, 1914-1921, edited by R. Simon and E. Tejirian. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Smith, Anthony D. 1987. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New York: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
———. 1996. Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and 
Nationalism. International Affairs 72 (3): 445-458. 
 
Spykman, Nicholas. 1944. The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Company. 
 
 276 
Tejirian, Eleanor. 2004. The United States, the Ottoman Empire, and the Postwar 
Settlement. In The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921, edited R. Simon and E. Tejirian. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Watts, Nicole. 2001. Routes to Ethic Resistance: Virtual Kurdistan West and the 
Transformation of Kurdish Politics in Turkey, Interdisciplinary Program in Near 
and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Washington, Seattle. 
 
Wilson, Woodrow. 1985. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 45. Edited by A. 
S. Link. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2001. Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism 
in Turkey. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7 (3): 1-24. 
 
 
 277 
APPENDICES 
 278 
APPENDIX A 
Excerpts from THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND 
ASSOCIATED POWERS  
AND TURKEY 
SIGNED AT SÈVRES 
AUGUST 10, 1920 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN, 
These Powers being described in the present Treaty as the Principal Allied 
Powers; 
ARMENIA, BELGIUM, GREECE, THE HEDJAZ, POLAND, PORTUGAL, 
ROUMANIA, THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE AND CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, 
These Powers constituting, with the Principal Powers mentioned above, the 
Allied Powers, of the one part; 
AND TURKEY, 
of the other part; 
Whereas on the request of the Imperial Ottoman Government an Armistice was 
granted to Turkey on October 30, 1918, by the Principal Allied Powers in order 
that a Treaty of Peace might be concluded, and 
Whereas the Allied Powers are equally desirous that the war in which certain 
among them were successively involved, directly or indirectly, against Turkey, 
and which originated in the declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, I914, by 
the former Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, and in the 
hostilities opened by Turkey against the Allied Powers on October 29, 1914, and 
conducted by Germany in alliance with Turkey, should be replaced by a firm, just 
and durable Peace, 
________________________________________________________________ 
SECTION III. 
KURDISTAN. 
ARTICLE 62. 
A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members 
appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft 
within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of 
local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, 
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south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, 
and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in 
Article 27, II (2) and (3). If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be 
referred by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments. 
The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-
Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with 
this object a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and 
Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what 
rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where, under the 
provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia. 
ARTICLE 63. 
The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of 
both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from their 
communication to the said Government. 
ARTICLE 64. 
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish 
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the 
Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of 
the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the 
Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence 
and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to 
execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these 
areas. 
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate 
agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. 
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the 
Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish 
State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been 
included in the Mosul vilayet. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Excerpts from TREATY OF PEACE WITH TURKEY SIGNED AT LAUSANNE  
JULY 24, 1923  
THE CONVENTION RESPECTING THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS AND 
OTHER INSTRUMENTS SIGNED AT LAUSANNE 
 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, GREECE, ROUMANIA and 
the SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE,  
of the one part,  
and TURKEY,  
of the other part; Being united in the desire to bring to a final close the state of 
war which has existed in the East since 1914,  
Being anxious to re-establish the relations of friendship and commerce which are 
essential to the mutual well-being of their respective peoples,  
And considering that these relations must be based on respect for the 
independence and sovereignty of States,  
Have decided to conclude a Treaty for this purpose, and have appointed as their 
Plenipotentiaries:  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, 
EMPEROR OF INDIA: 
The Right Honourable Sir Horace George Montagu Rumbold, Baronet, G.C.M.G., 
High Commissioner at Constantinople;  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: 
General Maurice Pelle, Ambassador of France, High Com missioner of the 
Republic in the East, Grand Officer of the National Order of the Legion of 
Honour;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY: 
The Honourable Marquis Camillo Garroni, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador 
of Italy, High Commissioner at Constantinople, Grand Cross of the Orders of 
Saints Maurice and Lazarus, and of the Crown of Italy;  
M. Giulio Cesare Montagna, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at 
Athens, Commander of the Orders of Saints Maurice and Lazarus, Grand Officer 
of the Crown of Italy;  
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HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN: 
Mr. Kentaro Otchiai, Jusammi, First Class of the Order of the Rising Sun, 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HELLENES: 
M. Eleftherios K. Veniselos, formerly President of the Council of Ministers, Grand 
Cross of the Order of the Saviour;  
M. Demetrios Caclamanos, Minister Plenipotentiary at London, Commander of 
the Order of the Saviour;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROUMANIA: 
M. Constantine I. Diamandy, Minister Plenipotentiary;  
M. Constantine Contzesco, Minister Plenipotentiary;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, THE CROATS AND THE 
SLOVENES: 
Dr. Miloutine Yovanovitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at 
Berne;  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY: 
Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy for Adrianople; Dr. Riza Nour 
Bey, Minister for Health and for Public Assistance, Deputy for Sinope;Hassan 
Bey, formerly Minister, Deputy for Trebizond;  
Who, having produced their full powers, found in good and due orm, have agreed 
as follows:  
 ______________________________________________________________ 
SECTION I. 
I. TERRITORIAL CLAUSES. 
ARTICLE 3.  
From the Mediterranean to the frontier of Persia, the frontier of Turkey is laid 
down as follows:  
(I ) With Syria:  
The frontier described in Article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th 
October, 1921  
(2) With Iraq:  
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The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement 
to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.  
In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments 
within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the 
League of Nations.  
The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the 
decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other 
movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of 
the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.  
________________________________________________________________ 
SECTION II . 
NATIONALITY. 
ARTICLE 30. 
Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become ipso facto, 
in the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State to which such 
territory is transferred.  
ARTICLE 31.  
Persons over eighteen years of age, losing their Turkish nationality and obtaining 
ipso facto a new nationality under Article 30, shall be entitled within a period of 
two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty to opt for Turkish 
nationality.  
ARTICLE 32.  
Persons over eighteen years of age, habitually resident in territory detached from 
Turkey in accordance with the present Treaty, and differing in race from the 
majority of the population of such territory shall, within two years from the coming 
into force of the present Treaty, be entitled to opt for the nationality of one of the 
States in which the majority of the population is of the same race as the person 
exercising the right to opt, subject to the consent of that State.  
ARTICLE 33.  
Persons who have exercised the right to opt in accordance with the provisions of 
Articles 31 and 32 must, within the succeeding twelve months, transfer their 
place of residence to the State for which they have opted.  
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They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the other 
State where they had their place of residence before exercising their right to opt.  
They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export 
or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of 
such property.  
ARTICLE 34.  
Subject to any agreements which it may be necessary to conclude between the 
Governments exercising authority in the countries detached from Turkey and the 
Governments of the countries where the persons concerned are resident, Turkish 
nationals of over eighteen years of age who are natives of a territory detached 
from Turkey under the present Treaty, and who on its coming into force are 
habitually resident abroad, may opt for the nationality of the territory of which 
they are natives, if they belong by race to the majority of the population of that 
territory, and subject to the consent of the Government exercising authority 
therein. This right of option must be exercised within two years from the coming 
into force of the present Treaty.  
ARTICLE 35.  
The Contracting Powers undertake to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise 
of the right which the persons concerned have under the present Treaty, or under 
the Treaties of Peace concluded with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria or Hungary, or 
under any Treaty concluded by the said Powers, other than Turkey, or any of 
them, with Russia, or between themselves, to choose any other nationality which 
may be open to them.  
ARTICLE 36.  
For the purposes of the provisions of this Section, the status of a married woman 
will be governed by that of her husband, and the status of children under 
eighteen years of age by that of their parents.  
SECTION III. 
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. 
ARTICLE 37. 
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be 
recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official 
action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, 
regulation, nor official action prevail over them.  
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ARTICLE 38.  
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life 
and liberty to ali inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, 
language, race or religion.  
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or 
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be 
incompatible with public order and good morals.  
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, 
subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all 
Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for 
national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.  
ARTICLE 39.  
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil 
and political rights as Moslems.  
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before 
the law.  
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish 
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for 
instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the 
exercise of professions and industries.  
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any 
language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in 
publications of any kind or at public meetings.  
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be 
given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own 
language before the Courts.  
ARTICLE 40.  
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, 
they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own 
expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other 
establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own 
language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.  
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ARTICLE 41.  
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns 
and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are 
resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the 
instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the 
medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish 
Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the 
said schools.  
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish 
nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured 
an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be 
provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for 
educational, religious, or charitable purposes.  
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the 
establishments and institutions concerned.  
ARTICLE 42.  
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, 
in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the 
settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.  
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of 
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the 
minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish 
Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement 
an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.  
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, 
synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-
mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious 
foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities 
at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the 
formation of new religious and charitable institu- tions, any of the necessary 
facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.  
ARTICLE 43.  
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to 
perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious 
observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their 
refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly 
day of rest.  
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This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such 
obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the 
preservation of public order.  
ARTICLE 44.  
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-
Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of 
international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of 
Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the 
Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan 
hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles 
which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of 
Nations.  
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall 
have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of 
infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take 
such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the 
circumstances.  
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of 
fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of 
the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the 
League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character 
under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish 
Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party 
thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force 
and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.  
ARTICLE 45.  
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem 
minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority 
in her territory.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
List of Kurdish Grievances Presented to the Iraqi Government, March 1935 
1. Improvement of the administration of the northern areas and abolishment of 
the Regulations for Selection of Administrative Officials as regards the north. 
2. Enforcement of the Local Languages Law and its amendment as 
recommended by Amin Zaki Beg. 
3. Unification of education in Kurdish areas and the grant of greater authority to 
the Mudir education in the north and a share of the education budget in 
proportion to the population. 
4. Opening of a secondary school, teachers' training college and a technical 
school in the northern area. 
5. Granting a fair share of educational missions to the Kurds. 
6. Allotment of a share of night schools, as in the capital, to Kurds in proportion to 
their numbers. 
7. Reappointment of a Kurdish Assistant Director-General of Interior, who should 
be a capable Kurd and should be granted wide powers by special regulations.  
8. Granting to the Kurds of a share in proportion with their numbers of 
appointments in headquarters of Ministries, central offices and the Palace. 
9. Formation of a liwa from the Kurdish qadhas in the liwa of Mosul with its 
headquarters at Dohuk. 
10. Granting of opportunity to the inhabitants of the northern areas for the 
election of Deputies who have true connexion with the distict and are natives of 
it. 
11. Instructions in Kurdish history in Kurdish schools. 
12. Improvement in afforestation, fruit culture and tobacco cultivation by the 
appointment of specialists and the opening of foreign markets, such 
arrangements no to bedetrimental to merchants or cultivators. 
13. Amendment of the capital works programme to include the following 
projects:-- 
 (a) Water project Qarajun and Gobal in the Liwa of Arbil. 
 (b) The Zab project in the Liwa of Kirkuk. 
 (c) Artesian well projects in the Kirkuk and Arbil Liwas. 
(d) Prolongation of the road from Penjwin to the Persian frontier and 
arrangements of transit trade thereby. 
(e) Opening of a road between headquarters of Sulaimani Liwa and that of 
Sharbazher Qadha. 
(f) Completion of the road Surdash-Rania. 
 (g) Improvement of the road Arbil-Koi Sanjak and its extension to Rania. 
 (h) Opening of a road from Kirkuk to Koi-Sanjak via Shuan. 
 (j) Opening of a road from Sulaimani to Qara Dagh via Qara Dagh. 
(k) Opening of a road between Aqra and Barzan and its extension to meet 
the Arbil-Rowanduz road. 
14. Preparation for settlement of the Jaf, Herki and other nomad tribes. 
15. Appointment of doctors to headquarters of qadhas and important nahiyas and 
increase dispensaries, permanent and mobile."1 
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1 Bidwell, Robin, ed. 1985. Doc. 273 14806/122(i) Petition Kurdish Leaders n.d. Reforms, In 
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential 
Print. Vol. 10 Eastern Affairs, Dec. 1933-June 1935, Pt. II Series B. Turkey, Iran, and the Middle 
East. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 431. 
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